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Abstract
This thesis explores causal attribution statements on performance outcomes given
in annual reports of UK listed ﬁrms. The objectives are three-fold. First, it analy-
ses the nature and extent of attribution statements provided. Second, it explores
corporate governance factors and ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics that are related to the
provision of attribution statements. Finally, it investigates the economic consequences
of providing attribution statements by examining their association with the ﬁrm's cost
of equity capital.
Using data drawn from a sample of 142 UK ﬁrms listed on the London Stock
Exchange, content analysis was used to measure the extent of attributions in the
annual reports for the year 2006. The results show that the volume of attribution
statement provision is generally low and variation across ﬁrms is low. Firms also show
a strong tendency to explain performance with internal rather than with external
reasons. The results from regression analysis show that the volume of attribution
statements and the space given to internal and external attribution statements is
associated with the proportion of non-executive directors, director share ownership,
audit committee size, market value, gearing, proﬁtability and new share issues.
With respect to the relationship between the attribution statements and the cost
of capital, the PEG model was employed to estimate the cost of equity capital. The
ﬁndings indicate an association between attribution statement provision and the cost
of equity capital, but only for ﬁrms with low analyst following. For these ﬁrms,
more extensive performance explanations and more extensive internal explanations
are associated with a higher cost of equity capital. However, attribution statements
are unrelated to the cost of equity capital for ﬁrms with high analyst following.
The thesis makes two contributions in the area of attribution determinants. First,
it measures attribution provision with a measure that has not been previously applied
in the literature to measure attribution statements. Second, it provides evidence
on how ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics and the ﬁrm's corporate governance mechanisms
inﬂuence the extent and the type of performance explanations provided by ﬁrms.
The thesis makes four contributions regarding the eﬀect of attribution statements
on the cost of capital. First, it uses a quantitative approach to directly estimate the
ii
cost of capital eﬀects of attribution statements. Second, it provides evidence that the
association between attribution statements and the cost of equity capital is inﬂuenced
by an interaction between attribution statements and analyst following. Third, the
thesis provides the ﬁrst evidence of the relationship between attribution statements
and the cost of equity capital in a UK setting. Fourth, it provides evidence that
the relationship between disclosure and the cost of equity capital is complex and is
inﬂuenced by interactions between disclosure and information intermediaries.
Keywords: Attribution Statements, Corporate Governance, Disclosure, Cost of
Capital, Management Commentary
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
The main objective of this thesis is to investigate the determinants and consequences
of attribution statements (also referred to as performance explanations) in ﬁnancial
reports of UK listed ﬁrms.1 The main objective of ﬁnancial reporting is to provide
information that is useful to participants in the capital markets to enable them to
make economic decisions (International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 2005),
particularly relating to assessing a ﬁrm's ﬁnancial position and performance, its use
of economic resources and cash generating ability (Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) 1985; Accounting Standards Board (ASB) 1999). Consistent with
this view, there has been a longstanding awareness among standard setters and reg-
ulatory bodies that ﬁnancial statements and their footnotes alone are not suﬃcient
to achieve this objective (Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 1989; IASB
2005). In this context, regulators (e.g. FASB 1985; ASB 1999; IASB 2005) have
called for companies to provide non-ﬁnancial information in the annual reports to
supplement and complement the information provided in the ﬁnancial statements.
Previous research (e.g. Lee and Tweedie 1977; Courtis 1986) has repeatedly shown
1Throughout this study, the expressions attribution statement and performance explanation
are used interchangeably.
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that non-ﬁnancial information is useful for investors for valuation and investment pur-
poses. For instance, the results by Lee and Tweedie (1977) and Courtis (1986) show
that the chairman or president's letter is the most widely read part in the annual
report. Furthermore, Kaplan et al. (1990) found that the content of the president's
letter inﬂuences decision making, and other studies reported that the letter contains
information that is both useful for predicting future ﬁrm performance and for equity
valuation (see McConnell et al. 1986; Swales Jr 1988; Abrahamson and Amir 1996).
The Jenkins Report (1994) in the US also pointed to the insuﬃciency of ﬁnancial
statements and therefore called for more explanations and discussions of a company's
operations and of factors inﬂuencing its future performance to the beneﬁt of users.
In this context, standard-setters and regulatory bodies around the world require or
encourage the provision of complementary and supplementary commentaries of or-
ganisational accounting outcomes and future prospects in the annual reports (Cole
and Jones 2005). For example in the US, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)
requires listed companies to provide a narrative statement (SEC 2003), known as the
Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A). In the UK, the Accounting Stan-
dards Board (ASB 2006) encourages companies to include in their annual reports an
Operating and Financial Review (OFR) by directors, and the Companies Act (2006)
requires ﬁrms to provide an enhanced business review in the directors' report to dis-
cuss the performance, development and position of the ﬁrm (Companies Act 2006;
Deloitte 2007). The European Union (2003) introduced enhanced requirements for
companies to produce a directors' report2. More recently, in December 2010, the In-
ternational Accounting Standards Board (IASB 2010) has released a non-mandatory
Management Commentary statement as guidance for the preparation and presenta-
tion of management commentary.
The common objective of these regulations or best practice statements is to pro-
vide users with an analysis and explanation of a ﬁrm's performance and position
through the eyes of management (SEC 1989; ASB 2006). As management can give
a unique insight (Cole and Jones 2005, p. 137) on the company, this supple-
2Via the EU Accounts Modernisation Directive 2003/51/EC, Art. 1.14 (European Union Direc-
tive 2003/51/EC 2003).
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mentary and complementary information sets the ﬁnancial statement into context
and can help investors in their assessment of the company's results and its future
prospects by increasing their understanding of the reasons for changes in the ﬁnancial
statements, of factors inﬂuencing performance, and of the viability of a company's
strategy (Cole and Jones 2005; IASB 2005; ASB 2006). This means that the provi-
sion of explanations for performance outcomes is seen as beneﬁcial to the investor.
Consequently, a lot of research (e.g. AIMR 2000; Clarkson et al. 1999; Rogers
and Grant 1997; Barron et al. 1999) has examined the information content of narra-
tives, whether these explanations are indeed useful. In line with the claims made by
standard setters and regulatory bodies (e.g. SEC 2003; IASB 2005; ASB 2006) that
performance explanations improve decision making, the studies into the usefulness of
narrative information have provided evidence that narrative information, in particular
management's discussion and explanation of ﬁrm performance, is a crucial compo-
nent in analysts' ﬁrm valuation processes. For example, the Association of Investment
Management and Research (AIMR 2000) survey revealed that 86% of the participat-
ing ﬁnancial analysts stated that management's discussion of ﬁrm performance was
either extremely or very important for ﬁrm valuation. Similarly, Clarkson et al. (1999)
surveyed ﬁnancial analysts and demonstrated that MD&A disclosures provide incre-
mental information that is used by analysts for ﬁnancial analysis. Rogers and Grant
(1997) found that the narrative sections in the annual reports of ﬁrms provided 40% of
the information cited in analysts' reports. Barron et al. (1999) revealed that MD&A
information on capital expenditures is associated with less error and dispersion in
analysts' earnings forecasts. Eikner et al. (2000) reported a signiﬁcant association
between prospective information and abnormal security returns, and Bryan (1997)
found a signiﬁcant association between information on planned capital expenditures
and current and future stock returns. Further, Bryan (1997) documented that ret-
rospective information on sales volume changes and general prospective information
are associated with next period's changes in sales, earnings per share, and capital
expenditures, as well as analysts' sales forecast revisions. Cole and Jones (2004) pro-
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vided evidence that information on historical revenue changes and certain prospective
information, such as on capital expenditures, are positively associated with future
revenue and income changes, as well as with contemporaneous stock returns. Taken
together, these studies demonstrate that narrative information is useful to market
participants.
1.2 Research problem
The discussion in the preceding section highlights that the usefulness of narrative
information has attracted considerable attention by researchers. Although academic
research has extensively examined the importance of narrative information and its use
by users, the studies have tended to focus on the information content of aggregate
narrative disclosures (Clarkson et al. 1999; Barron et al. 1999) and the predictive
ability of its various components (e.g. Bryan 1997; Eikner et al. 2000). However, there
is very limited research on attribution statements (or explanations of performance
outcomes).
Attribution statements are causal explanations for an outcome, where a reason
or cause is assigned to an event or outcome (Kelley and Michela 1980; Harvey and
Weary 1984; Martinko et al. 2007). The environment reacts to attributions and how
an outcome is explained and uses the attribution to assess and shape its perception
of the attributor (Harvey and Weary 1984; Lee et al. 2004). Depending on how
the environment sees the explanation, the attributor can be perceived favourably or
unfavourably (Lee and Tiedens 2001; Lee et al. 2004). Companies use attribution
statements in several ways, such as to legitimise their actions and performance (Pfeﬀer
1981; Staw et al. 1983), and to attract or reassure the public and investors (Staw
1980; Salancik and Meindl 1984), or to provide the environment with an interpretation
of their results to guide perception (Aerts 2005).
In this thesis, two issues are examined to extend the literature. First, it examines
the determinants of the extent and nature of attributions provided in annual reports.
In particular, it explores whether corporate governance factors inﬂuence attribution
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statements. Second, it investigates whether attribution statements are value relevant,
that is, whether they aﬀect the cost of capital. In the context of the determinants
of attribution statements, Aerts (2005) shows that attributions are inﬂuenced by the
industry in which the ﬁrm operates, whilst Clatworthy and Jones (2003) demonstrate
that attribution behaviour is inﬂuenced by performance. Aerts and Tarca (2010) show
that diﬀerences in disclosure requirements and litigation across countries inﬂuence
attribution statements leading to US ﬁrms being more moderate and formal in their
attributions than ﬁrms in the UK and Australia.
Other studies (e.g. Bettman and Weitz 1983; Salancik and Meindl 1984; Huﬀ
and Schwenk 1990; Baginski et al. 2004; Baginski et al. 2008; Aerts 2005; Aerts
and Tarca 2010; Aerts and Cheng 2011) have shown that the provision of attribution
statements is aﬀected by factors such as ﬁrm size, proﬁtability, or gearing. However,
these studies do not address the eﬀects of corporate governance factors on attri-
bution behaviour. Understanding the eﬀects of corporate governance is important
especially given that in the UK the Companies Act (2006) requires that the directors'
report in the annual report provides an enhanced business review that discusses the
performance, development and position of the ﬁrm. The Companies Act does not,
however, specify the extent or nature of the explanations, leaving it to the discretion
of the managers. Similarly, the UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC 2010b) rec-
ommends that the board of directors provide a balanced review of the performance
and position of the company, and such review should provide an explanation of the
factors inﬂuencing performance outcomes.
Whilst there are several studies examining the relationship between general dis-
closure and corporate governance (see for example Williamson 1985; Forker 1992;
Core 2001; Mangena and Pike 2005; Armstrong et al. 2010; Beyer et al. 2010),
there are virtually no studies that examine the impact of corporate governance on
attribution behaviour. Hence this study ﬁlls this gap in the literature. Barton and
Mercer (2005) argue that attribution statements are a key component of a ﬁrm's
disclosure strategy, and the literature (e.g. Forker 1992; Chen and Jaggi 2000; Ho
and Wong 2001; Eng and Mak 2003) has demonstrated that corporate governance
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inﬂuences overall disclosure strategy. The implication is that attribution statements
should also be inﬂuenced by a ﬁrm's corporate governance system. Indeed, the Smith
Committee (2003) explicitly states that the task of a ﬁrm's audit committee is to
oversee ﬁnancial reporting as part of the ﬁrm's corporate governance system, and
that task should cover reviewing additional information related to the ﬁnancials, such
as performance explanations. Further, Aerts (2005) and Aerts and Tarca (2010) note
that performance explanations have become a key component in the system of public
accountability. Such explanations allow a judgement on whether management has put
the ﬁrm's resources optimally to work. Providing explanations reduces information
asymmetry and can give investors more insight into whether management is capa-
ble of creating shareholder wealth. Moreover, Barton and Mercer (2005) argue that
the board of directors may use performance explanations to evaluate management's
performance. Hence stronger corporate governance mechanisms could increase ac-
countability pressures and so induce management to be more forthcoming about the
reasons for performance. Also, stronger oversight might dampen management's at-
tempts at impression management, leading them to be less defensive (avoid blame for
negative outcomes) and less self-enhancing (claim responsibility for good outcomes)
in their attributions.
Similarly, with respect to the value relevance of a ﬁrm's causal attribution state-
ments, this has not been given much attention in the literature. This is surprising
given that standard setters and regulatory bodies see explanations for corporate per-
formance outcomes as useful for improving investors' economic decisions, hence re-
quire or encourage their provision (SEC 2003; ASB 2006). In addition, prior research
reported that explanations of performance outcomes dominate the MD&A section of
annual reports (Collins et al. 1993), and make up more than half of the narrative
sections of annual reports (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2007a). Consequently, there
have been calls in the literature for more academic research to better understand the
valuation implications of attribution statements (e.g. Baginski et al. 2004; Barton
and Mercer 2005), and particularly their eﬀects on the ﬁrm's cost of capital (Bar-
ton and Mercer 2005). Furthermore, there have been calls for more research on the
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relation between disclosure and the cost of capital in general, and particularly to un-
derstand how diﬀerent types of disclosures aﬀect the cost of capital (e.g. Healy and
Palepu 2001; Botosan 2006). Professional bodies (FASB 2001; ICAEW 2004) have
also called for research to better understand the relation of information asymmetry,
disclosure, and the cost of capital. This thesis responds to these calls by exploring
the eﬀect of attribution statements on the cost of capital. Investigating this issue
is important against the background of research showing that these statements are
generally self-serving, that is, ﬁrms tend to attribute favourable performance to their
internal environment and negative outcomes to the external environment (Clatwor-
thy and Jones 2003; Aerts 2005). Given that attributions may inﬂuence shareholders'
impressions of the company and therefore their reaction to the reported performance
(Lee et al. 2004), the question of whether they are used by investors and inﬂuence
the cost of capital constitutes an important issue to investigate (Barton and Mercer
2005).
To date, only a small number of studies (Baginski et al. 2000; Baginski et al. 2004;
Barton and Mercer 2005; Baginski et al. 2008; Kimbrough and Wang 2009) have
investigated the eﬀects of attribution statements on stock price reactions and the cost
of capital. However, there are some limitations which warrant further investigation.
First, the studies by Baginski et al. (2000), Baginski et al. (2004), Baginski et al.
(2008) analysed attributions in voluntary management earnings forecasts. Attribu-
tions in management earnings forecasts are distinctively diﬀerent from attributions
in annual reports because they are not prescribed, are not related to audited infor-
mation, and there is no regulation regarding the form or content of the information
provided. In this context, it is reasonable to suggest that attributions in annual re-
ports are diﬀerent - they relate to the audited accounts, and, according to the Smith
Committee (2003), should be subjected to review by the board of directors via its
audit committee.
Second, the studies focused on stock price reactions using an event study method,
thus have not examined the longer term eﬀects (i.e., the cost of capital) of attribu-
tions. Barton and Mercer (2005) have shown that the plausibility of explanations
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aﬀects management's reputation with the market, and this in turn aﬀects the cost of
capital. Hence, Barton and Mercer (2005) call for studies to investigate not only the
market's short-term reactions to the attributions, but also their longer term eﬀects,
as reputation eﬀects last longer than a short-term reaction. Furthermore, in an event
study it has to be assumed that the information has not been known to the market
before, that is it is not impounded in price yet. This assumption may prove diﬃcult to
uphold in reality. Christensen et al. (2007) pointed out that the analysis of a longer
term eﬀect on the cost of capital does not assume that no information has arrived in
the market prior to its oﬃcial announcement.
Third, although Barton and Mercer (2005) found evidence for a cost of capital
eﬀect of attribution statements, the results are based on an experiment with ﬁnancial
analysts to investigate their reactions to attribution statements and performance
expectations, using earnings valuation multiples derived from analysts' assessments
to provide a proxy for the cost of capital eﬀect. The authors could have extended
this to an estimation of the cost of capital using one of several methods available to
calculate an implied cost of capital (see e.g. Botosan and Plumlee 2005 for a review
of methods) so as to give a quantiﬁcation of the impact on the cost of capital.
More importantly for this study, the existing studies have all been carried out in
the US institutional environment, and no identiﬁable study has yet considered this
issue in other settings, particularly in the UK. The US environment is prescriptive in
terms of disclosure requirements and has more demanding accounting and disclosure
standards than many other countries worldwide including the UK (Levitt 1998; Ball
et al. 2000; Clatworthy and Jones 2003; La Porta et al. 2006). Several studies (e.g.
Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Core 2001; Hail 2002) have also suggested that this high
disclosure environment in the US would make it diﬃcult to detect tangible eﬀects of
disclosure on the cost of capital due to lower disclosure variations. Additionally, the
US is characterised by prevalence of litigation (Baginski et al. 2002; Clatworthy and
Jones 2003) which restricts US companies' disclosure behaviour (e.g. Baginski et al.
2002; Rogers and Van Buskirk 2009). However, litigation in the UK is rare (Ball et al.
2000, Clatworthy and Jones 2003) so that UK ﬁrms face less danger of litigation and
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have more discretion in presenting disclosures (Clatworthy and Jones 2003). In this
respect, the UK provides a more appropriate environment to investigate attribution
statement provision.
1.3 Research aims and questions
1.3.1 Aims
Pursuant to the above, the aim of this research is twofold:
1. To explore the determinants of causal attribution statements for corporate per-
formance outcomes provided by management in corporate communications by
UK companies. Speciﬁcally the research examines the relationship between at-
tribution statement provision and corporate governance and ﬁrm-speciﬁc fac-
tors.
2. To investigate the economic consequences of attribution statements provided
by management in corporate communication to the capital market in the UK.
Speciﬁcally, the study examines whether attribution statements have informa-
tion content for equity valuation by analysing their association with the ﬁrm's
cost of equity capital.
1.3.2 Research questions
The thesis addresses the following research questions:
1. What is the nature and extent of attribution statements provided by UK listed
companies on organisational performance outcomes?
2. Do corporate governance factors inﬂuence the extent and nature of attributions
on organisational performance outcomes by UK listed companies?
3. Is the extent and nature of attributions on organisational performance outcomes
by UK listed companies related to ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors?
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4. Do attribution statements about organisational performance outcomes inﬂuence
a ﬁrm's cost of equity capital?
5. Does this inﬂuence on the cost of equity capital depend on the types of attri-
bution statements (e.g. internal or external)?
1.4 Summary research methodology
The research methodology used is summarised in this section.
The framework for the thesis was developed from a review of previous research
and the theoretical literature. The thesis is based on a cross-sectional analysis of
annual reports of a sample of 142 ﬁrms listed on the London Stock Exchange in the
year 2006.3 The year 2006 represents the most recent year of economic activity under
regular conditions before the turmoil in the ﬁnancial sector started to unfold in 2007.
This ensures that the performance explanations given in the corporate documents
are the result of normal attribution behaviour so that the results of the investigation
are not unduly inﬂuenced by the eﬀects of this major external event on the ﬁrms'
operations and attributions.
Annual reports are considered the main document of ﬁrm communication with the
outside (see chapter 5 methodology), thus it can be argued that the annual report is
the main document for ﬁrms to justify performance and to provide accountability to
investors. Also, the annual report has become a corporate Public Relations document
ﬁrms use to promote a certain image and identity of themselves (Lee 1994; Stanton
and Stanton 2002; Beattie et al. 2008). Attributions, as a primary means for justifying
performance and convincing the public of the strength of the business, will therefore
occupy an important part in the image-building role of the annual report. Against this
backdrop and the widespread use of the annual report in the disclosure literature4,
annual reports are examined in this thesis.
To answer the research questions, two main regression models were speciﬁed:
3The list of sample ﬁrms is provided in Appendix A.1.
4See chapter 3 and chapter 5.
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First, a model with attribution statements as the dependent variable to analyse the
determinants of attribution provision. Second, a model with the cost of equity capital
as the dependent variable to explore the eﬀect of attribution statements.
To measure the extent and nature of attributions, a content analysis of the narra-
tive sections of the ﬁrm's annual report, including the Operating and Financial Review
(OFR), Chairman's Statement, and Chief Executive's Review, was undertaken. The
basis of the content analysis was a checklist of performance outcomes to which ﬁrms
provide attributions. The checklist was developed from a review of previous literature
and a review of a sample of annual reports and this resulted in a ﬁnal list of ﬁve
corporate performance outcomes. These are sales/revenues, costs, proﬁt, cash ﬂow,
debt. The content analysis approach used identiﬁed sentences on each item and
counted the number of words used in attributing performance. The ﬁrm's attribution
statement provision was measured as the percentage of the total number of words
used for all attributions to the total number of words in the ﬁrm's narrative sections
of the annual report. To ensure the reliability of the attribution measures, a second
coder independently performed the content analysis procedure on a sample of 10
randomly selected annual reports. The results were compared and these were similar.
In addition, following Poshakwale and Courtis (2005), the attribution measures were
regressed against ﬁrm size, gearing, and proﬁtability, factors that previous research
has found to be related with attribution statements (see Bettman and Weitz 1983;
Salancik and Meindl 1984; Baginski et al. 2004; Baginski et al. 2008; Clatworthy and
Jones 2003; Aerts 2005; Aerts and Tarca 2010). The results show that the measures
are related to these factors in the expected directions. These approaches to assessing
reliability give reasonable assurance that the attribution measures are valid. In order
to measure the cost of equity capital, the Easton Price-Earnings-Growth (PEG) model
(Easton 2004) was used. The PEG model estimates an implied cost of equity capital
based on analysts' earnings forecasts and stock price. The validity of the measure
was tested by regressing these estimates against the traditional risk factors (beta,
ﬁrm size, gearing, ratio of book-to-market value) and the results are consistent with
previous studies (Fama and French 1992; Botosan 1997; Easton 2004), suggesting
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that the measures are reliable.
Data analysis was done in three ways. First, descriptive statistics were used to
obtain an understanding of the sample data and its distribution. Second, univariate
analysis (Pearson) explored correlations between the dependent and the independent
variables and helped to highlight potential multicollinearity problems. Third, multi-
variate regression analysis was used to test the hypotheses and to shed light on both
the determinants of attribution provision and the eﬀect of attributions on the cost
of equity capital. To ensure that the assumptions underlying regression analysis were
met, prior to running the regressions, the data were tested for normality, linearity,
homoscedasticity, multicollinearity.
1.5 Summary of the key ﬁndings
This section presents a brief summary of the key ﬁndings:
1. The percentage of words in the narrative sections of annual reports taken up
by attribution statements is generally low (about 5%), suggesting that the
extent of attribution in UK annual reports is limited. Nevertheless, ﬁrms have
a clear tendency to explain performance outcomes with internal factors rather
than with external reasons. The percentage of words taken up by internal and
external attributions is 3.7% and 1.9% respectively. This preference to use
internal reasons to explain performance outcomes is independent from whether
the ﬁrm's performance has increased or decreased, and can also be found across
all industries examined in the thesis.
2. A number of corporate governance factors (proportion of non-executive direc-
tors, director share ownership) show a positive association with the extent of
attribution statements in the narrative sections of the annual report and with
internal attribution statements. Also, a number of corporate governance (audit
committee size) and ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors (proﬁtability, new share issue) show a
negative association with the extent of attribution statements, and a negative
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association with internal attributions (new share issue) and external attributions
(ﬁrm size, gearing).
3. In terms of the consequences of attribution statement provision, the thesis ﬁnds
that attribution statements inﬂuence the cost of equity capital, but only for
ﬁrms with low analyst following. For the overall sample there is no association
between attribution statement provision and the cost of equity capital. Yet for
ﬁrms with low analyst following, more extensive performance explanations are
associated with a higher cost of equity capital. Regarding the type of attribution
statement (internal or external), there is a positive association between the cost
of equity capital and the extent of internal explanations, but also only for ﬁrms
with low analyst following.
1.6 Contribution to knowledge
The thesis makes six contributions in two areas. The ﬁrst area is on the determinants
of attribution statement provision. Here the thesis makes two contributions.
1. The thesis provides evidence on the amount and type of attribution statements
provided in the annual reports of UK listed ﬁrms by measuring attribution
provision with a measure that has not been previously applied in the literature
to measure attribution statements. Attributions are measured as the percentage
of words used for performance explanations to the total number of words in
the ﬁrm's narrative sections that review and discuss performance and ﬁnancial
position to capture the extensiveness of attribution statements. This measure
oﬀers insight into an aspect of attribution statement disclosure not oﬀered by
previous research. Unlike other disclosure measures that previous research has
used that only record the presence/absence of an attribution, the total number
of explanations provided by a ﬁrm, or broad sentence-based measures, this
measure captures how detailed a ﬁrm explains performance outcomes.
2. The thesis provides evidence on the factors that inﬂuence the extent and the
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type of performance explanations provided by ﬁrms. The evidence relates to
two categories of determinants, ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics, and the ﬁrm's cor-
porate governance mechanisms in particular. As current evidence on the deter-
minants of attribution statement provision is very limited, the study responds
to the call by Clatworthy and Jones (2006) for future research to examine more
factors that may inﬂuence a ﬁrm's accounting narratives, and analyse charac-
teristics such as capital market access.
The second area to which the thesis contributes is on the eﬀect of performance
explanations on the ﬁrm's cost of equity capital. The contribution is fourfold.
1. The thesis provides evidence of the association between a ﬁrm's performance
explanations and its cost of equity capital based on a quantitative approach
to directly estimate the cost of capital eﬀects. Unlike previous research that
either analysed stock price reactions to attribution announcement (Baginski
et al. 2000; Baginski et al. 2004; Baginski et al. 2008; Kimbrough and Wang
2009) or used earnings valuation multiples as a proxy in an experiment (Barton
and Mercer 2005), this study uses an implied cost of equity capital measure.
This method allows a precise quantiﬁcation of the longer term eﬀect as opposed
to a short term market reaction or the use of earnings valuation multiples. Using
this measure, the thesis shows that attribution statements are value relevant
for ﬁrms with low analyst following, while for ﬁrms with high analyst following
attribution statements do not aﬀect the cost of equity capital.
2. The thesis contributes to the growing body of research (e.g. Espinosa and
Trombetta 2007; Dhaliwal et al. 2011) on how diﬀerent types of disclosure
interact in their eﬀect on the cost of equity capital by providing evidence on
how the association between attribution statements and the cost of equity cap-
ital is inﬂuenced by an interaction between attribution statements and analyst
following. To date, no study has analysed this eﬀect.
3. The thesis provides the ﬁrst evidence of the relationship between attribution
statements and the cost of equity capital in a UK setting. While previous
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research on the value relevance of attribution statements was done on US data
(e.g. Baginski et al. 2000; Baginski et al. 2004), the literature in the UK has
only examined factors that inﬂuence attribution behaviour (e.g. Clatworthy and
Jones 2003; Aerts and Tarca 2010).
4. The thesis responds to calls for more research on the relation between disclosure
and the cost of capital by both academic studies (e.g. Healy and Palepu 2001;
Botosan 2006) and professional bodies (ICAEW 2004) to better understand
the relation of information asymmetry, disclosure, and the cost of capital. It
provides evidence that the relationship between disclosure and the cost of equity
capital is complex and is inﬂuenced by interactions between disclosure and
information intermediaries.
1.7 Structure of the thesis
Chapter 1 introduces the research problem and presents the research aims and ques-
tions, followed by the research methodology to carry out the analysis. Subsequently,
the key ﬁndings are summarised. The chapter concludes with highlighting the con-
tribution to knowledge and the outline of the structure of the thesis.
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on causal attributions. It introduces the psycho-
logical concept of causal attribution and explains, after a discussion of the theory, the
function of attributions in corporate communication with stakeholders. Subsequently,
the empirical literature that investigates companies' attributions in the annual report
is reviewed, leading to outlining the research gap within that stream of literature and
the need for further research.
Chapter 3 discusses the determinants of attribution provision. The chapter de-
velops a theoretical framework based on which the disclosure of performance ex-
planations can be explained. The chapter ﬁrst reviews relevant theories that the
literature has put forward to explain the disclosure of causal attributions in corporate
documents. Then, the chapter discusses factors which prior research has found to
inﬂuence disclosure, and establishes hypotheses about how these factors inﬂuence
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causal attribution provision.
Chapter 4 reviews the literature on disclosure and the cost of capital and develops
the hypotheses regarding the eﬀect of attribution statements on the cost of capital.
First, the chapter reviews the theoretical literature on the link between disclosure
and the cost of capital to establish the underlying theoretical foundation for the
association between attribution statements and the cost of capital. Second, it reviews
the empirical literature that has investigated the link between the cost of capital and
disclosure and identiﬁes the gap in current research. Third, it formulates hypotheses
about the association of attribution statement disclosure and a ﬁrm's cost of equity
capital.
Chapter 5 presents the research methodology and the methods used to carry out
the analysis. The chapter starts with an outline of the research philosophy and the
approach taken to analyse the research questions, followed by the development of
the regression models. The discussion of the sample and sample selection process
is followed by a presentation of the data collection methods, the data sources, and
the measurement of variables. Finally, the data analysis process and techniques are
presented.
Chapter 6 presents the descriptive analysis of the data. First, it describes the sam-
ple characteristics and the descriptive results for the cost of equity capital. Second,
it presents the descriptive statistics for the attribution disclosure measure.
Chapter 7 reports the results of tests of the hypotheses on the inﬂuence of cor-
porate governance and ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics on the disclosure of performance
explanations in UK listed ﬁrms' annual reports. The chapter starts with a presenta-
tion of the regression model, and then describes the tests for normality of the data
and any data transformations carried out prior to further analysis. Next, it presents
the univariate correlations between the attribution disclosure measure and the inde-
pendent variables, and then reports the results of the multiple regression analysis
followed by additional tests of the data.
Chapter 8 reports the results of tests of the hypotheses regarding the eﬀect of the
provision of causal attribution statements on the cost of equity capital. The chapter
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ﬁrst presents the regression model and describes the tests for normality of the data
and any data transformations carried out prior to further analysis. It then presents
the results of the multiple regression analysis, followed by a number of additional
tests.
Chapter 9 presents the conclusion. The chapter summarises the key ﬁndings and
discusses the implications of the ﬁndings for accounting standard setters, regulators,
and policy makers. The chapter also discusses the contribution and the limitations
of the study, and provides suggestions for further research.
CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE ATTRIBUTION
LITERATURE
2.1 Introduction
In chapter 1, the research problem was identiﬁed as to investigate the determinants
and consequences of attribution statements provided in the annual report of UK
companies. To put the investigation into context, this chapter presents the concept
of attribution and reviews the literature on attribution statements. The chapter is
structured as follows. First, the deﬁnition of attribution is presented and the theory
of attributions is outlined. The function of attributions in corporate communication
with stakeholders is also discussed. Second, the empirical literature that investigates
companies' attributions in the annual report is reviewed and the limitations identiﬁed.
The chapter concludes with a summary.
2.2 The concept of attribution
2.2.1 Deﬁnition of causal attribution
Causal attributions are an important component of people's everyday life. The under-
lying concept is that the social environment surrounding individuals, which includes
18
2.2. THE CONCEPT OF ATTRIBUTION 19
other people's actions and behaviours, is unpredictable. Individuals therefore attempt
to gain control over this environment by trying to predict other people's future be-
haviour or actions. This can be achieved by gaining causal understanding of others'
behaviour, that is by understanding why a person behaved in a certain way (see
Heider 1958; Hewstone 1990; Jones 1990; Taylor et al. 2000). Generally speaking,
attributions are a psychological tool that helps individuals to understand and make
sense of the environment (Harvey and Weary 1984).
When individuals experience an event or observe the behaviour of other people,
they start engaging in the search for an explanation to identify a cause in order to make
sense of what they have observed. This reasoning process results in assigning a cause
which the individual, the attributor, perceives to be the reason for this event. Hence
a causal attribution constitutes the assignment of a cause to an outcome (Kelley
and Michela 1980; Harvey and Weary 1984; Martinko et al. 2007), and expresses an
individual's perception of why something has happened (Lee et al. 2004).
The prevalence of causal attributions in people's lives has been highlighted by
Heider (1976, p. 18) who has deﬁned an attribution as ... part of our cognition of
the environment. Whenever you cognize your environment, you will ﬁnd attribution
occurring. Against that backdrop, attributions are considered to play a central role
in human behaviour (Kelley and Michela 1980, p. 460).
A cause can be classiﬁed along a number of dimensions which all reﬂect an
individual's perception of diﬀerent aspects of the nature of the cause. The attribution
an individual gives to an event diﬀers in response to the perception of the cause along
these dimensions. The dimensions include locus of causality (is the cause internal or
external to the individual), controllability (can the individual inﬂuence the cause or
not), causal stability (is the cause temporary or permanent), globality and universality
(is the cause generalisable across situations and individuals) and whether the outcome
is positive or negative (Abramson et al. 1978; Weiner 1979; Ford 1985; Hewstone
1990; Rees et al. 2005). People act upon and react to what they perceive to be the
reason for an outcome, hence attributions are important for shaping an individual's
interaction with the environment (Kelley and Michela 1980).
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2.2.2 The theory of attribution
Attribution theory is not one single theory but is an umbrella term that encompasses
all types of research in social psychology on perceived causation and includes a mul-
titude of theories and issues around how individuals perceive, interpret, and react to
behaviour (Kelley and Michela 1980; Harvey and Weary 1984; Gilbert and Malone
1995). More precise, it can be said that attribution theory is the area of psychology
concerned with when and how people ask 'why?' questions (Taylor et al. 2000, p.
76) and is a widely researched topic in social psychology (see, e.g. Kelley and Michela
1980, Harvey and Weary 1984, Mezulis et al. 2004 for reviews). The work by Heider
(1958) has been credited in the literature as being precursory in the attribution area
(see e.g. Kelley 1973; Martinko et al. 2007; Rudolph and Reisenzein 2008) as it
describes how attributions arise from individuals trying to explain observed outcomes
and to give meaning to other individuals' behaviour. The author also introduced
the crucial distinction between internal causes for behaviour (for instance, eﬀort and
ability) or external causes (luck or other situational factors) (Hewstone 1990), and
that individuals would attribute behaviour along these lines. A whole stream of re-
search has built upon Heider's insights and has investigated individuals' attribution
behaviour (Kelley 1973; Rudolph and Reisenzein 2008). Work by Jones and Davis
(1965) and by Kelley (1967), Kelley (1971), Kelley (1973) is considered to be the
chief contributions (Hewstone 1990) as they sought to develop models to explain how
individuals would attribute.
The way individuals attribute causes to outcomes is subject to a number of biases.
According to Hewstone (1990), three of the most crucial biases are the fundamental
attribution error (e.g. Ross 1977; Harvey and Weary 1984; Gilbert and Malone 1995),
the 'actor-observer eﬀect' (Jones and Nisbett 1972), and the self-serving bias (see
e.g. Miller 1976; Bradley 1978; Zuckerman 1979; Zuckerman 2006).
The 'fundamental attribution error' (e.g. Ross 1977; Harvey and Weary 1984;
Gilbert and Malone 1995) is considered as the tendency of attributors to underesti-
mate the impact of situational factors and to overestimate the role of dispositional
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factors (Ross 1977, p. 184). According to this principle, individuals would tend to
emphasise the eﬀect of dispositional factors, that is personal or internal causes such
as ability or eﬀort, and discount the eﬀect of situational, or external, factors such as
luck or task diﬃculty.
The 'actor-observer eﬀect' (Jones and Nisbett 1972; Kelley and Michela 1980;
Hewstone 1990; Wagner III and Gooding 1997) suggests that if individuals observe
another person's actions, the attributions the individuals will give to the other person's
behaviour tend to diﬀer from the attributions the individuals would give for their
own behaviour. That is, when observing the actions of another person, individuals
tend to discount this person's personal contribution to a successful outcome (e.g.
ability or eﬀort) and emphasise environmental factors as reason for the success (e.g.
luck or task diﬃculty). By contrast, when attributing their own success, individuals
would emphasise their own contribution and play down the inﬂuence of environmental
factors. For failure, individuals as observers would discount environmental factors and
emphasise the other person's personal responsibility, whereas if individuals attributed
their own behaviour, failure would be blamed on external factors and the own personal
responsibility would be discounted.
One of the most common biases is the self-serving bias in attributions (see e.g.
Miller 1976; Bradley 1978; Zuckerman 1979; Zuckerman 2006). The literature argues
that individuals perceive the causes for failure and success diﬀerently (Miller 1976;
Kelley and Michela 1980; Wong and Weiner 1981). The self-serving bias shows that
there is a tendency for individuals to attribute success to factors internal to oneself,
or dispositional factors (Gooding and Kinicki 1995), such as ability or eﬀort. This
allows the individual to take credit and direct responsibility for achievements or good
outcomes. By contrast, failure is usually seen as being due to factors external to the
person, situational factors (Gooding and Kinicki 1995), such as luck or task diﬃculty.
In this respect, the individual avoids blame for negative events or outcomes, thus
responsibility is denied.
To explain this self-serving bias, two potential reasons have been brought forward
by the literature. The ﬁrst perspective suggests a motivational explanation, that
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individuals give self-serving attributions deliberately (e.g. Bradley 1978; Zuckerman
1979). This may happen due to three reasons. First, in an attempt to protect the
person's self-esteem (Bradley 1978; Zuckerman 1979; Bettman and Weitz 1983; Lee
et al. 2004), by claiming success for themselves and denying responsibility for failure,
individuals can improve or protect their self-esteem. Forsyth (1980) described this as
the 'egocentric function'. Second, individuals give self-serving attributions for reasons
of self-presentation, so as to avoid embarrassment or get their behaviour or actions
approved by other people (Harvey and Weary 1984). Self-presentation is sometimes
also referred to as `impression management', deﬁned as
the process by which individuals attempt to control the impressions others form
of them. Because the impressions people make on others have implications for how
others perceive, evaluate, and treat them, as well as for their own views of themselves,
people sometimes behave in ways that will create certain impressions in others' eyes
(Leary and Kowalski 1990, p. 34).
This implies that individuals attribute to convey a certain image of themselves in
an attempt to direct or manipulate the way they are perceived by the environment.1
Third, some studies have suggested that individuals engage in attribution behaviour
in order to obtain a higher degree of control over the environment (e.g. Forsyth 1980;
Harvey and Weary 1984). Kelley and Michela (1980) highlighted that attributions to
controllable factors can increase the attributor's belief that goals can be reached by
own eﬀorts, thus increasing that person's conﬁdence that the goal can be reached.
The second perspective for explaining the self-serving bias suggests that human
cognition might be the reason (Wagner III and Gooding 1997). This literature argues
that many people expect that their own eﬀorts lead to success, or they are used to their
actions resulting in successful outcomes. For that reason, they generally expect to be
successful in their undertakings. If failure occurs despite own eﬀorts, the perception
of individuals is that external factors must have intervened, and these external factors
prevented their own eﬀorts from paying oﬀ and led to the failure. Responsibility for
1The notion of impression management plays an important role for attributions in corporate
communication, as the following sections will show. For a discussion of diﬀerent aspects of corporate
impression management in narrative reporting in general, see Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2011).
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failure is therefore denied and the cause is sought in external inﬂuences (Miller and
Ross 1975; Huﬀ and Schwenk 1990; Wagner III and Gooding 1997).
With regard to the consequences of causal attributions, they not only inﬂuence
the attributor's perception of the social world, but also inﬂuence the reactions of his
environment to these attributions (Kelley and Michela 1980). That is, the environ-
ment reacts to how an individual explains an outcome, and on that basis forms its
attitudes towards, and perceptions and evaluations of, the attributor (Harvey and
Weary 1984; Lee et al. 2004). Hence people's reaction to an attribution is inﬂuenced
by the attribution itself. For instance, attributing a negative outcome to an exter-
nal factor makes the attributor appear in a better light by reducing the perceived
accountability of the attributor for the outcome (Lee et al. 2004). By contrast, for
persons in positions of power or high status who are expected to have inﬂuence and
control, making external attributions for failure violates these expectations and they
are perceived negatively by others (Lee and Tiedens 2001).
2.2.3 Corporate use of causal attributions
The process of attributing a cause to an outcome constitutes not only a phenomenon
observed with individuals, but can also be found in corporate communications. Or-
ganisations use causal attributions to explain their actions. Pfeﬀer (1981, p. 4) noted
that an important part of the responsibilities of corporate management is to provide
explanations, rationalizations, and legitimation for the activities undertaken in the
organization.
Explanations for performance outcomes can be considered a part of an overall
corporate strategy to justify and legitimise the ﬁrm's operations to the public. Staw
et al. (1983, p. 583) highlighted this point by arguing that since ﬁrms are under
pressure to make best use of their input factors and to reach their stated objec-
tives, organizations will attempt to justify their performance when communicating
or conveying information about their results. Pfeﬀer (1981) further stressed that
these explanations intend to demonstrate that the ﬁrm acts within the values and
expectations of society. Thus performance explanations can be seen as a response
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to demands and pressure by the public on ﬁrms to account for and explain corporate
activities and the way the ﬁrm is run.2
These causal attributions not only fulﬁl an informational role but also have a
symbolic function (Aerts 2005) and go beyond providing accountability for past ac-
tions and performance. By explaining and justifying their actions, ﬁrms are trying to
project an image that presents them as rational, competent, successful, and so to
convince the public of their legitimacy (Staw et al. 1983; Aerts 1994). Salancik and
Meindl (1984, p. 239) argued that causal attributions are also political statements
meant to reassure constituents or induce them, when necessary, to participate in the
organization's aﬀairs. In this context, managers may strategically use attributions
to demonstrate that they are in control of the situation and the environment around
the ﬁrm, and are able to deliver performance or demonstrate that they are tackling
problems and negative inﬂuences. This can instil conﬁdence among the public and
investors, convince them of the capabilities of management to deliver results and the
prospects of the ﬁrm, thus inducing new investors to get involved in the ﬁrm's aﬀairs
(Staw 1980; Pfeﬀer 1981; Staw et al. 1983; Aerts 2005).
Another important function of attributions is to act as a guide to outsiders' in-
terpretation of the achieved results (Aerts 2005). Managers provide explanations and
justiﬁcations to guide the public's perception and interpretation of the ﬁrm's actions
from the perspective of the ﬁrm. Aerts (2005, p. 513) argued that annual reports
are a medium to place speciﬁcs of the annual accounts within a wider explanatory
context, and further noted that the reports go beyond simply presenting informa-
tion, as by providing explanations they also oﬀer a means for how to interpret the
information.
Thus he argued by selectively directing and focusing attention, attribution pro-
cesses can be powerful and ﬂexible instruments to correct and supplement the mes-
sage implied by negative performance characteristics or reinforce positive performance
identities(Aerts 2005, p. 515).
2Staw et al. (1983) and Bettman and Weitz (1983) highlighted that these attempts at justiﬁca-
tion and rationalisation are, at the same time, also directed internally at the ﬁrm's members.
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2.3 Empirical studies on attributions in the an-
nual report
Causal attributions in annual reports have received much attention in the area of
management research. Studies can be grouped into three broad categories. First,
studies that analyse the self-serving bias in attribution statements in annual reports
and potential explanations for the bias (e.g. Bettman and Weitz 1983; Clatworthy
and Jones 2003; Tessarolo et al. 2010). Second, some studies have examined the
determinants of attribution statement provision (e.g. Aerts 1994; Aerts 2005; Luz
et al. 2009). Third, other studies take a future-oriented perspective and investigate
the consequences of the disclosure of causal attributions, for instance the association
with future ﬁrm performance or the eﬀect on the capital market (e.g. Staw et al.
1983; Lee et al. 2004). These studies are discussed in the following sections.
2.3.1 Studies analysing the self-serving bias
A number of studies has examined how factors such as performance, industry, or the
overall economic environment determine the self-serving bias in annual reports. For
instance, Bettman and Weitz (1983) investigated (1) whether self-serving attribu-
tions can be explained by impression management or a cognitive bias, and (2) the
factors that determine the amount of causal reasoning by comparing years with good
and bad economic conditions. They examined 181 letters to shareholders of US ﬁrms
from four industries (metal mining, aerospace, scientiﬁc instruments, telecommuni-
cation) for both 1972 (as a good economic year) and 1974 (as a bad year), using an
increase or decrease in Gross Domestic Product and stock price indexes as a measure
for a good/bad year. Their ﬁndings show a tendency of ﬁrms to attribute negative
outcomes more to external, unstable and uncontrollable causes, while positive out-
comes tended to be attributed to internal, stable, and controllable causes. They also
show that self-serving behaviour was more pronounced for the bad year (1974) than
for the good year (1972). An industry eﬀect was found, showing that metal mining
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ﬁrms attributed both favourable and unfavourable outcomes to external causes to a
greater extent than ﬁrms in the other three industries. Also, ﬁrms made the highest
amount of attributions when their performance was worse than expected and mostly
discussed negative outcomes. In addition, ﬁrms were found to talk more about un-
favourable (favourable) outcomes when performance was worse than or as (better
than) expected.
In a replication of the Bettman and Weitz (1983) study, Tsang (2002) use data
from 147 companies listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange to investigate whether
US evidence holds in a diﬀerent cultural context. The results conﬁrmed a self-serving
pattern of attributions. Consistent with Bettman and Weitz (1983), the results
show that ﬁrms gave more attributions when performance departs from expectations,
when outcomes are unfavourable, and when outcomes are both unexpected and un-
favourable. In addition, ﬁrms gave the highest amount of attributions when their
performance was worse than expected and mostly discussed negative outcomes.
Clatworthy and Jones (2003) investigated whether UK ﬁrms with improving or
declining performance show diﬀerent attribution patterns. Using a sample of 100
Chairman's Statements of listed UK ﬁrms, they classiﬁed the content of the Chair-
man's Statement as good, bad, or neutral, and the attributions as internal or external.
The results showed that ﬁrms with improving performance (positive change in proﬁt
before taxation from last year) presented more good news than bad performers were
giving bad news, and they were more positive in their words than declining performers
were negative. Performance attributions evidenced a self-serving pattern, with ﬁrms
attributing good news to internal factors but bad news to the environment, irrespec-
tive of company performance. Moreover, in general ﬁrms were found to explicitly
attribute bad news to external factors.
Recent evidence by Tessarolo et al. (2010) also conﬁrmed the association of the
self-serving pattern with ﬁrm performance in the Brazilian environment. They anal-
ysed letters to shareholders of 49 Brazilian companies listed on the Sao Paolo Stock
Exchange. For each company, both from a good (2003) and bad (2002) economic
year (measured as increase/decrease in per capita GDP and stock index). Perfor-
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mance was measured as net income, and attributions were coded as causes (inter-
nal/external) and eﬀect on performance (good/bad). The authors found that 90%
of good (83.3% of bad) performance was attributed to internal (external) causes,
suggesting that managers attribute good performance to themselves and bad per-
formance to external factors. Moreover, they found that the highest proportion of
self-serving attributions in the letters occurred in the case of bad performance in a
bad economic year, but that the level of self-serving attributions by ﬁrms with good
performance in a bad year did not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from ﬁrms with positive (and
negative) performance in a good year.
Hooghiemstra (2008) compared letters to shareholders issued by 50 US and 50
Japanese ﬁrms in the period of 1994-2000. Two reports per ﬁrm were chosen to
represent both a good and bad economic year, taking the positive/negative change
in net sales margin and return on assets (ROA) as a measure of good/bad year. The
results showed that, in general, both countries' ﬁrms provided more attributions for
good outcomes than for bad. However, US ﬁrms stressed positive outcomes much
more than Japanese ﬁrms. For both countries, the self-serving bias was conﬁrmed,
with a higher amount of internal (external) attributions for good (bad) performance.
Huﬀ and Schwenk (1990) analysed speeches by Chrysler executives over a 15-year
period (1970-1984) and of four major oil companies over a 16-year period (1969-
1984), during times of performance increases and decreases. For Chrysler, the results
showed that more speeches were given in a good year than in a bad year. Also, more
attributions were given to external factors in a bad year, and more to internal factors
in a good year. For the oil ﬁrms, the proportion of internal and external attributions
statements did not diﬀer between good and bad years, but there was signiﬁcantly
more talk about the environment in a bad year.
To sum up, the ﬁndings of these studies suggest that ﬁrms have a tendency to at-
tribute causes to performance in a self-serving way, which is inﬂuenced by factors such
as ﬁnancial performance, the overall economic environment, or industry membership.
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2.3.2 Studies analysing the determinants of attribution state-
ment provision
Studies have also investigated the determinants of attribution statement provision to
performance outcomes. Salancik and Meindl (1984) argued that ﬁrms with unstable
performance lack control over their outcomes thus will try to create an image of
control by taking more responsibility even for negative events (compared to ﬁrms
with stable performance). Analysing letters to shareholders of 18 US companies over
an 18 year period from 1961-1978, the authors found that unstable ﬁrms attributed
positive outcomes more to internal factors than did stable companies, and unstable
ﬁrms blamed external factors for negative outcomes less than did stable ﬁrms. They
also found a positive relation between taking credit for positive outcomes and future
performance in the case of unstable ﬁrms. By contrast, accepting blame for negative
outcomes was found to be negatively related to future performance, for both stable
and unstable companies.
Clapham and Schwenk (1991) investigated the relation of attributions with com-
pany performance and whether the higher monitoring and scrutiny by regulatory
bodies in regulated industries might moderate the self-serving tendency as compared
to ﬁrms in unregulated industries. Examining letters to shareholders of 20 US elec-
tric and gas utility ﬁrms between 1978-1982, the authors reported the existence of
a self-serving bias. Regarding performance, claiming internal reasons for success was
negatively associated with future performance, but there was a positive association
with taking blame for negative outcomes. Future EPS growth had a negative relation
with defensiveness.
Aerts (1994) explored the inﬂuence of ﬁrm characteristics on `accounting bias':
that good performance is explained by verbal causal explanations, but bad perfor-
mance is explained by more formal and impersonal accounting language and technical
terms. Examining the Reports of the Board of Directors of 50 Belgian ﬁrms from the
year 1983, attributions were coded according to four categories: internal/external,
positive/negative eﬀect for the ﬁrm, and whether (1) the explanation and (2) cause
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or eﬀect are expressed in technical-accounting terms or not. The results showed
evidence of self-serving bias and the `accounting bias'. Firms used accounting lan-
guage to explain negative outcomes, but gave clear verbal cause-eﬀect relationship
explanations for positive outcomes. However, this pattern could only be found for
ﬁrms with stable performance, but not for those with unstable performance. Aerts
(1994) also examined the factors inﬂuencing attribution behaviour. First, the results
demonstrated that listing status inﬂuences assertiveness (giving internal causes for
positive performance), with listed ﬁrms explaining positive accounting outcomes more
with verbal explanations than unlisted ﬁrms. Second, performance stability inﬂuenced
defensive (giving external causes for negative performance) accounting explanations,
which were found signiﬁcantly more often in stable than in unstable ﬁrms. Finally,
proﬁtability and ﬁrm size did not have a signiﬁcant impact.
Aerts (2005) compared listed and unlisted companies to explore the reasons for
the self-serving tendencies in attributions, arguing that listed ﬁrms are more prone to
impression management due to higher levels of accountability and public scrutiny. In
addition, the study analysed how attributions are inﬂuenced by (1) the characteristics
of the content of the attributed outcomes, (2) improving (declining) performance, (3)
several additional ﬁrm characteristics. Using a matched sample of Directors Reports
of 72 unlisted and 95 listed Belgian companies from the year 1997, the explained
eﬀects were coded according to: nature (to which ﬁnancial performance measure),
time orientation (past/present/future year), valence of the eﬀect (negative/positive),
expression (quantitative/qualitative), and organisational level. The results showed
that listed ﬁrms gave more attributions than unlisted ﬁrms (for both improving and
declining performance), and were more defensive (giving external causes for negative
performance) in their attributions when the performance outcomes were negative. In
addition, the results showed a negative association between defensive behaviour and
ﬁrm size, but positive with listing status and industry type. Self-acclaiming behaviour
showed a positive association with declining ﬁrm performance and with ﬁrm size.
In a more recent study, Aerts and Cheng (2011) investigated the association
between earnings management and certain company characteristics and the disclo-
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sure of explanations to earnings-related outcomes in the Management and Discussion
(MD&A) section of a sample of 104 Chinese Initial Public Oﬀering (IPO) prospec-
tuses. The authors suggested that causal explanations might be used to legitimise
earnings outcomes. Causal explanations were classiﬁed into the same categories as
in Aerts (2005) and aggregated to form two variables to measure assertiveness in at-
tributions (attributing positive outcomes more to internal reasons) and defensiveness
(attributing negative outcomes more to external reasons). The results conﬁrmed the
self-serving bias, and that pre-IPO earnings management practices were associated
with self-serving attribution behaviour in the IPO prospectuses. In addition, ﬁrms with
a positive change in proﬁtability were found to be signiﬁcantly more (less) assertive
(defensive) in their attribution behaviour. Proﬁtable ﬁrms were also signiﬁcantly less
defensive.
Baginski et al. (2008) compared a sample of 2437 interim and annual management
earnings forecasts from two periods (1983-1986 and 1993-1996) and documented an
increase in external attribution provision over time. Internal attribution provision
did not change signiﬁcantly. An analysis of determinants of external attributions for
the full sample covering both periods showed that giving more external attributions
was associated with ﬁrms that are larger, have smaller ranked absolute unexpected
earnings in the management forecast, and report bad news (negative unexpected
earnings).
While a number of studies that have examined the determinants of attribution
statement provision have tended to focus on ﬁrm-speciﬁc and market-related factors
such as proﬁtability, ﬁrm size, and listing status (e.g. Aerts 1994; Aerts 2005; Aerts
and Cheng 2011; Baginski et al. 2008), only few studies have analysed the inﬂuence of
corporate governance on attribution provision. Staw et al. (1983) compared high and
low performing ﬁrms and explored (1) diﬀerences in attribution behaviour between
the two groups, (2) whether the type of news contained in the letter to shareholders
(good or bad) inﬂuences the type of attributions provided, (3) situational and personal
determinants of attribution provision. Employing a sample of letters to shareholders
of 49 extremely high and 32 extremely low performing US companies in the year
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1977, the authors did not ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in attributions between high and
low performers. The results also revealed that organisational performance was not a
strong determinant of attributions, neither were personal variables of the CEO such
as salary, age and tenure. Institutional ownership was also insigniﬁcant.
Luz et al. (2009) explicitly investigated the association of self-serving attribu-
tions with the strength of corporate governance for the Brazilian environment. They
argued that ﬁrms with better governance should show less bias in their attribution
behaviour. Using a sample of 385 management reports for the year 2006, the authors
demonstrated that the occurrence of self-serving bias among ﬁrms did not diﬀer with
governance standards; but showed that ﬁrms with better governance were more likely
to attribute good outcomes to internal reasons. No diﬀerence was found in the per-
centage of the total report given to attribution statements between ﬁrms with better
governance and the other ﬁrms.
Aerts and Tarca (2010) examined how attribution statement provision is inﬂu-
enced by certain company characteristics and corporate governance factors. They
examined 172 Management Commentaries of ﬁrms in ﬁve industries from Canada,
the US, the UK and Australia. The results revealed that analyst following has a pos-
itive association with the absolute amount of attributions provided, whereas a ﬁrm's
market-to-book value has a signiﬁcant negative association. Change in proﬁtability
showed a positive association with the number of explanations provided per perfor-
mance outcome. However, no signiﬁcant relationship between corporate governance
structure and attribution behaviour was found.
A recent study by Aerts and Cheng (2012), using the same sample of Chinese IPOs
as in Aerts and Cheng (2011), analysed how the ﬁrm's ownership inﬂuences assertive
or defensive behaviour in the performance explanations in the IPO prospectuses.
Ownership was measured as (1) retention of ownership by CEO and other pre-IPO
shareholders after the IPO, (2) a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if ﬁrm is
state-controlled, 0 otherwise. No signiﬁcant inﬂuence of these variables on attribution
behaviour was found, only a marginal eﬀect of ownership on the amount and bias of
assertiveness in explanations.
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Taken together, the studies on the determinants of attribution statement provision
found evidence for an inﬂuence of ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors such as proﬁtability, ﬁrms size,
or listing status, but could not ﬁnd evidence for a strong role of a ﬁrm's corporate
governance.
2.3.3 Studies analysing the consequences of attribution state-
ment provision
In addition to exploring the determinants of attribution behaviour, some studies anal-
ysed the potential eﬀects of attribution statements. These studies examined an asso-
ciation of attribution statements with stock price increases (e.g. Staw et al. 1983; Lee
et al. 2004), stock price reactions (e.g. Baginski et al. 2000; Baginski et al. 2004;
Kimbrough and Wang 2009), stock valuations and earnings forecasts (Barton and
Mercer 2005), and Initial Public Oﬀering (IPO) price valuation and ﬁrst-day trading
returns (Aerts and Cheng 2012).
In addition to analysing the determinants of attributions in the letter to share-
holders as discussed in the previous section, Staw et al. (1983) also compared high
and low performing ﬁrms and analysed the eﬀect of attributions on the ﬁrm's share
price after publication of the report. Employing a sample of letters to shareholders
of extremely high and low performing US companies in the year 1977, the authors
showed that for both good and bad performing ﬁrms, there was a positive association
between internal attributions and stock price. Moreover, the greater the degree of
self-enhancement in the attributions, the higher the increase in share price in the
month after the publication of the annual report.
Lee et al. (2004) investigated whether performance attributions may predict future
share prices. The authors hypothesised that the public expects ﬁrms to be in control of
their performance outcomes, thus companies that blame external factors for negative
events may violate these expectations, leading to negative impressions of the ﬁrm
and subsequently worse stock price performance. Analysing letters to shareholders of
14 US companies in three industries (pharmaceuticals, food and beverage, industrial
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equipment) during a 21-year period (1975-1995), the authors found that ﬁrms which
made self-disserving attributions had higher stock prices one year later. Attributions
to positive outcomes had no association with stock prices.
Aerts and Cheng (2012) found that causal explanations are associated with IPO
oﬀer price valuation and subsequent ﬁrst trading day returns. They argued that as-
sertive explanations will have positive consequences for IPO valuation, while defensive
explanations will have negative consequences. Analysing the same sample of Chinese
IPOs as in Aerts and Cheng (2011), the authors found a strong self-serving tendency
in the attribution statements. IPO price valuation had a signiﬁcant positive relation-
ship with assertiveness of explanations, while the association of assertiveness with
ﬁrst-day underpricing (the initial return after the ﬁrst trading day relative to oﬀer
price) was negative. Defensiveness of explanations showed a negative relation with
IPO price valuation.
In addition to the studies reviewed above, there is also a limited number of studies
that have examined the association of causal attributions with stock price reactions
and the cost of capital. Baginski et al. (2000) examined whether attribution state-
ments in management earnings forecasts provide credible information to investors.
They explored three issues: (1) when attributions are given (when forecast news is
good or bad), (2) whether they are biased (what type of attribution is given for
good/bad news), (3) whether stock prices respond to the existence of attribution to
test whether attributions are seen as credible by investors. Their analysis considered
2085 US quarterly and annual management earnings forecasts for the period of 1983-
1986. The results demonstrated that more attributions were given for bad news, and
those were more often explained by external factors. Moreover, the analysis provided
evidence for the value relevance of attributions by showing that the stock price reac-
tion to unexpected earnings was stronger when the forecasts contained attributions.
This eﬀect of attribution presence was found for both internal and external attri-
butions. The authors considered this as evidence that the credibility or precision of
management forecasts can be increased by giving attributions.
Baginski et al. (2004) extended the Baginski et al. (2000) study and explored
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in more detail the determinants of providing attributions in voluntary management
forecasts as well as stock price responses to forecasts containing attributions. They
used a sample of 951 US interim and annual management earnings forecasts for the
period of 1993 to 1996. The results revealed that attributions were given more often
when earnings news was bad, and that bigger ﬁrms gave more attributions whereas
ﬁrms in regulated industries gave less. They also showed that external attributions
are more likely for larger ﬁrms and when the deviation from prior earnings expectation
is smaller. By contrast, the results showed that internal attributions were more likely
for larger deviations from earnings expectations, and for good earnings news. Further,
the authors demonstrated a positive association between attributions and absolute
security price changes. Also, attribution presence was associated with negative price
reactions and an enhanced price reaction per dollar of unexpected earnings. The
authors found that the eﬀect of attributions on stock price reactions was due to a
reaction to the existence of external attributions, whereas internal attributions were
insigniﬁcant.
Baginski et al. (2008) also found in their comparison of 2437 interim and annual
management earnings forecasts containing attribution statements from two periods
(1983-1986 and 1993-1996) that stock price reactions around the announcement were
stronger for forecasts given in the later period, and such responses only held for ﬁrms
covered by analysts.
Kimbrough and Wang (2009) extended the Baginski et al. (2004) study by arguing
that investors' reaction to self-serving attributions depends on the attributions' plau-
sibility. Plausibility was measured as (1) concurrent industry performance and (2) the
commonality of the earnings with industry and market earnings (ﬁrm ROA compared
to industry ROA). Based on a sample of 1790 quarterly earnings announcements
by 98 ﬁrms during 1999-2005, the authors demonstrated that enhancing (defensive)
attributions are associated with higher (less negative) abnormal stock returns for pos-
itive (negative) earnings surprises. For the subsample of announcements containing
self-serving attributions, defensive attributions were related to a less negative market
reaction to bad news when the majority of the ﬁrms in the same industry also reported
2.4. LIMITATIONS OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND THE NEED FOR
FURTHER RESEARCH 35
bad news, and when commonality of the ﬁrm's earnings with the industry and the
market was higher. Further, enhancing attributions were related to higher abnormal
returns to good news when the majority of the ﬁrms in the same industry reported
bad news and when commonality of the ﬁrm's earnings with the industry and the
market was lower.
Barton and Mercer (2005) conducted an experiment with 124 ﬁnancial analysts
to investigate the valuation implications of performance explanations. The authors
demonstrated that analysts that received a plausible (implausible) explanation for
bad performance believed that this performance was less (more) likely to persist than
the analysts in the control condition (who did not receive an explanation). Earnings
per share forecasts and stock valuations were signiﬁcantly higher (lower) for plausible
(implausible) explanations than if no explanation was given. In addition, analysts that
received an implausible explanation assessed management's reputation lower than the
analysts in the control group, while plausible explanations showed no positive eﬀect
on analysts' assessment. Earnings valuation multiples, which the authors used as a
proxy for the cost of capital, were lower for implausible explanations than for the
control group, but plausible explanations had no eﬀect. The authors concluded that
plausibility aﬀects management's reputation, thus its credibility in communicating
with the capital markets. Changes in this reputation will impact on a company's
information risk, which eventually aﬀects the cost of capital.
2.4 Limitations of previous research and the need
for further research
Although the studies discussed above have provided useful insights into attributions
in terms of the extent and nature, determinants (e.g. Bettman and Weitz 1983; Staw
et al. 1983) and consequences (e.g. Baginski et al. 2000; Baginski et al. 2004; Barton
and Mercer 2005), the studies have some limitations to warrant further research on
the topic.
First, prior studies have tended to focus mostly on exploring the motivations
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behind the self-serving bias (i.e. impression management or cognitive bias), analysing
situations which facilitate to discern the diﬀerent explanations, such as comparing
ﬁrms with good or bad performance (e.g. Bettman and Weitz 1983; Staw et al.
1983; Clatworthy and Jones 2003). Only a few studies (e.g. Staw et al. 1983;
Aerts 2005; Aerts and Tarca 2010) have examined the determinants of attribution
disclosure. However, these few studies have mostly focused on how speciﬁc aspects of
attributions (e.g. the attribution bias, or assertiveness/defensiveness of attributions)
are inﬂuenced by certain factors such as ﬁrm performance (e.g. Clatworthy and Jones
2003; Tessarolo et al. 2010; Aerts and Tarca 2010). Hence previous research has not
examined the determinants of the overall level of attribution statement disclosure and
most have tended to focus on examining performance, ﬁrm size and listing status as
determinants of attributions.
Second, only four studies could be identiﬁed that have analysed the inﬂuence
of corporate governance factors on attribution type and amount (Staw et al. 1983;
Aerts and Tarca 2010; Luz et al. 2009; Aerts and Cheng 2012). However, the range of
corporate governance mechanisms considered is very limited. For example, the only
mechanism Staw et al. (1983) examined was institutional ownership, while Aerts and
Cheng (2012) explored the role of CEO ownership and whether a ﬁrm is government
controlled in the special situation of an IPO in a Chinese setting. No identiﬁable study
has examined board structure variables, including the role of the audit committee,
which is the key corporate governance mechanism for overseeing ﬁnancial reporting
(Keasey and Wright 1993; Blue Ribbon Committee 1999; Smith Committee 2003;
Mangena and Pike 2005; FRC 2010b). Aerts and Tarca (2010) and Luz et al. (2009)
analyse the ﬁrm's overall corporate governance quality so that the eﬀect of individual
corporate governance mechanisms is unknown. Analysing the eﬀects of individual
corporate governance factors is important compared to composite factors with respect
to ﬁnancial reporting. A composite measure includes mechanisms that are not directly
responsible for the ﬁnancial reporting oversight, for example nomination committees
or remuneration committees, and therefore dilute the eﬀects observed. As previous
research has demonstrated, individual corporate governance mechanisms (e.g. non-
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executive directors, audit committee size) can inﬂuence disclosure (see e.g. Chen and
Jaggi 2000; Eng and Mak 2003; Mangena and Pike 2005; Mangena and Tauringana
2007; Patelli and Prencipe 2007). This study ﬁlls in this gap by investigating the
relationship between attributions and individual corporate governance factors.
With respect to the consequences of attributions, there is some insight on the
eﬀects of attributions on stock prices, but very limited evidence on the eﬀects on
the cost of capital. The only studies to examine the value relevance of attributions
examined management earnings forecasts (Baginski et al. 2000; Baginski et al. 2004;
Baginski et al. 2008; Kimbrough and Wang 2009). As these studies noted, attri-
butions in voluntary management earnings forecasts are distinctively diﬀerent from
attributions in a Management Commentary in the annual report, since they are not
prescribed, are not related to audited information, and there is no regulation regarding
form or content. This implies that attributions in annual reports are diﬀerent since
they relate to the audited accounts, and there are requirements for companies to
provide explanatory factors for their performance to aid users see the results through
the eyes of management. For example, the Companies Act (2006) requires directors
to include an explanation of factors inﬂuencing performance in the Business Review.
The UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC 2010b) also recommends that the board
should provide in their review explanations of the key factors inﬂuencing performance.
Also, Baginski et al. (2000), Baginski et al. (2004), Baginski et al. (2008) and
Kimbrough and Wang (2009) have focused on stock price reactions using an event
study method, thus have not examined the cost of capital eﬀect. Barton and Mercer
(2005) argue that attribution statements have an eﬀect on the cost of capital and call
for further research on the issue to understand the long-term eﬀects of reputation
eﬀects which last longer than a short-term reaction to disclosure. Therefore, this
study analyses the cost of capital eﬀects of attribution statements.
Finally, and more important for this study, most of the studies, especially on the
consequences of attribution statements, are US based. Clatworthy and Jones (2003)
and Aerts and Tarca (2010) are the only two studies that have examined the UK
context, but these do not examine the eﬀects of corporate governance factors on
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attributions, neither do they examine the cost of capital eﬀects of attribution state-
ments. As Clatworthy and Jones (2003) argue, the US results cannot be generalised
to the UK setting because the ﬁnancial reporting environments are diﬀerent. The US
ﬁnancial reporting is more prescriptive whilst the UK is more discretionary. Also, in
the US, litigation is prevalent, whilst in the UK it is limited, so that companies in the
US may be limited in their attribution behaviour compared to those in the UK.
2.5 Summary
This chapter has reviewed the literature on attribution disclosures. While there is a
large body of existing research, many studies have investigated the self-serving bias
in attribution statements and much less attention has been given to determinants or
consequences of attribution statements. Of these few studies that have analysed the
determinants of attribution statement disclosure, the studies have tended to focus
on the qualitative characteristics of attributions rather than on the extensiveness of
attribution disclosure and the type (internal/external). In particular, not much is
known about how corporate governance mechanisms inﬂuence attribution disclosure.
Regarding the economic consequences of attribution statements, existing research has
mainly focused on short-term market reactions to their announcement, thus has not
analysed a longer term cost of equity capital eﬀect. To date, no quantiﬁed impact of
attribution statements on the cost of capital based on an estimation of the cost of
equity capital has been provided.
Based on this review, it can therefore be concluded that this thesis can contribute
to the body of knowledge in two ways: First, by exploring in detail the determinants
of the extensiveness and the type (internal or external) of attribution disclosure with
special regard to the inﬂuence of corporate governance factors. Second, by investigat-
ing the cost of capital eﬀects of causal attribution statements by explicitly estimating
the cost of equity capital to provide a quantiﬁcation of the eﬀect.
CHAPTER 3
DETERMINANTS OF ATTRIBUTION
DISCLOSURE: THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
3.1 Introduction
In chapter 1, one of the objectives of this research was speciﬁed as to investigate the
determinants of attribution disclosure. Chapter 2 reviewed the literature investigating
attribution statements, including some of the determinants of attributions. In this
chapter, the hypotheses that are tested in the study to address the above objective are
developed. The chapter is organised as follows. The ﬁrst part develops a theoretical
framework to explain the disclosure of attribution statements based on a review
of relevant theories that the literature has put forward to explain the disclosure of
causal attributions in corporate documents. The second part builds on the theories
supported by studies reviewed in the previous chapter and other disclosure studies to
develop hypotheses about how these factors inﬂuence causal attribution disclosure.
The chapter concludes with a summary.
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3.2 Theories of voluntary disclosure
The literature provides a number of theories by which a ﬁrm's disclosure policy might
be explained (see Merkl-Davies et al. 2007 and Beyer et al. 2010 for a review). These
include agency theory (e.g. Jensen and Meckling 1976; Staw et al. 1983; Aerts 2005),
signalling theory (e.g., Salancik and Meindl 1984; Aerts 2005), capital needs theory
(e.g., Lang and Lundholm 1993; Gray, Meek and Roberts 1995; Lang and Lundholm
2000; Baginski et al. 2000; Baginski et al. 2004), and proprietary costs theory (e.g.,
Verrecchia 1983; Dye 1985; Hayes and Lundholm 1996). These theories are discussed
in the following sections.
3.2.1 Agency theory
Agency theory deals with the problems arising from the separation of ownership and
control in companies. In their classical paper, Jensen and Meckling (1976) described
the problems arising in this relationship: The principals (owners) of the ﬁrm hire an
agent (manager) in order to run the business on their behalf and in their interest.
As the agent's interest may be diverging from that of the owners, the business is
not necessarily run in the best interest of the owners but in that of the manager.
The manager has incentives to use the owners' funds as perquisites, such as high
compensation or other beneﬁts, or undertake projects and investments which may not
necessarily be in the best interest of the owners of maximising ﬁrm value (Jensen and
Meckling 1976; Fama 1980). The principals, therefore, have to incur costs to control
their agent, which are referred to as agency costs. These include the principal's costs
incurred for monitoring the agent, or the agent's bonding costs which are expenses
by the agent to reassure the owners of the proper use of the funds, for instance
an independent audit. Moreover, there are also the principal's residual losses that
stem from the agent taking decisions which do not maximise the owner's `welfare', or
bankruptcy costs. These agency costs have a negative eﬀect on ﬁrm value as investors
take agency costs into account in their stock valuation (Jensen and Meckling 1976;
Lev 1992).
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To deal with these agency problems a number of mechanisms are in place, both
internal as well as external to the ﬁrm, to protect the interests of the providers of
ﬁnance. Firm-internal mechanisms include institutional systems such as accounting,
or mutual monitoring by managers and the ﬁrm-internal labour market (Alchian and
Demsetz 1972; Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983). The board of directors is consid-
ered by Fama and Jensen (1983) as the apex of the mechanisms to control managers'
decisions. Shareholders delegate their control to the board, which monitors manage-
ment on their behalf and assures shareholders' interests are protected and thereby
reduces agency costs (Fama and Jensen 1983; Schaﬀer 2002). The board therefore
plays a major role in overseeing and controlling ﬁnancial reporting (FRC 2010b).
As performance explanations are an important component of ﬁnancial reporting to
the capital market (Smith Committee 2003; Barton and Mercer 2005), this suggests
that the board's oversight extends to management's explanations for performance
outcomes, thus the provision of attribution statements.
External mechanisms to control management's actions can be the divestment of
shares on the stock market if shareholders are not satisﬁed, the market for corpo-
rate control and takeovers to put pressure on underperforming management, or the
managerial labour market that uses ﬁrm performance to judge managers' market
value (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama 1980; Fama and
Jensen 1983).
As has been pointed out above, the agency problem can have negative eﬀects on
ﬁrm value. One way of reducing the agency problem and the negative capital market
eﬀects is by increasing information disclosure (see e.g. Lev 1988; Verrecchia 2001;
Bartov et al. 2005).1 Since managers have more information about the ﬁrm and
its performance than the owners, the owners will have strong interest in controlling
management to ensure their investments are put to best use. This creates agency
costs. If, however, investors receive more information about the ﬁrm, they can bet-
ter ascertain that management does not misappropriate their funds, which then may
1This is linked to the issue of information asymmetry. Information asymmetry occurs when one
capital market participant has more information about the value of an asset than the other. For a
discussion of information asymmetry and its implications see the next section 2.2.
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reduce the need for strong agency mechanisms. This may lead to reduced agency
costs and beneﬁcial eﬀects on ﬁrm value as investors will have less need to protect
themselves via assessing a lower share price.2 An important role in this process can be
accorded to the disclosure of explanations for corporate performance outcomes. As
only management can provide the reasons for the achieved performance, disclosing
this information to the market can enable investors to better judge the sustainability
of ﬁrm performance and so increase investors' conﬁdence in their estimates of future
returns. Moreover, as ... there are strong norms for organizations to make eﬃcient
use of resources and to achieve their goals ... (Staw et al. 1983, p. 584), manage-
ment uses attributions to justify or legitimise corporate performance (Staw et al. 1983;
Aerts 1994). Management may use performance explanations to demonstrate that
they served shareholders' interest well, which may reduce investors' fears of subopti-
mal or misuse of their funds. Moreover, negative performance may cause conﬂicts of
interest between owners and managers, so that management may recur to impression
management3 to inﬂuence perceptions of the outsiders (Merkl-Davies et al. 2007).
Firms may blame external factors to deny responsibility, whereas for good outcomes
ﬁrms may emphasise internal strengths and capabilities to foster conﬁdence in the
future of the ﬁrm. To sum up, agency conﬂicts and information asymmetry can be
considered a major driver of attribution disclosure.
3.2.2 Signalling theory
Signalling theory is linked to the concept of information asymmetry (see Spence 1973).
Information asymmetry arises if one party has more information about the quality and
value of a good than the counterparty. An investor interested in buying a ﬁrm's shares
faces an adverse selection problem as the seller may have better information about
the value and the future prospects of the ﬁrm (Lev 1988; Verrecchia 2001). Hence
the investor cannot be certain if the price paid for the shares appropriately reﬂects the
underlying value or is too high. If investors cannot distinguish between good and bad
2See chapter 4, section 2 for a discussion of potential beneﬁts of increased disclosure.
3See chapter 2, section 3.1.
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investments, they will undervalue good opportunities and overvalue bad opportunities,
resulting in an average valuation level (Healy and Palepu 2001), thus a misvaluation
of companies.4 Information asymmetry therefore has direct negative implications for
ﬁrm value by increasing investors' required rate of return, thus the cost of equity
capital.
To overcome this problem, ﬁrms with good performance can send signals to the
market to distinguish themselves from others and point out their superiority.5
One way for ﬁrms to signal their superiority to the market is through the disclosure
of information (Gonedes 1978; Gray, Meek and Roberts 1995; Aerts 2005). The
literature suggests that a better performing ﬁrm will signal this to the market by
disclosing more information (e.g. Singhvi and Desai 1971; Cooke 1989; Wallace et al.
1994; Wallace and Naser 1995). More information allows investors to better judge
the prospects of a ﬁrm and to distinguish between good and bad investments. Firms
with good performance have an incentive to provide more information to elaborate
on their success and present themselves in a positive light, distinguishing them from
worse performing ﬁrms. This can contribute to convincing investors of their superiority
and good future prospects, thus help the ﬁrm to attract capital at more favourable
terms and lower its cost of capital. By contrast, bad performing ﬁrms may not have
an incentive to elaborate on their poor performance as there is not much to boast.
However, not signalling does not automatically imply bad news, disclosure costs may
lead ﬁrms to not disclose, even though non-disclosure may be perceived negatively
by the market (Spence 1973; Verrecchia 1983). Disclosure costs can include direct
costs such as those for gathering and preparing information or indirect costs such
4If eventually information asymmetries are very high, uninformed market participants will refuse
to trade stocks under this condition or completely leave the market (Lev 1988). Akerlof (1970)
showed that this may eventually lead to a market breakdown, a situation when no more trade
occurs because due to information asymmetry market participants cannot be sure whether they
obtain a good or a bad quality product.
5Spence (1973) and Spence (2002) illustrated the signalling of superiority using a job market
analogy. As an employer cannot observe certain attributes of job candidates and how they will
perform in their tasks, thus cannot distinguish between better and worse candidates, the employer
will pay an average wage leaving the more productive employees with a lower wage than they
could achieve. In order to distinguish themselves, more productive candidates would signal their
superiority to the prospective employer by means of a higher education that separates them from
lower productivity candidates. From these considerations follows that signals about quality and value
can reduce information asymmetry and allow to distinguish between good and bad performers.
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as proprietary costs, that is revealing valuable information to competitors (see e.g.
Hayes and Lundholm 1996; Leuz and Wysocki 2006).6 In this context, ﬁrms will
compare the beneﬁts and costs of disclosure, and disclose information if the beneﬁts
outweigh the costs (Healy and Palepu 2001; Verrecchia 2001). Thus the existence of
these costs makes it more diﬃcult for investors to judge whether the non-disclosed
information is negative or not (Verrecchia 1983).
Explaining ﬁnancial performance outcomes is a means of sending signals about
performance. Aerts (2005, p. 497) argued that positive performance is a powerful
signal of managerial competence. In this case, ﬁrms may be inclined to signal this
by elaborating on their superiority. Against the background of the self-serving bias in
attributions, emphasising internal strengths and capabilities as the reasons for success
may positively inﬂuence the market's perception of the ﬁrm and its management, and
reassure investors of the good prospects of the ﬁrm. In return, when performance
is bad, ﬁrms may provide fewer explanations so as not to alert the market to any
shortcomings and spread uncertainty among investors.
On the other hand, Salancik and Meindl (1984) found evidence that ﬁrms with
unstable ﬁnancial performance over time take responsibility for both positive and
negative performance more than stable ﬁrms do. That is, management takes blame
for bad outcomes to signal to the public that they are in control of the situation and
measures to address the problem have been taken. Doing so may be seen by investors
as a sign that all is under control.
3.2.3 Capital needs theory
Similar to signalling theory, ﬁrms compete in the capital market to attract investors,
and investors need information to make decisions about their capital allocation (see
Meek et al. 1995). Investors allocate capital to the investment opportunities that
maximise their expected utility (Sterling 1972; Scott 2009), and the purpose of ﬁ-
nancial reporting is to provide information that makes this decision-making easier
(Beaver et al. 1968; IASB 2005). Information asymmetry between management and
6See section 2.4 of this chapter for a discussion of proprietary costs.
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the market impedes a fair pricing of the ﬁrm and can lead to a higher required rate
of return (Lev 1992; Healy and Palepu 2001; Verrecchia 2001). Hence ﬁrms relying
on the capital market for ﬁnancing have incentives to provide information beyond the
mandatory minimum to reduce information asymmetry in order to increase demand
for their shares and to secure capital at the best possible terms (Cooke 1989; Meek
et al. 1995).
Theoretical research provides support for the notion that more disclosure can
reduce information asymmetry.7 Empirically, the literature has documented various
capital market beneﬁts for ﬁrms providing higher disclosure, such as higher liquidity of
the shares (e.g. Welker 1995), a lower cost of capital (e.g. Botosan 1997; Mangena
et al. 2010) and a lower cost of issuing debt (Sengupta 1998). These ﬁndings provide
support for the notion that ﬁrms may recur to voluntary disclosure in order to attract
capital at more favourable terms. In particular, ﬁrms intending to raise money in
the capital market have incentives to increase voluntary disclosure prior to the share
oﬀering so as to maximise the proceeds by lowering the cost of capital (Choi 1973;
Cooke 1989; Lang and Lundholm 1993; Healy and Palepu 2001). And indeed, the
literature found evidence for a tendency that ﬁrms increase their voluntary disclosures
when they intend to access the capital market (Choi 1973; Gibbins et al. 1990; Lang
and Lundholm 1993; Frankel et al. 1995; Lang and Lundholm 2000).
Against this background, the provision of performance explanations given from
management's perspective can play an important role as they can give investors an
insight they could not get from other sources (Cole and Jones 2005). By setting the
ﬁnancial statements into context, such explanations provide investors with a better
understanding of which factors inﬂuenced performance and whether these are likely
to persist (Cole and Jones 2005). The resulting reduced information asymmetry can
therefore help investors to price shares more accurately and lower the required rate
of return. On that basis, it can be argued that ﬁrms have an incentive to provide
more performance explanations in order to reduce information asymmetry and to
obtain capital at better terms. In particular, ﬁrms intending to raise capital may have
7This literature is discussed in chapter 4, section 2.
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incentives to provide more performance explanations to reduce the cost of capital.
3.2.4 Proprietary costs theory
There is consensus in the literature that concerns of supplying competitors with
valuable information keep ﬁrms from disclosing proprietary information (Verrecchia
1983; Dye 1985; Dye 1986; Gibbins et al. 1990). According to Verrecchia (2001),
proprietary costs are one of the main reasons for nondisclosure, even if withholding
information may be perceived negatively by the capital market. On the other hand,
when industry entry costs are low, the incumbent ﬁrm has incentives to disclose
information in order to deter potential competitors (Darrough and Stoughton 1990;
Wagenhofer 1990). Nondisclosure may cause proprietary costs by attracting new
entrants into the industry, whereas releasing negative information about the industry's
proﬁts and prospects may deter entry of competitors and thus eliminate proprietary
costs (Dye 2001). Hayes and Lundholm (1996) and Palepu et al. (2003) argued that
ﬁrms take threats to their own competitiveness and rivals' reactions into consideration
when deciding on the level of aggregation of segment results in their disclosures.
So the intensity of competition and the associated costs of disclosing proprietary
information may inﬂuence a ﬁrm's decision of how much information to provide so
as not to weaken its competitive position.
The association of proprietary costs and disclosure is of particular relevance for
causal attributions. Explaining why performance was particularly good or bad might
reveal why the ﬁrm is so proﬁtable or which industry is particularly lucrative. The
ﬁrm may therefore decide not to reveal such information so as not to alert and
attract competitors. For non-proﬁtable ﬁrms, explaining why performance was bad
or fell short of expectations may also constitute proprietary information and provide
competitors with an edge. For instance, explaining a shortfall in proﬁt with problems
in the development of a new product due to cost overruns or sourcing problems may
give competitors an indication of when a new product may come to market, or whether
it will be launched at all. Competitors could adjust their strategies to exploit this
delay and try and boost their own sales and gain market share. Similarly, explanations
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such as problems with internal control or inventory systems can give competitors an
indication of the ﬁrm's internal processes, thus are valuable information. Against
this background, proprietary cost considerations may lead both proﬁtable and non-
proﬁtable ﬁrms to be cautious in providing detailed explanations for their performance
outcomes, despite market expectations and potential negative implications for ﬁrm
value.
3.3 Factors inﬂuencing causal attribution disclo-
sure: Hypotheses development
Having discussed in the previous section the key theories that may explain corpo-
rate attribution disclosure, this section now develops hypotheses of the relationship
between attribution disclosure and corporate governance and ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors.
3.3.1 Corporate governance
John and Senbet (1998, p. 372) suggest that corporate governance deals with mech-
anisms by which stakeholders of a corporation exercise control over corporate insiders
and management such that their interests are protected. This means corporate
governance is the mechanism by which stakeholders reduce agency and information
asymmetry problems via the monitoring of management performance, and ensuring
that managers are accountable to shareholders and other stakeholders. These gov-
ernance mechanisms are both internal and external (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen
1983; Williamson 1984; Shleifer and Vishny 1986). The key internal mechanisms
are ownership structure and the board of directors (Brown et al. 2011), with the
board of directors considered to be the apex of the internal control system (Fama
and Jensen 1983). The board of directors is delegated by the shareholders to monitor
management. External control mechanisms consist of the stock market, the mar-
ket for takeovers, regulation and enforcement, or the managers' labour market (see
Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983; Vafeas 2003; Brown et al. 2011). Both internal
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and external governance mechanisms contribute to reducing agency and information
asymmetry problems.
The focus in this thesis is the internal governance mechanisms. Forker (1992)
argues that the introduction of internal corporate governance mechanisms, particu-
larly the board of directors, improves monitoring and reduces the beneﬁts manage-
ment derives from withholding information. The board of directors is responsible
for monitoring managerial performance in general (Jensen 1993; Karamanou and
Vafeas 2005), and in particular, the ﬁnancial reporting processes (Karamanou and
Vafeas 2005; Mangena and Pike 2005). The UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC
2010b, p. 18) provides that the board of directors has the responsibility to present
a balanced and understandable assessment of the company's ﬁnancial performance,
ﬁnancial position and prospects. This balanced assessment includes explanations for
performance.
In this context, Aerts and Tarca (2010) note that performance explanations have
become a key component in the system of public accountability. Providing expla-
nations reduces information asymmetry and can give shareholders more insight into
whether management is capable of creating shareholder wealth. As corporate disclo-
sure is mainly decided at board level (Gul and Leung 2004) and the quality of the
corporate governance system inﬂuences the quality of ﬁnancial reporting (Whittington
1993), it can be argued that a ﬁrm's corporate governance system inﬂuences attribu-
tion disclosure. Stronger corporate governance mechanisms can increase accountabil-
ity pressures and so induce management to be more forthcoming about the reasons
for performance, and to increase disclosure of explanations. In addition, stronger
oversight might dampen management's attempts at impression management, leading
them to be less defensive and less assertive in their attributions.
While the inﬂuence of corporate governance mechanisms on disclosure has been
analysed by a multitude of studies, the issue of how attribution statements are in-
ﬂuenced by corporate governance has not been well researched.8 Therefore, in the
following sections, hypotheses on the link between attribution disclosure and corpo-
8See Chapter 2, section 3.2 for a detailed review.
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rate governance attributes are developed.
3.3.1.1 Proportion of non-executive directors on the board (PropNED)
The board of directors occupies the central role in internal control, and is composed
of both inside directors and outside directors.9 Fama and Jensen (1983) highlight that
internal managers will be the most inﬂuential board members as they are involved in
running the business, thus have speciﬁc insight into the ﬁrm's processes. Manage-
ment therefore may easily use the board to their own advantage at the expense of
shareholders' interests (Williamson 1984). Furthermore, Jensen (1993) suggests that
inside directors are to some extent dependent on the CEO and therefore could not
openly bring up criticism and monitor their superior. The inclusion of outside directors
who are not employed by the ﬁrm can mitigate this problem (see e.g. Fama 1980 and
Leftwich et al. 1981). Their task is to scrutinise the performance of management
in meeting agreed goals and objectives and monitor the reporting of performance
(FRC 2010b, p. 11). Including outside, or non-executive directors enhances monitor-
ing and control of top management and limits expropriation of shareholders because
...outside directors have incentives to carry out their tasks and do not collude with
managers to expropriate residual claimants (Fama and Jensen 1983, p. 315). Fama
and Jensen (1983) argue that outside directors are usually managers themselves, thus
have interest in establishing a reputation as experts in decision control as their market
value as managers depends on their performance as decision makers. Hence, outside
directors will have interest in closely controlling a ﬁrm's management to demonstrate
their expert skills so as to foster their own reputation and market value. The UK Cor-
porate Governance Code (FRC 2010b) recommends that the board is to be composed
of an adequate mixture of both executive and non-executive directors such that none
of the groups can inﬂuence and dominate the decisions made on the entire board.
Further, the UK Code (FRC 2010b) recommends that ﬁrms state which non-executive
director they consider to be independent, that is having no ties or close relationships
9The literature refers to this dichotomy varyingly as executive/ non-executive directors (e.g.
Forker 1992; Gul and Leung 2004; Mangena and Pike 2005) or as inside/outside directors (e.g.
Fama and Jensen 1983; Beasley 1996).
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with the ﬁrm or its personnel, so that the directors' judgment will not be aﬀected
by potential relationships with the ﬁrm. The Code provides a number of criteria for
judging independence.10 This thesis takes the position that any non-executive direc-
tor can add value to the monitoring process, not necessarily only those considered
to be independent, and that they can complement each other in providing oversight.
Hence a broad view is adopted here and the role of all non-executive directors for
attribution statement disclosure is examined, whether they are formally considered
independent or not.
Forker (1992) argues that the improved monitoring by non-executive board mem-
bers will lead to better disclosure quality as it reduces the beneﬁts for management
of not disclosing information. Moreover, Patelli and Prencipe (2007) suggest that
independent directors would not only monitor insiders' actions but also push inside
directors to improve and strengthen other control mechanisms such as disclosing more
voluntary information.
On the basis of the link between outside directors, monitoring of management,
and disclosure, it can be suggested that there is an association between non-executive
board members and disclosure of performance attributions. Schaﬀer (2002) and Bar-
ton and Mercer (2005) highlight that attribution statements to ﬁnancial performance
outcomes can be used by the board to assess management performance. Directors
will want to know the reasons behind performance to assess this performance and to
analyse whether management is doing a good job. It can therefore be expected that
non-executive directors may push management to provide more extensive performance
explanations. In order to satisfy outside directors' demands, management will have
to provide these explanations. This suggests a positive association between the pro-
portion of non-executive directors on the board and the extensiveness of attribution
disclosure.
In addition, there is also research to suggest that executive and non-executive di-
10The UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC 2010b, para B.1.1) deﬁnes independence if the
director (1) has not been an employee of the ﬁrm in the last 5 years, (2) has not upheld a material
business relationship with the ﬁrm the last couple of years, (3) does not obtain remuneration by
the ﬁrm of any kind, (4) does not have close family ties to the ﬁrm's leading personnel, (5) does
not have cross-directorships or associations with other board members, (6) does not represent a
signiﬁcant shareholder, or (7) has not already served on the board for more than 9 years.
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rectors may diﬀer in the tendency to provide internal or external attributions. Schaﬀer
(2002) argues that inside and outside directors face diﬀerent constraints that reduce
their monitoring ability and will lead to a diﬀerent behaviour when it comes to giving
attributions for poor ﬁrm performance. Schaﬀer (2002) states that inside directors
are restrained by their proximity and loyalty to the CEO ('social constraints'), and
the potential fear of retaliation in case they oppose and criticise the CEO and top
management. Therefore, they will tend to be less critical of their own ﬁrm and more
likely to, for instance, attribute poor performance to external factors than to internal
reasons. Outside directors on the other hand do not assess their own performance,
and their personal accountability is mostly to the ﬁrms in which they are directors.
Hence they are more free in their attribution search and could attribute performance
either to internal or external causes. Schaﬀer (2002) argues that outside directors,
for example, will be more likely to give internal attributions for bad performance if
internal reasons are the cause. This suggests that non-executive directors may diﬀer
from executive directors in the tendency to provide internal or external attributions.
Empirical research has produced mixed results. A signiﬁcant positive association
between the proportion of outside directors on the board and voluntary disclosure was
reported by Patelli and Prencipe (2007), Lim et al. (2007), and Donnelly and Mulcahy
(2008). A positive association was also found by Li et al. (2008) with intellectual
capital disclosure and by Chen and Jaggi (2000) with comprehensiveness of ﬁnancial
disclosure. Baek et al. (2009) reported a positive association with overall disclosure
and with information about board and management processes in particular, and Cheng
and Courtenay (2006) reported a positive association between boards dominated by
a majority of independent directors and disclosure. Felo (2010) found a positive
relationship between director independence and corporate reporting transparency, and
a meta-analysis of disclosure studies by Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta (2010)
found a positive relationship between director independence and disclosure for non-
Anglo-Saxon countries.
By contrast, a negative association between outside directors and voluntary disclo-
sure was reported for a sample of ﬁrms from Singapore (Eng and Mak 2003), Hong
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Kong (Gul and Leung 2004), Malaysia (Haniﬀa and Cooke 2005), Kenya (Barako
et al. 2006), and for compliance with executive stock option disclosures in Australia
(Nelson et al. 2010). No relationship was found by e.g. Forker (1992), Ho and Wong
(2001), Haniﬀa and Cooke (2002), Mangena and Pike (2005). Also, Brammer and
Pavelin (2006) and Felo (2010) did not ﬁnd an association between outside directors
and corporate reporting transparency. Therefore, based on the theoretical consider-
ations the following hypotheses are stated, with hypothesis H1b in non-directional
form:
H1a: There is a positive association between the proportion of non-executive
directors on the board and attribution disclosure.
H1b(i): There is an association between the proportion of non-executive directors
and internal attribution disclosure.
H1b(ii): There is an association between the proportion of non-executive directors
and external attribution disclosure.
3.3.1.2 Director ownership (Dirown)
Agency theory suggests that managerial ownership helps align managers' and share-
holders' interests more closely and thereby reduces the agency problem (e.g. Jensen
and Meckling 1976; Jensen 1993). When managers have an equity stake in the ﬁrm,
acting in self-interest becomes more costly for the managers as they share an in-
creasing portion of the costs of this behaviour and not only the beneﬁts. Managers
therefore will have a higher incentive to act in the interest of shareholders, which
includes themselves. In this context, managers are more likely to engage in actions
that improve ﬁrm value. One action that managers can take is to increase voluntary
disclosure (Ruland et al. 1990; Eng and Mak 2003).
Studies (e.g Forker 1992; Leung and Horwitz 2004; Mangena and Pike 2005)
suggest a positive relationship between executive director ownership and disclosure.
The idea is that higher levels of director ownership would reduce the extent of the
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agency problem and provide incentives to the directors to disclose more (Leung and
Horwitz 2004). Also, Mangena and Pike (2005) suggest that directors may be inclined
to increase disclosure if they want to buy or sell their ﬁrms' shares, as higher disclosure
might lead to higher liquidity, which in turn would increase share price. Hamill et al.
(2002) stress that executive directors are insiders so that their trading falls under
insider dealing regulations, and that insiders are not allowed to trade ﬁrm's shares
without disclosing inside information. Hence Mangena and Pike (2005) argue that
directors would have incentives to disclose more information to the market in order
to prevent falling foul of insider trading rules when trading their shares.
In this context, there is reason to suggest a positive association between executive
director ownership and attribution statement disclosure. The capital market expects
explanations of performance outcomes and if these go unsatisﬁed, this may result in
negative eﬀects on share price and directly hurt managers' wealth. The more shares
management owns, the more management has to lose. Therefore, the higher man-
agement's stake and inﬂuence in the ﬁrm, the more they might be inclined to explain
the causes for performance to satisfy investors' demands. Providing more detailed
performance explanations may give investors more conﬁdence in the probabilities of
their expected payoﬀs, this might lead to a lower required rate of return and higher
stock price. This will directly beneﬁt directors' wealth.
It can also be expected that the level of executive director ownership inﬂuences
the type of attribution (internal or external) provided. If management holds part of
their wealth in their ﬁrm, they may engage in self-serving behaviour and impression
management to make sure their wealth is protected. Hence the higher management's
stake, the more they will be inclined to engage in impression management to convince
the market of the quality of the ﬁrm and to keep and attract investors. This behaviour
can support the ﬁrm's stock price, and thereby help protect management's ﬁnancial
interests. In sum, one would expect that the pattern of attributing outcomes to
internal or external causes diﬀers with the degree of management ownership.
Empirical research has not provided clear evidence for the relationship between
management ownership and disclosure. Ruland et al. (1990) and Karamanou and
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Vafeas (2005) found a negative association of managerial ownership with the likeli-
hood of giving management earnings forecasts. Eng and Mak (2003) demonstrated
a negative association between managerial ownership and voluntary disclosure in the
Management Discussion and Analysis section, and Chau and Gray (2002) reported
a negative association of ownership by insiders (directors and dominant sharehold-
ers) with voluntary disclosures. Mixed evidence has been provided by Leung and
Horwitz (2004). They found a positive association between higher director owner-
ship (between 1% and 25% of the shares) and more voluntary segment disclosure,
but a negative association beyond 25%, pointing to negative eﬀects of ownership
concentration. Baek et al. (2009) found a negative relationship between managerial
ownership and disclosure for ﬁrms with low director ownership (< 5%). Other stud-
ies found no signiﬁcant association between management ownership level and share
option disclosure (Forker 1992), interim disclosure (Mangena and Pike 2005), ﬁrms'
internet ﬁnancial reporting (Kelton and Yang 2008), and overall voluntary disclosures
(Donnelly and Mulcahy 2008). Therefore, based on the theoretical considerations and
the mixed empirical evidence, the following hypotheses are stated in a non-directional
form:
H2a: There is an association between director ownership and attribution disclo-
sure.
H2b(i): There is an association between director ownership and internal attribu-
tion disclosure.
H2b(ii): There is an association between director ownership and external attribu-
tion disclosure.
3.3.1.3 Audit committee characteristics
The board of directors carries out the monitoring function on behalf of the share-
holders to ensure management acts in their interests. This function is commonly
carried out in specialised board committees tasked with speciﬁc aspects of monitor-
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ing. Oversight over ﬁnancial reporting matters is assigned to the audit committee
(see Blue Ribbon Committee 1999; Smith Committee 2003; FRC 2010b) which con-
stitutes a key part of the accountability component of corporate governance (Keasey
and Wright 1993).11 The role of the audit committee is to monitor the ﬁrm's inter-
nal accounting processes and controls, ﬁnancial reporting and ﬁnancial statements,
and to interact on a regular basis with the ﬁrm's internal and external auditors (see
e.g. Fama and Jensen 1983; Klein 1998; Blue Ribbon Committee 1999; He et al.
2009). Reﬂecting these tasks, the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999, p. 17) describes
the audit committee as ...the entity at the core of the corporate ﬁnancial reporting
process. It has responsibility to ensure that the accounting information provided to
the outside is unbiased (Klein 1998; Song and Windram 2004; FRC 2010a). The
Smith Committee (2003, p. 10 para 5.4) explicitly stated that the audit committee
should review related information presented with the ﬁnancial statements, including
the operating and ﬁnancial review .... This implies that the review should also con-
sider the performance explanations provided by managers to ensure that they are fair
and unbiased.
The Smith Committee (2003) identiﬁed some attributes of audit committee ef-
fectiveness. In this study, the attributes of audit committee size and audit committee
expertise are considered to inﬂuence the disclosure of explanations for performance
outcomes.12
Audit committee size (ACSize)
The Blue Ribbon Committee (1999, p. 26) argues that due to the complex nature
of the accounting and ﬁnancial matters the audit committee deals with, it ... merits
signiﬁcant director resources, both in terms of the number of directors dedicated to
the committee and the time each director devotes to committee matters. Both the
Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) and Smith Committee (2003) recommend that at
11Two other commonly used board committees are the remuneration and nomination committee.
12A third aspect often analysed in the literature, the independence of audit committee members
(e.g. Abbott et al. 2000; Anderson et al. 2004; Karamanou and Vafeas 2005; Armstrong et al.
2010) was considered for this study as well. The data collection process, however, revealed that
94% of audit committee members of the sample ﬁrms were classiﬁed as independent non-executive
directors, hence the variable was dropped from the analysis.
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the minimum, the audit committee should have three independent directors. The
UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC 2010b) also recommends a minimum of three
members, or at least two for smaller ﬁrms. Felo et al. (2003) and Abbott et al.
(2004) argue that larger committees can provide better oversight as they are, due to
more members, more likely to uncover and highlight problems in ﬁnancial reporting.
Furthermore, increasing the number of committee members strengthens the commit-
tee's position towards management, and reduces the potential for the members to
collude with management on ﬁnancial reporting matters and to take actions to the
detriment of the shareholders (Archambeault and DeZoort 2001).13
In the context of attribution statements, a large audit committee provides greater
potential for critical questioning of the validity of the reasons provided by management
to explain performance and would be, potentially, less likely to accept any explanation
at face value. This may reduce self-serving tendencies and so inﬂuence not only the
extent of attribution disclosure but also the type of attributions provided. In this
respect, managers would be more likely to take responsibility and make appropriate
internal and external attributions for performance in a non-self-serving manner.
Empirical research on the eﬀect of audit committee size has provided mixed evi-
dence. For instance, while Lin et al. (2006) reported a signiﬁcant negative association
of audit committee size and occurrence of earnings restatements, neither Abbott et al.
(2004), Xie et al. (2003) nor Bedard et al. (2004) found a signiﬁcant association with
earnings management. By contrast, a signiﬁcant negative association was found be-
tween audit committee size and quarterly earnings management (Yang and Krishnan
2005) and suspicious auditor switches (Archambeault and DeZoort 2001).
In terms of the eﬀect of audit committee size on disclosure, the research evidence
is also mixed. A positive association was found by Felo et al. (2003) and Felo and
Solieri (2009) between audit committee size and the quality of ﬁnancial reporting
and disclosure, and by Nelson et al. (2010) between audit committee size and com-
13Other studies take the contrary position suggesting that larger boards are less eﬀective due
to internal coordination problems and poorer communication and decision making, hence reducing
monitoring and control capabilities (see Lipton and Lorsch 1992; Jensen 1993; John and Senbet
1998). Felo et al. (2003) and Yang and Krishnan (2005), however, argue that audit committees are
not as large as the board of directors, so these problems are unlikely to happen.
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pliance with executive stock option disclosure. Karamanou and Vafeas (2005), using
management earnings forecasts as proxy for disclosure, found a positive association
between audit committee size and forecast accuracy, but they also reported a sig-
niﬁcant negative association between audit committee size and (1) the likelihood of
providing earnings forecasts and (2) forecast precision. Yet Mangena and Pike (2005)
and Mangena and Tauringana (2007) found no signiﬁcant association with disclosure
level in interim reports. Based on the notion that larger audit committees may have
more potential for critical analysis and thus lead to more detailed performance ex-
planations, as well as the empirical evidence, the following hypothesis is stated, with
H3b in non-directional form:
H3a: There is a positive association between audit committee size and attribution
disclosure.
H3b(i): There is an association between audit committee size and internal attri-
bution disclosure.
H3b(ii): There is an association between audit committee size and external attri-
bution disclosure.
Audit committee expertise (ACExp)
There is broad agreement among committees of enquiry and in the literature that
audit committee members should be appropriately qualiﬁed (e.g. Blue Ribbon Com-
mittee 1999; Smith Committee 2003; McDaniel et al. 2002; Felo et al. 2003). For
the audit committee to be eﬀective, the members ... need to have suﬃcient un-
derstanding of the issues to be dealt with by the committee to take an active part
in its proceedings (Cadbury Committee 1992, para 4.37). The members therefore
need to have ﬁnancial expertise, experience, and the ability to read and understand
ﬁnancial statements (Bull and Sharp 1989; Song and Windram 2004). The view is
that members with ﬁnancial expertise and technical knowledge can ask more probing
questions and will be more critical towards management and reporting (Knapp 1987;
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Bull and Sharp 1989; Levitt 2000; McDaniel et al. 2002). Moreover, Knapp (1987)
suggests that in an audit dispute with management audit committee members with
ﬁnancial expertise will be less inﬂuenced by management and more likely to support
the auditor. Experts on the committee could also 'sharpen and shift the focus' of
discussions and assessments of the quality of ﬁnancial reporting in the committee
(McDaniel et al. 2002, p. 142). Taken together, this suggests a positive association
between ﬁnancial expertise on the audit committee and better disclosure quality.
Against that background, to increase eﬀectiveness of the audit committee, both
the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) and the Smith Committee (2003) recommend
that the audit committee contains at least one member with expertise in accounting
or ﬁnancial management. This principle has been incorporated into the UK Corporate
Governance Code (FRC 2010b). It can be achieved by demonstrating prior experience
as CEO, ﬁnance director, or auditor, as well as evidence of a professional accounting
qualiﬁcation (Blue Ribbon Committee 1999; Smith Committee 2003).
Research evidence on the association of ﬁnancial expertise and ﬁnancial reporting
issues shows a positive eﬀect. Abbott et al. (2000) reported a negative association of
expertise with ﬁnancial statements fraud, and Song and Windram (2004) a negative
relationship between audit committee ﬁnancial expertise and incidences of investiga-
tions by the Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP). Dhaliwal et al. (2010) found
a positive association between expertise and accruals quality, whilst Abbott et al.
(2004) reported a negative association with occurrence of earnings restatements.
Yang and Krishnan (2005), however, found no signiﬁcant association between the
presence of an expert on the committee and quarterly earnings management. Knapp
(1987) found that experts were more supportive of the auditor in an audit dispute with
management, whereas Carcello and Neal (2003) and DeZoort and Salterio (2001) re-
ported no signiﬁcant association between ﬁnancial expertise and auditor dismissals
following a going-concern report.
A number of studies have also examined the eﬀect of audit committee ﬁnancial
expertise on disclosure. For example, Felo et al. (2003) documented a positive as-
sociation of committee expertise with ﬁnancial reporting quality. Felo and Solieri
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(2009) found a positive association between disclosure and the percentage of expert
members who are aﬃliated with ﬁrms that have business relations with the ﬁrm,
and a negative association between disclosure and the percentage of expert members
who are relatives of ﬁrm executives. Moreover, adding more independent experts was
followed by subsequent improvements in disclosure quality. Karamanou and Vafeas
(2005) reported a positive association between audit committee expertise and the
likelihood of updating forecasts. Mangena and Pike (2005) and Kelton and Yang
(2008) found a positive association between audit committee ﬁnancial expertise and
interim disclosure, and internet ﬁnancial reporting, respectively. Mangena and Tau-
ringana (2007) reported a positive association of ﬁnancial expertise with compliance
with the ASB statement of best practice on interim reporting. Finally, Nelson et al.
(2010) ﬁnd audit committee expertise to be positively associated with compliance
with executive stock options disclosures.
Consequently, in this thesis it is hypothesised that audit committee ﬁnancial ex-
pertise is associated with attribution statements. The more ﬁnancial expertise and
experience an audit committee has, the more likely it will encourage management to
provide detailed explanations for performance outcomes. Audit committee members
with ﬁnancial expertise and experience are better able to discern the reasons for per-
formance and to probe management to provide more information, leading to more
extensive and detailed causal performance attributions. In addition, audit commit-
tees with more ﬁnancial expertise will inﬂuence the way a performance outcome is
attributed via critical questioning of the validity of the reasons provided by manage-
ment to explain performance. This suggests that the audit committee will less easily
approve self-serving attributions, in which management tends to claim successes and
blame failure on the environment. Following the above discussions, the following
hypotheses are stated:
H4a: There is a positive association between audit committee ﬁnancial expertise
and attribution disclosure.
H4b(i): There is an association between audit committee ﬁnancial expertise and
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internal attribution disclosure.
H4b(ii): There is an association between audit committee ﬁnancial expertise and
external attribution disclosure.
3.3.2 Firm-speciﬁc characteristics
In addition to corporate governance factors, this thesis analyses the inﬂuence of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics on the disclosure of causal attributions. The eﬀect of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics on corporate disclosure has been examined by numerous
studies (e.g. Singhvi and Desai 1971; Chow and Wong-Boren 1987; Cooke 1989;
Wallace et al. 1994; Wallace and Naser 1995; Meek et al. 1995; Hossain et al.
1995; Raﬀournier 1995; Archambault and Archambault 2003; Mangena and Pike
2005; Haniﬀa and Cooke 2005; Cerbioni and Parbonetti 2007).14 These studies
revealed that a number of ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics, such as ﬁrm size, gearing, and
proﬁtability, inﬂuence the disclosure of information.
Since performance explanations are a central part of a ﬁrm's disclosure strategy
(Barton and Mercer 2005), it can be argued that certain ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics
will also inﬂuence the disclosure of performance explanations. A limited number of
studies have pursued this issue and investigated speciﬁcally which ﬁrm characteristics
inﬂuence the disclosure of causal attributions (e.g. Staw et al. 1983; Aerts 1994;
Aerts 2005; Aerts and Tarca 2010). As was reviewed in Chapter 2, section 3.2, these
studies provided evidence that factors such as ﬁrm size, proﬁtability, and listing status
inﬂuence the way ﬁrms disclose attributions, and hence these factors are examined in
this study. This study also adds to existing literature by investigating additional ﬁrm-
speciﬁc characteristics that were found to inﬂuence general information disclosure.
The characteristics investigated in this thesis are discussed below:
14Ahmed and Courtis (1999) and Chavent et al. (2006) provide detailed reviews of this literature.
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3.3.2.1 Firm size (Size)
There is strong evidence in the literature that ﬁrm size and disclosure are positively as-
sociated. Several reasons why larger ﬁrms can be expected to have a higher disclosure
level have been suggested: the competitive disadvantage from disclosing information
is potentially lower for bigger ﬁrms (Singhvi and Desai 1971; Meek et al. 1995); they
have a lower cost of information production and dissemination (Buzby 1974; Chavent
et al. 2006; Cerbioni and Parbonetti 2007); larger ﬁrms have higher agency costs
and are more exposed to government intervention and political costs (Jensen and
Meckling 1976; Watts and Zimmermann 1986; Cooke 1989); and there is a higher
demand for information from analysts (Hossain et al. 1995). Consistent with these
arguments, a number of studies on the determinants of disclosure found a signiﬁcant
positive relationship (e.g. Chow and Wong-Boren 1987; Lang and Lundholm 1993;
Wallace and Naser 1995; Meek et al. 1995; Hossain et al. 1995; Ahmed and Courtis
1999; Cerbioni and Parbonetti 2007; Lim et al. 2007).
Similar arguments can be presented for a positive association between ﬁrm size
and the disclosure of attributions. Indeed, prior studies support this relationship. For
example, Baginski et al. (2004) and Baginski et al. (2008) found that larger ﬁrms
provided more attributions in their management earnings forecasts. Aerts (2005)
reported an inﬂuence of ﬁrm size on attribution characteristics. The study showed
a negative association between ﬁrm size and defensive (excuses, denials) attribution
tendencies, and a signiﬁcant positive association with self-acclaiming (entitlements,
enhancements) attributions. By contrast, Aerts (1994) did not ﬁnd a relationship
between ﬁrm size and attribution characteristics.
In addition, regarding the type of attributions (internal or external), both Baginski
et al. (2004) and Baginski et al. (2008) found that larger ﬁrms provided more external
attributions in their management earnings forecasts. Hence the following hypotheses
are stated:
H5a: There is a positive association between ﬁrm size and attribution disclosure.
H5b(i): There is an association between ﬁrm size and internal attribution disclo-
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sure.
H5b(ii): There is an association between ﬁrm size and external attribution disclo-
sure.
3.3.2.2 Analyst following (AF )
There is evidence in the literature that analyst following inﬂuences attribution state-
ment disclosure (e.g. Aerts and Tarca 2010). Analysts are among the prime users of
ﬁnancial information and play a vital role in the capital market by processing informa-
tion that is relevant to economic decision making and helps investors in their investing
and capital allocation decisions (Lang and Lundholm 1996; Healy and Palepu 2001).
In order to carry out their tasks, analysts require ﬁrms to provide them with informa-
tion. The more information about a ﬁrm analysts have at their disposal, the more
precise their judgements about the ﬁrm and its prospects can be (Lang and Lundholm
1996).
Of particular relevance in this context are explanations for corporate performance
outcomes. Barton and Mercer (2005) demonstrate that analysts use management's
performance explanations when they are evaluating ﬁrm performance, and that these
explanations inﬂuence the assessed share value. They suggest that performance ex-
planations could be used by ﬁrms to try and inﬂuence analysts' interpretations of the
results. This suggests that the higher the number of analysts covering a ﬁrm, the
more a ﬁrm will try and provide interpretations of the results. In this context, man-
agers may provide more detailed attribution statements that convey an interpretation
of the results in accordance with management's view, in an attempt to guide and
inﬂuence analysts' reactions to the reported performance towards a certain direction.
Prior empirical studies found support for a positive association of disclosure and
analyst following. For instance, Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Healy et al. (1999)
reported a signiﬁcant positive association between analyst following and a ﬁrm's
disclosure quality, and Healy et al. (1999) also found that increases in disclosure
are associated with increases in analyst following. Clarkson et al. (1999), however,
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reported no signiﬁcant association. With regard to attribution disclosure, Aerts and
Tarca (2010) found that ﬁrms with higher analyst following disclose signiﬁcantly more
performance explanations. Furthermore, Aerts and Tarca (2010) showed that ﬁrms
with higher analyst following attribute outcomes in a signiﬁcantly more self-serving
way, that is claiming more successful outcomes for internal reasons and blaming neg-
ative outcomes on external factors. The authors also found that ﬁrms with higher
analyst following use impersonal and seemingly objective technical-accounting expla-
nations signiﬁcantly more often for negative outcomes than for positive outcomes,
and vice versa, that is they explain positive outcomes much more in a causal narra-
tive way than with technical accounting terms. This suggests that the higher scrutiny
brought by higher analyst following inﬂuences attribution behaviour, and might in-
centivise ﬁrms to explain results in a more self-serving fashion. Hence, the following
hypotheses are stated:
H6a: There is a positive association between analyst following and attribution
disclosure.
H6b(i): There is an association between analyst following and internal attribution
disclosure.
H6b(ii): There is an association between analyst following and external attribution
disclosure.
3.3.2.3 Gearing (Gear)
Agency theory suggests that agency costs increase with the level of debt in the
capital structure, as this increases management's incentives to transfer wealth from
the bondholders to the shareholders (see Jensen and Meckling 1976). The ﬁrm can
counter these costs by disclosing more information. Furthermore, according to Myers
(1977) and Schipper (1981), ﬁrms with higher gearing disclose more information
because the ﬁrms' long term creditors will require more information than from a ﬁrm
with lower leverage, to make sure their claims are safe.
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Causal attributions are not only a means to justify performance. Another func-
tion is to foster conﬁdence in management's actions and to create an image that
management is in control of the situation and will be in the future (Salancik and
Meindl 1984). Salancik and Meindl (1984, p. 239) argued that ﬁrms' attributions
are not merely explanations of outcomes, but ...political statements that reassure
constituents or induce them, when necessary, to participate in the organization's af-
fairs. The holders of debt of a highly geared ﬁrm might be watching more closely a
ﬁrm's performance and might want more explanations for performance outcomes to
monitor debt covenants to make sure their capital is repaid (Wallace and Naser 1995;
Mangena and Pike 2005). Also, investors may be less conﬁdent regarding an invest-
ment in a highly geared ﬁrm. To counter this problem, management can use causal
attributions to create an image that everything is under control, that there is no rea-
son to be worried, and so to give debtholders and investors conﬁdence. A possibility
for management to use attributions in this way is by providing more explanations,
and by using more self-serving attribution tactics. Aerts (2005, p. 506) agrees with
this view, arguing that As a primary ﬁnancial risk indicator, higher ﬁnancial leverage
could induce companies to become more impression management sensitive and to be
more prone to using verbal coping tactics. This suggests that higher geared ﬁrms
may provide more attributions to counter doubts about their future stability and to
convince investors that they are not as risky as it appears.
Moreover, higher gearing may lead ﬁrms to attribute outcomes either more to
internal causes to reassure investors that management is in control (Salancik and
Meindl 1984), or more to external reasons to suggest that management is doing the
right thing, but external factors intervened so that the positive eﬀects of manage-
ment's actions could not unfold (Staw et al. 1983). Hence, it can be argued that the
type of causal attributions given by highly geared ﬁrms diﬀers from those of lower
geared ﬁrms, yet speciﬁc a priori predictions about how the attribution behaviour will
diﬀer between the two groups cannot be made.
Empirical research has not clearly conﬁrmed a positive relationship between gear-
ing and disclosure. While some studies found a positive association (e.g. Riahi-
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Belkaoui and Kahl 1978; Malone et al. 1993, Wallace et al. 1994, Ferguson et al.
2002), other studies found a negative association (e.g. Schadewitz and Blevins 1998),
and yet others did not ﬁnd gearing to be signiﬁcant (Haniﬀa and Cooke 2005; Wal-
lace and Naser 1995; Mangena and Pike 2005). Regarding causal attributions, Aerts
(2005) and Aerts and Tarca (2010) could not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant association. Therefore
the following hypotheses are stated:
H7a: There is a positive association between gearing and attribution disclosure.
H7b(i): There is an association between gearing and internal attribution disclo-
sure.
H7b(ii): There is an association between gearing and external attribution disclo-
sure.
3.3.2.4 Proﬁtability (Proﬁt)
Signalling theory suggests that good performing companies disclose more information
so as to distinguish themselves from less proﬁtable ﬁrms.
Signalling superior performance avoids the costs associated with being perceived
by investors as a 'lemon' (Akerlof 1970)15. Moreover, Singhvi and Desai (1971)
argue that, as proﬁtability is seen as a measure of good management performance,
higher proﬁtability may incentivise management to provide more information to assure
investors of the ﬁrm's proﬁtability and to support management compensation.
The same logic can be applied to suggesting an association of proﬁtability with the
amount and the type of attribution disclosure. Attributions to ﬁnancial performance
outcomes are a direct means of explaining the reasons for the achieved proﬁtability.
Therefore, proﬁtable ﬁrms will provide more detailed explanations for their perfor-
mance than less proﬁtable ﬁrms so as to emphasise their achievement. This may
convince investors of the sustainability of the achieved performance, and to retain
current and/or attract new investors to the stock.
15Akerlof (1970) uses the term 'lemon' to denote a product of bad quality.
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The justiﬁcation of proﬁtability may also incite management to engage in impres-
sion management. If proﬁtability is high, ﬁrms would have an incentive to elaborate
on this success, thus providing more detailed explanations pointing out how well they
performed. There is also reason to suggest that when proﬁtability is lower, man-
agement's attributions to internal and external reasons will be diﬀerent. Bowman
(1976) analysed the content and topics in letters to shareholders in annual reports
of US food-processing ﬁrms and documented that ﬁrms with low proﬁtability talked
more often about the external environment and factors than high proﬁtability ﬁrms,
which talked more about internal factors. Thus proﬁtable ﬁrms may be more inclined
to underscore internal strengths and highlight their responsibility for performance in
an attempt to demonstrate to investors that management is best placed to create
wealth for the investors. By contrast, lower proﬁtability may prompt management's
denial of responsibility and search for external reasons, trying to reassure investors
that this had nothing to do with management capabilities and boost investors' con-
ﬁdence in the ﬁrm as an investment.
The results by a multitude of studies on the association between proﬁtability and
disclosure level are mixed. Whilst some studies found a positive relationship between
proﬁtability and disclosure (e.g. Singhvi and Desai 1971; Gul and Leung 2004; Haniﬀa
and Cooke 2005; Lim et al. 2007; Arshad et al. 2011), other studies found a negative
relationship (Wallace and Naser 1995; Chen and Jaggi 2000), and some studies found
no association (Wallace et al. 1994; Raﬀournier 1995; Ho and Wong 2001; Chau and
Gray 2002; Eng and Mak 2003; Mangena and Pike 2005; Kelton and Yang 2008).
Likewise, empirical evidence regarding the relation of proﬁtability and disclosure
of causal attributions is also mixed. While Aerts (2005) failed to ﬁnd an association
between characteristics of causal attributions and proﬁtability, Aerts and Tarca (2010)
and Aerts and Cheng (2011) reported a negative relationship of attributional defen-
siveness with proﬁtability and change in proﬁtability. In a longitudinal study, Salancik
and Meindl (1984) found that ﬁrms with unstable performance history provided more
attributions, both internal attributions for success and external attributions for bad
outcomes. Huﬀ and Schwenk (1990) provided evidence that the proportion of space
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in Chrysler executives' speeches to stock market analysts that is accorded to external
attributions increased signiﬁcantly in years of bad ﬁnancial performance compared to
good years. Therefore, based on the mixed empirical evidence, the following non-
directional hypotheses are stated:
H8a: There is an association between proﬁtability and attribution disclosure.
H8b(i): There is an association between proﬁtability and internal attribution dis-
closure.
H8b(ii): There is an association between proﬁtability and external attribution
disclosure.
3.3.2.5 Financial performance change (Perf )
Aerts (2005) highlighted that performance attributions are normally given to changes
in performance, not to absolute levels. Indeed, other previous research has provided
strong evidence that a change in ﬁnancial performance inﬂuences the disclosure of
performance explanations (e.g., Bettman and Weitz 1983; Aerts 1994; Aerts 2005;
Tessarolo et al. 2010).
The attribution theory posits that individuals generally expect to be successful
and see themselves as having control of their actions and the environment (Miller
and Ross 1975; Gooding and Kinicki 1995). If an outcome is as expected, there is no
need for an extensive explanation as the reasons are presumed to be known (Gooding
and Kinicki 1995). On the other hand, when an outcome is unexpected and/or is
negative, this belief is shaken and individuals need to ﬁnd an explanation. In this case,
if an outcome is negative or falls short of expectations, greater attributional search
is triggered than if the outcome is successful or expected, and individuals provide a
greater amount of attributions to explain what has happened (e.g. Lau and Russell
1980; Wong and Weiner 1981; Weiner 1985; Lee et al. 2004). Experiments by Wong
and Weiner (1981) conﬁrmed this claim, by demonstrating that most attributions are
given when the outcome is unexpected and negative.
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On that basis, the literature argues that a downturn in ﬁnancial performance is
a predicament for a ﬁrm which will increase the need to comment on the outcomes,
hence increasing the amount of attributions provided (e.g. Staw 1980; Staw et al.
1983; Aerts 2005). Similarly, Bettman and Weitz (1983, p. 182) suggested that
... since annual reports can be used as persuasive documents, higher levels of jus-
tiﬁcation through causal reasoning may occur because corporations have a greater
need to attract investments after a year of unexpected negative performance. This
observation is consistent with the suggestion by Baginski et al. (2004, p. 13) that
investors are likely to demand explanations for unexpected bad news.
With regard to attributions to internal and external reasons, managers' previous
experiences and successes may create an illusion of control and make them over-
conﬁdent in their own abilities, focusing on internal actions and reasons for perfor-
mance (Ford 1985; Huﬀ and Schwenk 1990). In case of failure, internal actions will
not be cited as they were supposed to lead to good outcomes, and external causes
will be perceived as responsible, which may lead to an increase in external attribu-
tions (Ford 1985; Huﬀ and Schwenk 1990). Furthermore, management may tend to
blame external causes for a downturn in performance to try and maintain investor
conﬁdence and prevent selling of shares16, or for fear for their positions or compen-
sation (Clatworthy and Jones 2003). Against that background, a positive association
between a negative performance change and external attributions can be expected.
The association between ﬁnancial performance change and both the amount and
type of attribution disclosed has been conﬁrmed empirically. For instance, Bettman
and Weitz (1983) demonstrated that most attributions were given when ﬁrm perfor-
mance was worse than expected and when the ﬁrms mostly talked about negative
outcomes. Baginski et al. (2004) found evidence that ﬁrms provided attributions in
earnings forecasts more often in case of bad news. Moreover, Aerts (2005) showed
that in case of a negative performance change, ﬁrms tend to increase their self-
promotion and self-enhancement.
16Abrahamson and Park (1994) for instance argued that the fear of stock price decline induced
by investors' selling following the revelation of bad performance may lead management to conceal
bad news.
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Clatworthy and Jones (2003) showed that ﬁrms whose performance had declined
from the previous year were much more likely to give external attributions to explain
the outcome. Consistent with the ﬁnding by Clatworthy and Jones (2003), Baginski
et al. (2004) found that internal attributions in management earnings forecasts were
more likely for good news (hence external attributions for bad news), and Baginski
et al. (2008) demonstrated a positive association between bad news in ﬁrms' manage-
ment earnings forecasts (i.e. negative unexpected earnings) and external attributions.
Hence the following hypotheses are stated:
H9a: There is a positive association between a negative change in ﬁnancial per-
formance from the previous year and attribution disclosure.
H9b(i): There is an association between a negative change in ﬁnancial perfor-
mance from the previous year and internal attribution disclosure.
H9b(ii): There is a positive association between a negative change in ﬁnancial
performance from the previous year and external attribution disclosure.
3.3.2.6 Share issue (Issue)
The literature argues that there is an association between share issuance and voluntary
disclosure (see e.g. Choi 1973; Lang and Lundholm 1993; Lang and Lundholm 2000),
based on the argument that ﬁrms seeking to raise money on the capital market beneﬁt
from providing more voluntary disclosure prior to an oﬀering. This reasoning suggests
that in order to maximise ﬁrm value and the value of the securities oﬀered, ﬁrms
will increase information provision to reduce information asymmetry. This reduces
uncertainty surrounding the value of the securities, thus maximises the proceeds by
reducing the cost of capital (Lang and Lundholm 1993; Frankel et al. 1995; Lang and
Lundholm 2000). Moreover, increasing disclosure can enlarge the potential investor
base and so the demand for the shares oﬀered, thereby increasing the price (see Cooke
1989; Lang and Lundholm 1993).
With regard to the association between a share oﬀering and attributions for per-
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formance outcomes, a positive association can be suggested. Given that the aim of
providing attributions to performance outcomes is to reduce information asymmetry
and to help investors in their pricing of shares (see e.g. IASB 2005), it can be argued
that ﬁrms will provide more explanations to their performance outcomes if they are
planning on issuing equity, as more explanations provide investors with a better under-
standing of the reasons for performance. This may reduce uncertainty, the perceived
level of risk associated with the shares, and lead to a more favourable pricing of the
ﬁrm's shares in the following issue.
It can also be argued that the type of attribution provided (internal or external)
is associated with equity oﬀering. In order to attract capital at better rates, manage-
ment may engage in self-serving behaviour and try and present the ﬁrm in a good
light and as an investment with good prospects. That is, management might show
a tendency to emphasise the ﬁrm's strengths and excellent management capabilities,
whereas giving less prominence to external factors.
Empirical research suggests that disclosure and accessing the capital market are
positively associated: For instance, Gibbins et al. (1990) provided evidence based on
a survey and interviews that disclosures are inﬂuenced by the frequency with which
ﬁrms access the capital market. Frankel et al. (1995) analysed a 4 year period of US
listed ﬁrms and found evidence that ﬁrms which recur to external ﬁnancing via the
capital market more often, issue earnings forecasts with a higher frequency. Lang and
Lundholm (1993) found a positive association between disclosure and ﬁrms raising
money in the current or the following two years. Lang and Lundholm (2000) also
showed that issuing ﬁrms substantially increased their disclosure activity six months
prior to the oﬀering as compared to a control sample. In addition, Mangena and
Tauringana (2007) reported a positive association between share issue and ﬁrms'
compliance with the interim report disclosure requirements. However, Gul and Le-
ung (2004) found no signiﬁcant association between voluntary disclosure and equity
issuance. Therefore the following hypotheses are stated:
H10a: There is a positive association between a share issue in the following year
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and attribution disclosure.
H10b(i): There is a positive association between a share issue in the following
year and internal attribution disclosure.
H10b(ii): There is an association between a share issue in the following year and
external attribution disclosure.
3.4 Summary and conclusion
This chapter has provided the theoretical underpinning for the analysis of the de-
terminants of attribution disclosure. It has reviewed relevant theories of disclosure
to provide an understanding of why ﬁrms voluntarily provide information in general,
and attribution disclosure in particular. The review was followed by the develop-
ment of hypotheses on the determinants of attribution statement disclosure, covering
corporate governance mechanisms and ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors.
This chapter and the previous chapter have set the framework for analysing the
determinants of attribution statement disclosure. The next chapter moves the inves-
tigation on to the second objective of this thesis and develops, based on reviewing
the literature on disclosure and the cost of capital, the hypotheses regarding the
association between attribution statements and the cost of capital.
CHAPTER 4
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON
DISCLOSURE AND THE COST OF CAPITAL
4.1 Introduction
The previous two chapters have focused on the literature on attributions and the de-
velopment of hypotheses on the determinants of attribution statements. This chapter
focuses on the second key objective of the research regarding the consequences of
attribution provision, in particular the cost of capital eﬀects of attribution provision.
It reviews the literature on disclosure and the cost of capital and develops the hy-
potheses regarding the eﬀect of attribution statements on the cost of capital. The
chapter is structured as follows. First, the chapter reviews the theoretical literature
that establishes a link between disclosure and the cost of capital. This serves as the
underlying theoretical foundation for establishing the association between attribution
statements and the cost of capital. Second, the chapter reviews the empirical litera-
ture that has investigated the link between disclosure and the cost of capital. This
leads to the identiﬁcation of the gap in current research that the thesis intends to ﬁll.
Third, hypotheses about the association of attribution statement disclosure and a
ﬁrm's cost of equity capital are formulated. The chapter concludes with a summary.
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4.2 The link between information and the cost
of capital
Information and corporate disclosure of information play a crucial role in the capi-
tal market. As was discussed in the previous chapter, information asymmetry causes
investors to require a higher rate of return than in the absence of information asymme-
try, as investors protect themselves from other market participants that may possess
superior information and can take advantage of the uninformed investor (Lev 1992;
Verrecchia 2001). Verrecchia (2001, p. 171) labels this the `information asymmetry
component of the cost of capital', which is . . . the diﬀerence in the cost of capi-
tal in the presence versus absence of an adverse selection problem that arises from
information asymmetry.
Bartov et al. (2005, p. 98) stress that this information asymmetry problem can
be reduced by ﬁnancial reporting and disclosure: The problem of asymmetric infor-
mation between managers and shareholders is addressed through ﬁnancial reporting
and other means of timely public disclosure. A commitment to more disclosure re-
duces the beneﬁts for a person to become privately informed, so that information
asymmetry will be reduced (Lev 1988; Verrecchia 2001). Regarding the beneﬁts of
higher disclosure the literature found evidence for higher analyst following (Lang and
Lundholm 1996), increased institutional ownership (Lev 1992), or increased liquidity
of the stock (Healy et al. 1999). One of the most important beneﬁts suggested by
the literature, however, is the eﬀect on a ﬁrm's cost of capital. A multitude of studies
(e.g., Bartov and Bodnar 1996; Healy et al. 1999; Dye 2001) have pointed out that
providing additional voluntary disclosures can further correct stock misvaluations and
lower the required rate of return, so that . . . the full value of the company's pro-
duction, ﬁnance, and marketing strategies and activities will be reﬂected in a timely
manner in its stock and bond prices (Lev 1992, p. 12).
The literature has suggested various mechanisms regarding how the cost of capital
eﬀect of more information unfolds in the capital market. This section will now discuss
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the mechanisms of how exactly information may aﬀect the cost of capital. Theoretical
research can be grouped into two broad streams. The ﬁrst perspective suggests
an indirect link via the eﬀects of information on a stock's liquidity. The second
perspective incorporates various theories that provide a direct link between disclosure
and the cost of capital without referring to the means of liquidity. Oﬀering diﬀerent
explanations for the association, the common proposition is that higher disclosure
leads to a lower cost of capital.
4.2.1 Liquidity and the cost of capital
Research in this stream suggests that reducing information asymmetry in the market
lowers the cost of capital by reducing transaction costs and increasing liquidity of the
stock. Before discussing the literature suggesting the link between liquidity and the
cost of capital, the notion of market liquidity has to be brieﬂy introduced. Liquidity
refers to the fact that shares of a ﬁrm can be bought or sold immediately and with
as less an eﬀect on price as possible, that is, the more liquid a market, the easier it is
to trade assets, and the smaller the eﬀect trading will have on price (O'Hara 1995).
If demand and supply for a share are not balanced, that is there is no immediate
seller (buyer), a market maker, or specialist, steps in and keeps the market liquid by
acting as a counterparty (Fabozzi and Modigliani 2003). The market maker charges a
premium for his services, and the trader incurs transaction costs and pays a `price for
immediacy' (Demsetz 1968). These costs, the diﬀerence in price at which the market
maker buys or sells a security is known as the bid-ask spread (O'Hara 1995; Fabozzi
and Modigliani 2003). Unlike the informed trader who has the option not to trade
if he thinks the conditions are not optimal, the market maker has to trade (O'Hara
1995). Facing potential losses when trading with an informed trader, he sets the
spread so as to break even to oﬀset the expected losses with gains made from trades
with uninformed traders (Glosten and Milgrom 1985). The consequence of this spread
is a less liquid market, as pointed out by Kyle (1985, p. 1320): . . . market makers
compensate themselves for bad trades due to the adverse selection of insiders by
making the market less liquid. Consequently, the higher the information asymmetry,
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thus the risk of adverse selection, the higher the spread in the specialists' bid and ask
prices.
The cost of capital eﬀect of liquidity is based on research that has shown that
the spread, as a measure of liquidity, is inﬂuenced by information asymmetry. For
instance, Copeland and Galai (1983) demonstrated that the existence and extent of
information asymmetry give rise to and inﬂuence the size of the spread, and Glosten
and Milgrom (1985) provided the key insight that a trade of a stock has information
content in itself, thus aﬀects prices. This is because the bid-ask spread declines with
trading volume, as inside information is incorporated into prices.
Building on this notion, subsequent theoretical research has explicitly analysed
the cost of capital consequences of liquidity for a ﬁrm's cost of capital (e.g., Amihud
and Mendelson 1986; Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Baiman and Verrecchia 1996).
These studies agree that increased disclosure of information leads to increased liq-
uidity, reduced transaction costs, and a lower cost of capital. Evidence for the eﬀect
has been provided for both the primary and the secondary market.
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) demonstrated that returns are an increasing func-
tion of the bid-ask spread, asserting that this spread eﬀect is a rational reaction by an
eﬃcient market when faced with a spread. In the presence of transaction costs, the
investor requires a higher compensation via a higher required rate of return. Based on
their results, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) suggested that ﬁrms have an incentive to
reduce their opportunity cost of capital by engaging in liquidity-increasing behaviour
such as information disclosure.
Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) and Baiman and Verrecchia (1996) oﬀered a
diﬀerent possibility how liquidity may aﬀect the cost of capital. They suggest that
information asymmetry and the adverse selection problem negatively aﬀect the future
liquidity of a stock, because these factors increase the price impact of a large trade by
large investors if they have to sell in the future. This increases the present required
returns so as to compensate for future liquidity problems. Diamond and Verrecchia
(1991) demonstrated that reducing information asymmetry via disclosure reduces
uncertainty surrounding a ﬁrm's stock and the adverse selection problem, that is the
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problem faced by the investor that the counterparty may have superior information
about the stock and thus he/she may be taken advantage of. Reducing information
asymmetry increases a stock's future liquidity, thereby increasing price and lowering
the required rate of return. Consequently, market makers require a lower risk premium
for engaging in trade and providing liquidity, and hence liquidity is increased. This
eﬀect will subsequently attract more large institutional investors to buy the shares and
take larger positions, as the future negative price eﬀect is reduced. This increased
demand further increases stock price and reduces the required return. In addition,
Baiman and Verrecchia (1996) showed that this liquidity eﬀect also impacts on equity
issuances in the primary market. Their model demonstrates that investors in an initial
public oﬀering, when ﬁrst setting prices for the shares, demand a premium to take
into account the possibility of having to trade for liquidity reasons in the future.
The ﬁrm's initial choice of committing to a certain disclosure level thereby inﬂuences
market liquidity at the time of the potential future trade. This aﬀects investors' initial
determination of the share prices, thus the ﬁrm's cost of capital. The authors argue
that more disclosure reduces the information asymmetry between informed managers
and market makers, as the latter do not have to rely on demand for the shares as
much as before to glean information. This makes prices less sensitive to demand and
increases market liquidity. Since the initial shareholders appreciate future liquidity,
more disclosure reduces the ﬁrm's cost of capital.
4.2.2 Disclosure and the cost of capital: Direct links
The second broad stream of research attempts to provide a direct link between disclo-
sure and the cost of capital without referring to liquidity. This literature encompasses
several approaches, yet they all agree that increased disclosure may reduce the cost
of capital.
4.2.2.1 Estimation risk
The eﬀect of information disclosure on estimation risk is a widely used proposition
and usually regarded in the literature, beside the liquidity eﬀect, as the second main
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way to explain how information can aﬀect the cost of capital (see e.g., Botosan 2006).
According to this perspective, more disclosure can reduce the cost of capital by reduc-
ing the non-diversiﬁable estimation risk associated with estimating the parameters of
an asset's return or payoﬀ distribution. The reasoning behind this link is exempliﬁed
by Barry and Brown (1985) who highlighted that in a traditional theoretical asset
pricing and CAPM environment, it is generally assumed that the parameters required
for calculating an asset's return or payoﬀ distribution are certain. Barry and Brown
(1985) further state that if parameter uncertainty, thus estimation risk, surrounding
the parameters existed, it would not aﬀect the model's predictions.
These assumptions have been challenged by the estimation risk literature based
on the notion that, as investors cannot know all the parameters of a predictive dis-
tribution with certainty in advance, some of them still have to be estimated (Barry
and Brown 1985; Handa and Linn 1993). The literature has argued that for each
asset there is a certain amount of information available, which diﬀers across assets
(Handa and Linn 1993; Coles et al. 1995). Investors calculate the expected return
or payoﬀ from an investment based on the information available, hence a diﬀering
amount of information on assets can induce uncertainty for the investor regarding the
parameters, resulting in estimation risk. Handa and Linn (1993, p. 89) have empha-
sised this notion by deﬁning estimation risk as . . . the additional risk incorporated
in the covariance structure of returns by investors facing incomplete information.
Therefore, when confronted with higher uncertainty about the exact parameters of
the return or payoﬀ distribution, a rational investor will require a higher rate of return
to be compensated for this risk.
This hypothesised relationship has been conﬁrmed by a number of studies. Barry
and Brown (1985) showed that under diﬀerential information, high information stocks
have smaller betas than if estimation risk was equal among all stocks. For low
information stocks, they conclude, the beta then must be too low. A rational investor
will demand a higher return on the security for which less information is available, as
it is perceived to be riskier. These results have been conﬁrmed by Coles et al. (1995)
using a model based on payoﬀ, not returns. They demonstrate that the presence of
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estimation risk arising from symmetric uncertainty (when there is equal information for
all the securities considered) aﬀects equilibrium portfolio weights, asset betas, asset
expected returns, and market expected return. Additional evidence was provided by
Handa and Linn (1993) who, having modelled an economy with a constantly changing
asset composition so that estimation risk and assets with incomplete information are
always present, have demonstrated that beta and return calculations diﬀer between
the complete/incomplete information cases. With incomplete information, investors
attribute more systematic risk to assets for which little information is available than
they do for assets with more information. In case of diﬀerent levels of information
on assets, low (high) information asset prices are lower (higher), and low information
stocks have higher betas than in the case of complete information for all assets.
Moreover, in equilibrium, the demand and price of low (high) information assets are
lower (higher) than if there was complete information.
There is, however, still some debate about whether estimation risk is diversiﬁable
or not. For instance, whilst Barry and Brown (1985) demonstrated that this risk is
systematic, thus non-diversiﬁable, the ﬁndings by Clarkson and Thompson (1990)
do not fully support this. Although their results reject the strict assumption that
estimation risk surrounding low information stocks is diversiﬁable, they do not pro-
vide unambiguous evidence for non-diversiﬁability. Rather, the ﬁndings suggest that
estimation risk is partly diversiﬁable. The latter is consistent with evidence provided
by Clarkson et al. (1996) who found that estimation risk may be both diversiﬁable
and non-diversiﬁable, depending on the basis an investor uses for asset pricing. When
estimated factor betas on exogenous factors are used, estimation risk will be diver-
siﬁable and not priced. By contrast, when assets are priced using estimated factor
betas on imperfect mimicking portfolios which contain stocks for which little infor-
mation is available, there is a systematic component to estimation risk. In light of
this unsettled issue, Clarkson et al. (1996, p. 79) noted that . . . the extent of the
impact of estimation risk remains, fundamentally, an empirical question.
The model by Gao (2010) demonstrated that more disclosure improves investor
welfare (deﬁned as investors' ex ante expected utility) by lowering the cost of capital
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only in certain circumstances. The cost of capital may even increase, and the eﬀect
depends on the type of economy and investor type. Disclosure inﬂuences the cost of
capital via inﬂuencing the mean-variance ratio of the ﬁrm's cash ﬂows. Disclosure
quality could increase the cost of capital if it increases the overall cash ﬂow risk of the
ﬁrm. Better disclosure quality can increase or decrease welfare depending on whether
it is a current or new investor, and the risk tolerance.
4.2.2.2 Incomplete Information model
A well-known approach to link information and the cost of capital has come from
Merton (1987) who has modelled a situation in which there is incomplete, not asym-
metric information. Every investor knows only a part of the stocks available, that is,
they can only invest in a stock if they are aware of it, but every investor who is aware
of a certain stock has the same information about it including homogenous beliefs
about the return distribution. The model shows that the market value of a ﬁrm is
always lower in the case of incomplete information; and the diﬀerence is bigger the
smaller the investor base is. Moreover, Merton (1987) showed that this incomplete
information signiﬁcantly aﬀects expected returns, in particular for less widely known
stocks and which have small investor bases, as well as for smaller ﬁrms with little
institutional following. Thus providing more information can increase the investor
base, and will reduce the cost of capital and increase the market value, with the less
known companies beneﬁting the most.
4.2.2.3 Information precision and the role of public and private informa-
tion
A slightly diﬀerent perspective on information asymmetry and its eﬀects has been
taken more recently by Easley and O'Hara (2004), Hughes et al. (2007), Christensen
et al. (2010), Clinch and Lombardi (2011), and Lambert et al. (2012). Using a rational
expectations model, Easley and O'Hara (2004) demonstrated that, when comparing
two identical stocks, the ﬁrm with more private and less public information faces
a higher expected return by investors, because private information makes it more
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diﬃcult for uninformed investors to `infer the information from prices'. This increases
uninformed investors' risk attached to a stock as compared to informed investors,
who may better change the composition of their portfolio when new information
arises. Hence private information creates a new form of systematic risk, and, in
equilibrium, investors want to be compensated for bearing this risk. Therefore, more
public information reduces this non-diversiﬁable information risk uninformed investors
may have to take by holding a stock, and reduces their expected returns.
This conclusion has, however, been rejected by Hughes et al. (2007). Using a
factor-model-based extension of the Easley and O'Hara (2004) model in which in-
vestors receive private signals that contain information about both systematic factors
and idiosyncratic shocks, the authors demonstrated that the cost of capital is not
aﬀected by information asymmetry in cross-section since betas are not aﬀected by
idiosyncratic risks. They show that, in a large economy (with the number of assets
and investors towards inﬁnity), private information about systematic risk inﬂuences
the market-wide factor risk premiums, with higher information asymmetry leading to
a higher premium. However, private information about idiosyncratic risk does not af-
fect the cost of capital as it is diversiﬁed. It aﬀects risk premiums only as noise when
investors are assessing signals about systematic factors. Christensen et al. (2010)
built a two-period model with one risky asset that incorporates elements of the mod-
els by Easley and O'Hara (2004), Hughes et al. (2007), Lambert et al. (2007) and
Lambert et al. (2012). They distinguish between the cost of equity capital for the
period leading up to the release of information (denoted preposterior cost) and the
period after the release (denoted ex post cost). The authors showed that the cost
of capital remains unchanged by the release of information as the reduction in the
cost of capital after the release of information (i.e. reduced uncertainty) is oﬀset by
an increased cost of capital in the period leading to the release (due to increased
uncertainty). The authors argued that information disclosure simply allocates the
ﬁxed total risk premium over the two periods, but does not change it. Disclosure
would only inﬂuence the timing when the uncertainty around the terminal dividend
is resolved and reﬂected in prices. In a ﬁrst setting with only public information, the
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ex-ante cost of capital (comprising both periods) is unrelated to information disclo-
sure, as the reduction in the ex post cost of capital by disclosure is accompanied by
an increase in the preposterior cost of capital. In a second setting with both informed
(having private information) and uninformed investors, the ex post risk premium is
decreasing in the informativeness of the signal. In this setting, the reduction in the ex
post risk premium comes from the higher average precision of the investors' rational
equilibrium beliefs about the terminal dividend, and not from a higher required return
linked to private information.
Clinch and Lombardi (2011) modiﬁed the model by Easley and O'Hara (2004)
to analyse the case of endogenous information acquisition and provided support for
their conclusions. Two scenarios were examined. First, in a one-ﬁrm setting the au-
thors demonstrated that whether private information is associated with a higher cost
of capital depends on the cost of information acquisition. Contrary to Christensen
et al. (2010), they allowed the cost of acquiring private information to increase with
the precision of this information, and showed that in this case an increase in private
information is associated with an increasing cost of capital, thus conﬁrming Easley
and O'Hara (2004). Second, in a two-ﬁrm setting the authors postulated that infor-
mation can only be obtained for both ﬁrms, not separately. They then showed that
when the cost of information acquisition is ﬁxed, the rate of return is increasing in
private information when acquiring private information about one ﬁrm together with
the acquired analysis and interpretation skills generates spillover eﬀects in terms of
information that can be used for the other ﬁrm as well.
Lambert et al. (2012) distinguish between information precision (the average qual-
ity of information the investors possess) and information asymmetry (diﬀerences in
the quality or precision of information investors hold about a ﬁrm's cash ﬂows), and
showed that both inﬂuence the cost of capital in diﬀerent ways. The average precision
of information is found a key determinant of the cost of capital. Reducing information
asymmetry in models based on perfect competition reduces the cost of capital be-
cause more information increases the average precision of information, which lowers
the required rate of return, while information asymmetry has no eﬀect. In models
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based on imperfect competition, information asymmetry does inﬂuence the cost of
capital by reducing the adverse selection problem, as pointed at by previous studies.
In general, the results by Lambert et al. (2012) showed that asymmetry reduction
gives less informed investors access to information that was previously inside infor-
mation, so increasing their average precision and reducing the cost of capital. But
reducing information asymmetry may have the opposite eﬀect of increasing the cost
of capital because of the resulting decreasing average information precision. The
authors emphasise, however, that it might be diﬃcult to separate the eﬀects of in-
formation asymmetry and precision in an empirical setting, as many of the factors
associated with lowering information asymmetry are potentially related to increasing
information precision, too.
4.2.2.4 Information quality
Another suggestion for a link between information and the cost of capital has been
provided by Leuz and Verrecchia (2005) and has subsequently been used in Lambert
et al. (2007). The modelling by Leuz and Verrecchia (2005) demonstrated that the
quality of information directly impacts upon the cost of capital.1 Financial reporting
in the capital market has a coordinating role between the ﬁrm and investors con-
cerning a company's investment opportunities and decisions. With low information
quality, investors will anticipate capital misallocation by the ﬁrm, thus increase the
required rate of return. Thus higher quality information provided by ﬁrms about these
opportunities helps better aligning ﬁrms and investors, reducing the risk of misalign-
ment of ﬁrms' investment decisions. This aﬀects the cost of capital as the investors
will apply a lower required rate of return. Better information quality does not change
the covariance of the ﬁrm's cash ﬂows with those of the market, as this is inﬂuenced
by the project itself. But better information quality improves the eﬃciency of the
implementation of an investment, thus will increase the expectations about future
cash ﬂows, from which follows a reduced required rate of return.
1Leuz and Verrecchia (2005) see information quality as the quality of a ﬁrm's report on its
investment opportunities.
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Lambert et al. (2007) used this reasoning and demonstrated a direct and indi-
rect eﬀect of information on the cost of capital. The authors showed that higher
quality information about a ﬁrm's future cash ﬂows directly inﬂuences the assessed
covariances with other ﬁrms' cash ﬂows, thereby reducing the ﬁrm's cost of capital.
Moreover, the authors also demonstrated an indirect eﬀect of information quality by
its inﬂuence on a ﬁrm's real decisions. They showed that an increase in disclosure
that reduces managerial misappropriation of a ﬁrm's cash ﬂows increases ﬁrm value
and reduces the cost of capital. In addition, information quality inﬂuences a com-
panies' real decisions (such as production or investment). This aﬀects the ratio of
the expected future cash ﬂow to the non-diversiﬁable covariance risk, thereby also
aﬀecting the cost of capital.
Leuz and Wysocki (2006) stressed the similarity of the result by Lambert et al.
(2007) with ﬁndings in the agency theory literature which states that stronger corpo-
rate governance and increased transparency lead managers to reduce their misappro-
priation and take better decisions, and consequentially leads to improved expectations
about future cash ﬂows.
4.3 Attributions and the cost of capital
Based on the theoretical foundation discussed above, this section develops the argu-
ment for an association between the disclosure of attribution statements and the cost
of capital.
The previous section has laid out that information asymmetry between ﬁrms and
the capital market leads investors to require a higher return, and that disclosure can
help reduce this information asymmetry and lower the required rate of return (see
e.g. Lev 1992; Bartov and Bodnar 1996; Healy et al. 1999; Dye 2001). In this con-
text, it can be argued that the disclosure of management's attribution statements to
corporate performance outcomes can contribute to reducing information asymmetry
between the ﬁrm and the capital market, and aﬀect the ﬁrm's cost of capital.
Management's attribution statements can provide investors with valuable infor-
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mation for the analysis of a ﬁrm's performance outcomes. Attribution statements
set the ﬁnancial statement into context and can help investors assess the results by
increasing their understanding of the reasons for changes in the ﬁnancial statement,
of factors inﬂuencing performance, and of the viability of a company's strategy (ASB
2006; Cole and Jones 2005; IASB 2010). This view is supported by Baginski et al.
(2004, p. 2) who argue that management's explanations can increase the usefulness
of the ﬁnancial performance information they accompany because they can provide
information to relate various inﬂuential internal and external factors, oﬀering addi-
tional information on known links between factors and proﬁtability or by identifying
additional factors to consider. Thus attribution statements can provide a speciﬁc in-
sight into the reasons for ﬁrm performance which is not available from other sources,
and that can be used by investors for ﬁrm valuation.
Further, the view taken by the IASB (2009, p. 15) is that explanations are use-
ful when they describe the relationship between the entity's results, management's
objectives and management's strategies for achieving those objectives. Baginski
et al. (2004, p. 2) make a similar point and suggest that attributions . . . are poten-
tially important information to investors who engage in strategic analysis of ﬁnancial
statement information. Since research ﬁndings show that investors place crucial
importance on the assessment of the eﬀectiveness of a ﬁrm's strategy (PriceWa-
terhouseCoopers 2007b), it can be argued that performance explanations can help
investors to assess the results in light of the ﬁrm's strategy, and thereby aﬀect the
investors' assessment of ﬁrm value. Taken together, this suggests that attribution
statements that explain a ﬁrm's performance outcomes from the viewpoint of man-
agement are useful information for investors in their assessment and valuation of
shares, and hence can have an eﬀect on the investors' required rate of return.
As discussed in the previous section 4.2, theoretical research suggests two main
ways of how information disclosure can aﬀect the cost of capital: either via (1)
increasing liquidity of the stock and reducing transaction costs (Diamond and Ver-
recchia 1991, Welker 1995) or (2) a number of mechanisms that establish a direct
link without reference to liquidity, such as disclosure's eﬀect on estimation risk (Barry
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and Brown 1985; Coles et al. 1995), or the eﬀect of information precision (Lambert
et al. 2012) and information quality (Leuz and Verrecchia 2005) on the cost of cap-
ital. Given that attribution statements are considered a key component of a ﬁrm's
disclosure strategy (Barton and Mercer 2005, p. 513) and their perceived useful-
ness for valuing a ﬁrm, the above theoretical research presents a case to argue that
there is an association between provision of attribution statements and the cost of
capital. By providing information that can improve investors' understanding of the
ﬁrm's performance and prospects and thereby inﬂuencing their assessment of ﬁrm
value, the disclosure of attribution statements may therefore aﬀect the cost of eq-
uity capital either by increasing liquidity of the stock and reducing transaction costs,
or by a more direct way such as those suggested in the literature. In addition to
this general proposition of a relationship between disclosure and the cost of capital,
Barton and Mercer (2005) describe two ways how speciﬁcally attribution statement
disclosure can aﬀect the cost of capital. First, they suggest that analysts will as-
sess the explanations' plausibility and from that draw their conclusions about the
persistence of the ﬁrm's performance. This then inﬂuences analysts' assessment of
ﬁrm value, which is reﬂected in the required rate of return. Second, the authors
argue that attribution statements aﬀect the cost of capital via their eﬀect on man-
agement's reputation with the capital market. Barton and Mercer (2005) state that
analysts and investors use the quality of a ﬁrm's disclosures to make inferences about
management, which impacts on management's reputation. The authors argue that
in this assessment process, performance explanations will be particularly important
to determine management's reputation as management has leeway in deciding how
to explain the outcomes and how much detail they provide. Investors will therefore
assess the performance explanations as to their plausibility, and the plausibility of
these explanations will then aﬀect management's reputation. This reputation will,
in turn, aﬀect management's credibility in communicating information to the capital
market. On that basis, Barton and Mercer (2005) argue that the credibility of the
information disclosed aﬀects the cost of capital, since credibility of information con-
stitutes ﬁrm-speciﬁc information risk, and research evidence shows that information
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risk is non-diversiﬁable and aﬀects the cost of capital (e.g. Botosan 1997, Easley
et al. 2002).
The ﬁndings by a number of empirical studies also suggest that the provision of
attribution statements inﬂuences the required rate of return. For example, Barton and
Mercer (2005) provided evidence that management's attribution statements inﬂuence
ﬁnancial analysts' earnings forecasts and stock valuations. Moreover, a number of
studies (Baginski et al. 2000; Baginski et al. 2004; Baginski et al. 2008; Kimbrough
and Wang 2009) found that stock prices react stronger to the announcement of
management earnings forecasts that are accompanied by attribution statements. So
these ﬁndings demonstrate that performance explanations can inﬂuence the required
rate of return.
Taken together, in light of the theoretical suggestions of how attribution state-
ments can aﬀect the cost of capital, and empirical ﬁndings that attribution statements
inﬂuence investors' assessment of ﬁrm value and as a consequence aﬀect the required
rate of return, there is reason to argue that the disclosure of attribution statements
will aﬀect the cost of capital.
The next section reviews the empirical literature on disclosure and the cost of
capital in order to bring to light what research to date has found regarding the
association between attribution statements and the cost of capital.
4.4 Empirical literature on disclosure and cost of
capital
4.4.1 Indirect measures of the cost of capital and disclosure
Several studies have examined the relation of ﬁrms' disclosure policy with the bid-
ask-spread as a proxy for liquidity and transaction costs (e.g. Welker 1995; Heﬂin
et al. 2005; Healy et al. 1999; Gruening 2011; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Gassen and
Sellhorn 2006).
Using a sample of NYSE-listed ﬁrm from 1983-1990, Welker (1995) demonstrated
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that ﬁrms whose disclosures received higher ratings by analysts have lower spreads.
Heﬂin et al. (2005) conﬁrmed this negative association for their 1988-1992 sample of
FAF (Financial Analysts' Federation) ﬁnancial analysts' disclosure ratings. Analysing
the bid-ask spreads adjusted for depth quotes2, the authors revealed that better rated
disclosures are associated with lower depth-adjusted spreads. Further evidence for this
association was provided by e.g. Healy et al. (1999). Healy et al. (1999) analysed
a time series of AIMR disclosure ratings for a sample of 97 US ﬁrms which showed
signiﬁcant and sustained improvements in disclosure for the period between 1980
and 1990. The authors found that the increase in disclosure was associated with a
reduction of the bid-ask spread.
Gruening (2011) provided evidence for the eﬀect of disclosure on the bid-ask
spread in a sample of 390 annual reports of German listed companies for the year
2005. As proxy for liquidity, share turnover and the bid-ask-spread were used. The
cost of equity capital was proxied by ex-post abnormal returns and market value
(exploiting the inverse relationship between market value and cost of equity capital).
The results showed a signiﬁcant positive (negative) association between disclosure and
share turnover (bid-ask spread). Also, the results demonstrated a signiﬁcant nega-
tive (positive) association between disclosure and abnormal returns (market value,
meaning a lower cost of equity).
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) examined a sample of DAX listed ﬁrms from the year
1998 that had switched to either IAS or US GAAP. As German GAAP is seen as
providing less disclosure than IAS or US-GAAP, the authors posited that a switch is
a substantial commitment to more disclosure and ﬁrms should therefore experience
economic beneﬁts from enhanced disclosure. The authors found that ﬁrms that
switched to either of those two beneﬁted from a lower bid-ask spread and higher share
turnover afterwards as compared to ﬁrms that did not switch. Similarly, Gassen and
Sellhorn (2006) examined a matched sample of 708 German ﬁrms that voluntarily
adopted IFRS and those that did not for the period of 1998-2004. The authors
2Depth quotes are a component of market liquidity and indicate the maximum number of shares
that can be traded at a speciﬁc bid and ask price; orders that are larger than the depth that is
quoted might get ﬁlled at less favourable rates (see Heﬂin et al. 2005).
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reported that IFRS adopters had a lower bid-ask-spread than the non-adopting ﬁrms.
4.4.2 Direct measures of the cost of capital and disclosure
A large and more recent stream of research uses direct estimates of the cost of equity
capital, based on methods to calculate an implied cost of equity capital.3 In order to
identify the gap in current research, the review of the literature is presented in two
categories. First, studies that analyse the association between the cost of capital and
a measure of overall corporate disclosure, chieﬂy in the annual report, are reviewed.
Second, studies that focus on speciﬁc types of corporate information disclosure are
reviewed. This will help establish the state of current research on the association
between the cost of capital and the disclosure of attribution statements.
4.4.2.1 Studies on overall corporate disclosure
A number of studies has investigated the association between the cost of capital and
the overall level of corporate disclosure (e.g. Botosan 1997; Hail 2002; Espinosa
and Trombetta 2007). Botosan (1997) analysed a sample of 122 ﬁrms from the US
machinery industry in 1990 and used a self-constructed disclosure measure based on
ﬁrms' voluntary disclosure in annual reports. The multiple regression results revealed
a negative association between disclosure level and the cost of capital, but only for
ﬁrms with low analyst following. For ﬁrms with high analyst following the relation
was not signiﬁcant.
Hail (2002) investigated a sample of 73 Swiss-listed ﬁrms and found a negative
relationship between voluntary disclosure in the annual report and the cost of capital.
Firms providing the highest levels of disclosures exhibited a cost of equity capital that
is between 1.8% and 2.4% lower than the sample ﬁrms with the lowest disclosure
scores.4 Botosan (2006) criticised the study because the method used to calculate
the cost of equity capital, the Gebhardt et al. (2001) method, does not produce
reliable results and shows erratic patterns of association with risk measures. Francis,
3See chapter 5, section 6.3 for a review and discussion of these methods.
4Hail (2002) used a disclosure index based on disclosure ratings by the Swiss Banking Institute
and the University of Zurich.
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Khurana and Pereira (2005) used a sample of 672 ﬁrms from 34 countries to analyse
the relationship between disclosure, the need for external ﬁnancing and the cost of
capital for non-US jurisdictions. The authors used disclosure scores provided by the
CIFAR (Center for International Financial Analysis and Research) and the PEG model
by Easton (2004) to calculate the cost of capital. The regression analysis showed
that across all countries, ﬁrms operating in industries with a greater need for external
ﬁnancing have higher levels of disclosure and consequently lower costs of equity and
cost of debt.
Gietzmann and Ireland (2005) analysed a sample of 301 UK ﬁrms from the IT
sector for the period of 1993 to 2002. Using a self-constructed disclosure measure
based on ﬁrms' announcements via the London Stock Exchanges' Regulatory News
Service (RNS), the authors found a negative association between timely strategic dis-
closure and the cost of capital, but only for ﬁrms with an aggressive accounting policy
(measured as positive discretionary accruals). Firms with a conservative accounting
policy did not show any cost of capital beneﬁt from more disclosure. Espinosa and
Trombetta (2007) examined a sample of Spanish listed ﬁrms from 1998-2001 and
consistent with Gietzmann and Ireland (2005) reported a negative association be-
tween disclosure in the annual report and the cost of capital, but only for aggressive,
not for conservative ﬁrms.
Some studies have used indirect measures of disclosure quality. For instance,
Francis et al. (2004) demonstrated that earnings attributes aﬀect the cost of cap-
ital5, considering earnings attributes as an expression of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information.
They argued that earnings attributes convey information about free cash ﬂows to
common equity. Using a large sample covering ﬁrm year observations from 1975-
2001 and cost of capital estimates published by Value Line, the authors showed that
`accounting-based' attributes explain more of the cross-sectional variation on cost
of capital estimates than the `market-based' attributes. Francis et al. (2008) also
examined the relationship between earnings quality, disclosure and the cost of capi-
5The authors used seven earnings attributes separated into `accounting-based' (accrual quality,
earnings persistence, predictability and smoothness) and `market-based' (value relevance, timeliness,
and conservatism) attributes.
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tal. Earnings quality was proxied by the common factor of accruals quality, earnings
variability, and the absolute value of abnormal accruals. They reported a signiﬁcant
complementary relation of earnings quality and voluntary disclosure, such that once
earnings quality is controlled, disclosure becomes insigniﬁcant for explaining cost of
capital. First, the authors found that ﬁrms with higher earnings quality had a higher
level of disclosure. Second, in tests not incorporating earnings quality, a negative as-
sociation between their voluntary disclosure measure (based on the index by Botosan
1997) and the cost of capital was found. However, when earnings quality was in-
cluded together with the disclosure measure as explanatory variable in the regression,
disclosure became insigniﬁcantly related to the cost of capital.
Berger et al. (2006) demonstrated a negative association of the cost of capital
with a self-constructed measure of information quality, which was based on the idea
that investors see a ﬁrm's permanent earnings as the weighted average of the ﬁrm's
earnings and the industry average earnings. The higher (lower) a ﬁrm's information
quality, the more (less) weight the investor will put on the ﬁrm's earnings as opposed
to industry level earnings. Using a large sample from 1972-2004 and three cost of
capital measures (those used in Gebhardt et al. 2001, Easton 2004, Fama and French
1993), they found that the cost of capital is negatively related to information quality.
Hail and Leuz (2006) demonstrated that a country's disclosure and regulatory
environment inﬂuences the cost of capital. Comparing a large sample of ﬁrms from
40 countries for the period of 1991-2001 and using four cost of capital measures
(the models by Claus and Thomas 2001; Gebhardt et al. 2001; Ohlson and Juettner-
Nauroth 2005; Easton 2004), they demonstrate a lower cost of capital for companies
in countries with higher disclosure and security regulation along with better enforce-
ment of the rules.
A number of studies have investigated the capital market eﬀects surrounding
the introduction of International Accounting Standards (IAS)/International Financial
Reporting Standards (IRFS) in the European Union (EU) in 2005 based on the notion
that IAS/IFRS are of higher quality than the standards existing in many EU member
states. The studies could not ﬁnd unequivocal evidence for a reduced cost of capital,
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for both the voluntary period and the more recent mandatory period.
Cuijpers and Buijink (2005) examined a sample of 114 EU listed ﬁrms in 1999
which voluntarily either adopted IAS (80 ﬁrms) or US-GAAP (34) and a large control
sample of 1679 EU-listed local GAAP users. No evidence for a lower cost of capital
for the adopting ﬁrms was found, although they observed a slightly higher cost of
capital for adopters as compared to a matched sample of local GAAP users. Similarly,
Daske (2006) did not ﬁnd evidence for a lower cost of capital focusing on the German
context in which ﬁrms were allowed to use US-GAAP or IFRS before the EU required
its mandatory application. The sample consisted of 735 German ﬁrms from 1993-
2002 which either reported under German standards, IFRS or US-GAAP, and ﬁrms
that switched to international or US standards during the sample period.
Christensen et al. (2007) suggested that the eﬀect of mandatory IFRS introduction
on UK ﬁrms will be diﬀerent depending on the perceived beneﬁts of adoption for a
ﬁrm. To gauge beneﬁts, the authors constructed a proxy with characteristics of
German ﬁrms that adopted IFRS voluntarily before 2005 (larger ﬁrms, more foreign
sales exposure, less leverage). The results demonstrated that UK ﬁrms that shared
these characteristics had stronger stock price reactions to announcements favourable
to IFRS becoming mandatory. Further, while there was a general upward trend in the
cost of equity during the sample period, UK ﬁrms that shared the characteristics had
a lower increase in the cost of capital than the other ﬁrms.
Some studies have also investigated the role of private vs. public information
in aﬀecting the cost of capital (e.g. Easley et al. 2002; Mohanram and Rajgopal
2009; Botosan et al. 2004). The results are mixed. For instance, Easley et al.
(2002) have tested the theoretical proposition published in Easley and O'Hara (2004)
that when comparing two identical stocks, investors require a higher return for the
stock surrounded by more private and less public information. Easley et al. (2002)
constructed a measure of the probability of information-based trading of stocks (PIN)
to measure the extent of private information and demonstrated that securities with
a higher probability of information based trading exhibit a higher expected rate of
return. However, Mohanram and Rajgopal (2009) did not ﬁnd evidence that PIN is
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a priced risk factor. Using 4 diﬀerent tests6 , neither of those provided clear support
for the ﬁndings by Easley et al. (2002) and Easley and O'Hara (2004). Replicating
the study by Easley et al. (2002), they showed that these ﬁndings are restricted to
a sub period of the sample used for that study. Botosan et al. (2004) showed that
the precision of public vs. private information has an opposite impact on the cost of
capital. They found a negative association of more precise public information with
the cost of capital, but a positive association with more precise private information.
The magnitude of the eﬀects was such that the cost of capital increasing inﬂuence
of private information far outweighed the beneﬁts of public information.
4.4.2.2 Studies on speciﬁc types of information disclosure
A number of studies have focused on the eﬀect of speciﬁc types of information on
the cost of capital (e.g. Richardson and Welker 2001; Muino and Trombetta 2009;
Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Ghoul et al. 2011). Richardson and Welker (2001) investigated
the relation between ﬁrms' social and ﬁnancial disclosures and the cost of capital in
the Canadian environment using a time series of ﬁrm observations from the period of
1990 to 1992. The authors used disclosure ratings provided by the SMAC (Society of
Management Accountants of Canada) and the University of Quebec. They found that
ﬁnancial disclosure was negatively associated with the cost of capital. Furthermore,
conﬁrming the ﬁndings by Botosan (1997) on the role of analyst following in the
association between disclosure and the cost of capital, the authors found that ﬁrms
followed by fewer analysts beneﬁted more from increasing disclosure in terms of a
lower cost of capital. However, they reported that social disclosures were positively
associated with the cost of capital. Contrary ﬁndings for social disclosures have
come from Dhaliwal et al. (2011) who investigated voluntary disclosure of standalone
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reports and its association with the cost of
equity capital. The study used a sample of 1190 ﬁrst-time standalone CSR reports
of 294 US ﬁrms for the period of 1993-2007 and measured the cost of equity capital
as the mean value of estimations based on three diﬀerent implied cost of equity
6Time series and cross-sectional tests of returns on PIN factor loadings and the Fama and French
(1993) 3-factor model and the extended 4-factor model.
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capital models (the models by Gebhardt et al. 2001, Claus and Thomas 2001, Easton
2004). The results demonstrated that ﬁrms with a high cost of equity capital in
the previous year were signiﬁcantly more likely to voluntarily disclose standalone CSR
reports. Further, issuing CSR reports for the ﬁrst time showed a signiﬁcantly negative
association with the cost of equity capital, but only for those ﬁrms with superior CSR
performance (as measured by ratings of CSR performance), not for others. Similar
results were reported by Ghoul et al. (2011) based on an analysis of CSR disclosures
in 12,915 ﬁrm year observations by 2,809 US ﬁrms for the period of 1992 to 2007.
Measuring the cost of equity capital with 4 diﬀerent methods (Gebhardt et al. 2001;
Claus and Thomas 2001; Easton 2004; Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth 2005), the
authors found that ﬁrms with higher CSR disclosure scores had a lower cost of equity
capital. Further, breaking down the CSR disclosures into diﬀerent components, the
authors found a negative association between the cost of equity capital and better
scores for employee relations, environmental policies, and product strategies, while
better scores on community relations, diversity, and human rights did not aﬀect the
cost of equity capital.
Botosan and Plumlee (2002) demonstrated that the cost of capital may increase
or decrease depending on the type of disclosure considered. The authors extended the
Botosan (1997) study and analysed three diﬀerent types of disclosures: annual report
disclosures, more timely disclosures (quarterly reports and other publications), and
investor relations. The study used a sample from a ten-year period (1986-1996). They
found that the association between the cost of equity capital and disclosure depended
on the type of disclosure. Annual report disclosures showed the expected negative
association, but for more timely disclosures - quarterly reports or other publications
- a positive association with the cost of equity capital was observed. Finally, investor
relations activities were not associated with the cost of capital.
Muino and Trombetta (2009) analysed whether the disclosure of distorted graphs
in annual reports aﬀects the cost of capital using a sample of 259 ﬁrm-year obser-
vations of 67 ﬁrms listed at the Madrid Stock Exchange from the years 1996-2002.
They used the Easton (2004) PEG model and realised returns as the measure of the
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cost of equity capital, whilst graph distortion was measured with the Relative Graph
Discrepancy (RGD) index developed by Mather et al. (2005). Graph distortion is
seen as the degree of consistency/inconsistency of ﬁnancial information presented
in graphs with the underlying ﬁnancial data. The authors also employed an overall
disclosure index based on annual analyst rankings published in a Spanish business
magazine. They found that favourably distorted graphs have a negative association
with the cost of equity capital, yet the relationship was mitigated by an interaction
eﬀect of graph distortion and overall disclosure. For ﬁrms with low overall disclosure,
there was a negative association between favourably distorted graphs and the cost of
equity capital, while for ﬁrms with higher disclosure, the association turns positive.
The authors suggested that at higher overall disclosure levels, the market would more
easily uncover graph distortion and therefore increase the perceived risk, while at
lower overall disclosure levels, distortion might not be detected. However, the study
found no impact of graph distortion on realised returns.
Further evidence for a negative association between disclosure and the cost of
capital has been provided by Poshakwale and Courtis (2005) for the ﬁnancial sector.
The study was carried out using a sample of annual reports of 135 European and
Non-European (USA, Canada, Australia) banks from the period of 1995-1999. The
disclosure measure was comprised of a total of 29 ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial perfor-
mance measures that are particular to the banking industry and based on a survey by
PwC. These measures were grouped into six categories (disclosures about strategy,
customer and markets, people and reputation, risk management, ﬁnancial position,
ﬁnancial performance). The authors found a negative association between disclosure
of the performance measures and the cost of capital. Further analyses into the six
disclosure categories showed that banks' disclosures about risk management had the
strongest association with the cost of capital.
More recently, research has moved from studying the eﬀect of quality or quantity
of disclosures on the cost of capital to analysing the eﬀect of disclosure content
(e.g. Kothari et al. 2009; Kim and Shi 2011), termed directional link by Kothari
et al. (2009). For instance, Kothari et al. (2009) have demonstrated that the cost of
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capital eﬀect depends on the content of the disclosures as well as on the credibility
and timeliness of the source. Content analysing more than 100,000 disclosure reports
(by management, analysts, and the business press) and measuring disclosure content
as favourable or unfavourable news the authors found that, on an aggregate level,
favourable (unfavourable) disclosures were signiﬁcantly associated with a decrease
(increase) in the cost of capital, providing evidence for the cost of capital being
inﬂuenced by the content of disclosures, good or bad news. A separate analysis of
the information sources showed that positive news conveyed by management were
discounted by the market, possibly due to credibility concerns, and did not materially
aﬀect the cost of capital. Negative news, however, had no eﬀect. Similarly, analysts'
reports did not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the cost of capital (both positive and negative
news). Again, it was suggested that this is due to analysts being perceived as not
completely impartial. By contrast, ﬁnancial press reports were found to signiﬁcantly
aﬀect the cost of capital and two other risk measures, stock return volatility and
dispersion in analyst forecast errors. The authors suggested that the press is seen as
much more credible and objective, as well as being a more timely source of information
than, e.g., analysts reports.
Kim and Shi (2011) investigated the directional eﬀect of voluntary disclosure
on the cost of equity capital by analysing the disclosure of management earnings
forecasts (both good and bad news). They argued that bad (good) news forecasts
would increase (decrease) investor uncertainty and lead to a higher (lower) cost of
equity capital, and studied a sample of 1194 US management earnings forecasts, with
2004 non-forecasting observations as a benchmark. Using the Easton (2004) model
to estimate the cost of equity capital, they compared the cost of equity capital of
the sample ﬁrms one month before the forecast, one month after the forecast, and
one month after the actual earnings announcement. In terms of the results, for the
change in cost of equity capital one month prior to and after the forecast, ﬁrms with
bad news showed a signiﬁcant increase in the cost of equity capital, whereas there was
no signiﬁcant change in the cost of equity capital for good news and non-forecasting
ﬁrms. Moreover, the magnitude of changes in the cost of equity capital for ﬁrms
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with good news was signiﬁcantly lower than for both bad news and non-forecasting
ﬁrms. For changes in the cost of equity capital one month after the forecast to one
month after the actual earnings announcement, the results showed that for bad news
ﬁrms the change is insigniﬁcant, suggesting that the eﬀect of the bad news at the
announcement has already been pre-empted in the forecast.
4.5 Limitations of prior literature
In spite of numerous studies having investigated the relationship between disclosure
and the cost of capital, it is important to further examine the issue for a number of
reasons.
First, the results of prior studies are mixed, with some showing a negative asso-
ciation (e.g. Hail 2002; Poshakwale and Courtis 2005; Dhaliwal et al. 2011), others
showing a positive relationship (e.g. Botosan and Plumlee 2002; Richardson and
Welker 2001), and yet some show no association (e.g. Daske 2006). Many reasons
have been put forward in the literature to explain these mixed ﬁndings. Some suggest
that this is due to diﬀerences in the disclosure measures (e.g. Espinosa and Trombetta
2007), diﬀerences in the cost of capital measures (e.g. Botosan 2006), or that the
high disclosure level in the US makes it more diﬃcult to identify beneﬁts from more
disclosure in the US-based studies (e.g. Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Core 2001; Hail
2002). Most importantly for this current study, the literature review in the previous
section showed that while prior studies have examined diﬀerent types of disclosures,
ranging from overall disclosure (e.g. Botosan 1997; Espinosa and Trombetta 2007)
to speciﬁc types of disclosure only, such as graphs (e.g. Muino and Trombetta 2009)
or corporate social responsibility disclosures (e.g. Dhaliwal et al. 2011), currently
evidence on the association between attribution statement disclosure and the cost of
capital is virtually non-existent. This is despite the fact that standard setters and
regulatory bodies see performance explanations as useful information for improving
investors' economic decisions, hence require or encourage their provision (SEC 2003;
ASB 2006), and that explanations of performance outcomes constitute a major part
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of ﬁrms' narrative disclosures (Collins et al. 1993; PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2007a).
Also, the review of the attribution literature in chapter 2 has revealed that research
on the eﬀects of attribution statements is still scarce and has only been investigated by
a few studies (e.g. Baginski et al. 2000, Baginski et al. 2004, Baginski et al. 2008, and
Kimbrough and Wang 2009). These studies, however, focused on stock price reactions
using an event study method and have not examined the cost of capital eﬀect. Event
studies only reﬂect the short-term impact but not the long-term eﬀects, which are
the most important for the ﬁrm (Barker 1998; Bruner et al. 1998; Daske et al. 2006).
The cost of capital reﬂects the long-term perspective of the impact attributions have.
The experiment with analysts by Barton and Mercer (2005) shows management's
explanations aﬀect their reputation with the market, and this in turn aﬀects the
ﬁrm's cost of capital. Barton and Mercer (2005) therefore suggest that studies should
consider not only the market's short-term reactions to the announcement of results
and attributions, but also investigate the eﬀects on the cost of capital as analysts
revise their beliefs following attributions for performance. There have been repeated
calls for further research on the relation of disclosure and the cost of capital by both
academic studies (e.g. Healy and Palepu 2001; Botosan 2006) and professional bodies
(ICAEW 2004). This thesis responds to this call and the suggestion by Barton and
Mercer (2005) by investigating another important aspect of disclosure, management's
narrative explanations for corporate organisational outcomes.
Second, the studies on the eﬀects of attribution statements have all been carried
out in the US institutional environment, and no identiﬁable study has yet considered
this issue in other settings. The US environment is characterised by prescriptive
requirements (Collins et al. 1993; Clatworthy and Jones 2003) with some of the
most demanding accounting and disclosure standards worldwide (Levitt 1998), and
strong enforcement of rules (La Porta et al. 2006). By contrast, the UK and other
countries have less demanding requirements (Ball et al. 2000, Clatworthy and Jones
2003; La Porta et al. 2006) so that it can be argued that disclosure levels in non US
environments will be more variable. Since several studies (e.g. Leuz and Verrecchia
2000; Core 2001; Hail 2002) have suggested that this high disclosure environment
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in the US would make it diﬃcult to detect tangible cost of capital eﬀects of more
disclosure, therefore research needs to be carried out in non US settings such as the
UK.
Additionally, the US is characterised by prevalence of litigation (Baginski et al.
2002; Clatworthy and Jones 2003) which might constrain attributions. Research has
demonstrated that this litigation risk restricts US companies' disclosure behaviour
(e.g.. Baginski et al. 2002; Rogers and Van Buskirk 2009), while litigation in the
UK is rare (Ball et al. 2000, Clatworthy and Jones 2003), so that UK ﬁrms face
less danger of litigation and have more leeway for presenting disclosure. As Clat-
worthy and Jones (2003, p. 172) suggest, . . . it is commonly acknowledged that
US accounting narratives are more constrained through a greater fear of litigation
than their UK counterparts. Aerts and Tarca (2010) showed that these diﬀerences
inﬂuence attribution statements. They provide evidence to suggest that US ﬁrms are
more moderate in their attributions, thus less assertive and less defensive.7 The ﬁrms
used more formal language and gave more impersonal technical-accounting explana-
tions than ﬁrms in the UK and Australia. Moreover, their explanations were more
comprehensive and represented a higher proportion of disclosures contained in the
Management Commentary.
To sum up, the limitations presented above suggest there is reason to further
investigate the association between attribution statements and the cost of capital.
4.6 Development of hypotheses
This section develops the hypotheses about the eﬀect of attribution statements on
the cost of equity capital. The development is based on the theoretical framework
that links disclosure and the cost of capital and the review of the empirical literature,
both presented in this chapter.
There is reason to suggest that the disclosure of explanations for corporate per-
formance outcomes inﬂuences a ﬁrm's cost of equity capital. The capital market
7Assertive means taking credit for good results, whereas defensive refers to blaming external
factors for negative results (Aerts 1994).
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uses attribution statements for decision making. For example, Barton and Mercer
(2005) show in an experimental study that ﬁnancial analysts use these statements
for making and revising earnings forecasts and determining current share price. Also,
a number of studies (Baginski et al. 2000; Baginski et al. 2004; Baginski et al. 2008;
Kimbrough and Wang 2009) demonstrate that attribution statements are useful to
market participants, as they ﬁnd that stock price responses to management earnings
forecasts and earnings announcements are stronger when accompanied by attribution
statements. As management has an information advantage and can therefore give a
unique insight on the reasons for performance that outside investors could not achieve
based solely on their own analysis, it can be argued that attribution statements on
the reasons for performance outcomes will aﬀect information asymmetry between the
ﬁrm and capital market participants. The ﬁndings by Baginski et al. (2000), Ba-
ginski et al. (2004), Baginski et al. (2008) and Kimbrough and Wang (2009) that
stock prices react to the existence of attribution statements imply that attribution
statements help to clarify performance outcomes and therefore reduce information
asymmetry between the market and the company.
From a theoretical standpoint, as discussed in the previous sections of this chap-
ter, reducing information asymmetry by disclosing information can reduce the cost of
capital via (1) increasing liquidity of the stock and reducing transaction costs (Dia-
mond and Verrecchia 1991, Welker 1995) or (2) a reduction in estimation risk faced
by an investor when assessing the asset's payoﬀ or return structure, thus lowering
the required rate of return (Barry and Brown 1985; Coles et al. 1995). Empirically,
numerous studies have provided evidence to support the suggestion that higher dis-
closure is associated with a lower cost of capital (e.g. Botosan 1997; Hail 2002;
Francis, Khurana and Pereira 2005; Poshakwale and Courtis 2005; Hail and Leuz
2006; Berger et al. 2006; Ghoul et al. 2011; Dhaliwal et al. 2011).
With regard to attribution statements, disclosing performance explanations can
increase investors' understanding of a company's operations, particularly in under-
standing better the sources and factors that inﬂuence performance from manage-
ment's own perspectives. This reduces information asymmetry, and thus can lead to
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a lower required rate of return. So based on the theoretical suggestion that higher
disclosure may reduce the cost of capital, together with empirical evidence supporting
this proposition, a negative association between attribution statement disclosure and
the cost of equity capital can be suggested.
On the other hand, there is also experimental research suggesting that disclosing
attribution statements may lead to a higher cost of equity capital. Disclosing attribu-
tion statements may actually exacerbate information asymmetry especially if they are
not considered credible, and this may result in a higher cost of equity capital for the
ﬁrm. Barton and Mercer (2005) demonstrate that plausible attributions lead analysts
to provide higher earnings forecasts and stock valuations than if no attributions were
provided. An example of a plausible explanation is the claim by insurance, airlines
and tourism-related companies that the September 11 terrorist attacks aﬀected their
performance (see Barton and Mercer 2005). However, Barton and Mercer (2005)
also show that when the attributions are considered implausible, analysts provide
lower earnings forecasts and share price than when attributions were not provided.
An example of an implausible explanation is a nationwide supermarket chain trying
to blame the September 11 terrorist attacks for a drop in earnings, which led analysts
to express serious doubts as to whether this could have aﬀected the ﬁrm's perfor-
mance (Farrell 2001). Barton and Mercer (2005) argue that analysts may consider
implausible attributions as indicative of the bleak conditions of the ﬁrm. This will
lead to lower earnings forecasts and share price, and therefore higher cost of equity
capital. Furthermore, the evidence provided by McKenzie et al. (2002) suggests that
weak justiﬁcations for a case may cause reactions opposite to those intended. In
an experimental setting that involved legal judgements, the study demonstrated that
weak evidence from either side, the defendant or the prosecution, leads the jury to
favour and believe the other side's arguments, as a weak justiﬁcation is seen as not
very credible. The above discussion suggests the possibility of a positive association
between attribution statements and the cost of equity capital, if market participants
have doubts about the plausibility of the attributions.
In addition, more extensive attribution statements may not necessarily lead to a
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lower cost of capital if, for example, the explanations reveal internal problems and/or
point to issues that may cause problems for the ﬁrm in the future. Kothari et al. (2009)
argue that the disclosure of unfavourable information would lead to an increase in the
risk of a ﬁrm's expected future cash ﬂows, with the consequence being a potentially
higher cost of capital. Kothari et al. (2009) found empirical support for this notion,
showing that the disclosure of unfavourable news is associated with a higher cost
of equity capital. Kim and Shi (2011) provide similar evidence from an analysis of
earnings forecasts. They ﬁnd ﬁrms that announce bad news in their forecasts face a
subsequent increase in their cost of capital.
The ﬁndings from these studies suggest that attribution statements that may
indicate existing or potential future issues at a ﬁrm, that is negative information for
investors, might be associated with an increase in a ﬁrm's cost of equity capital. The
more information investors receive about the reasons for performance, the more they
are able to see how the ﬁrm operates and are better able to assess if the factors
that shaped performance in the past are likely to continue in the future. Whilst
this may give investors more conﬁdence in the future of the ﬁrm and therefore lower
their required rate of return, these increased details may also lead investors to the
conclusion that, for instance, the good past performance was inﬂuenced by factors
that will not last in the future and were only temporary. Due to the non-recurring
nature of these beneﬁcial factors investors, as a consequence, may infer that the
future of the ﬁrm is less bright than the past performance. This may lead them
to discount future prospects and require a higher rate of return for investing in the
ﬁrm. Against that background, it can be argued that the disclosure of attribution
statements not necessarily contributes to a lower cost of equity capital, but may
potentially lead to an increase. This proposition is consistent with the ﬁndings by
Kothari et al. (2009) and Kim and Shi (2011) presented above, that the disclosure
of negative information or of information that investors perceive to be negative for
the future of the ﬁrm, may lead to an increase in the cost of equity capital. Thus
information that investors perceive to be negative for the future prospects of the ﬁrm
may lead them to requiring a higher rate of return, that is cost of equity capital.
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Taken together, the above discussion provides reason to suggest that a positive
association between attribution statement disclosure and the cost of equity capital is
also possible.
Besides a positive or a negative association between attribution statements and
the cost of equity capital, there is also reason to suggest that they might be unre-
lated. That is, attribution statements might not aﬀect the cost of capital. Research
on 'cheap talk' communication (e.g. Farrell 1995; Farrell and Rabin 1996; Bhat-
tacharya and Krishnan 1999; Forsythe et al. 1999; Almazan et al. 2008) suggests the
possibility that attribution statements may be ignored by investors, as investors may
doubt the credibility and believability of these statements. 'Cheap talk' constitutes
costless, non-binding and non-veriﬁable messages that may inﬂuence the behaviour of
the message recipient (Farrell and Rabin 1996; Forsythe et al. 1999).8 For a message
to have an eﬀect on the receiver's behaviour, the incentives of the sender and the
receiver have to be closely aligned, otherwise the information is considered 'cheap
talk' and ignored (Farrell 1995; Forsythe et al. 1999). Forsythe et al. (1999) argue
that if the message about an asset's value emanates from a better informed party
whose incentives are opposite to those of the receiver, the cheap talk information
would not aﬀect the receiver's behaviour. It is doubtful whether management and
investors have the same incentives when it comes to ﬁnancial reporting, as managers
also consider their own interests when they provide information (Bhattacharya and
Krishnan 1999; Forsythe et al. 1999; Barton and Mercer 2005). In the context of
management's performance explanations, the review of the attribution literature in
chapter 2 demonstrates that management frequently uses attribution statements in
a self-serving way to promote their own causes. This potential bias in attribution
statements might lead investors (the recipients) to question whether to rely on such
information as input for ﬁrm valuation. Instead, investors may consider attribution
statements to be cheap talk, since Bhattacharya and Krishnan (1999) argue that all
disclosures other than 'hard ﬁnancial data' are potential cheap talk because they are
diﬃcult to verify. The widespread use of biased attribution statements by manage-
8Bhattacharya and Krishnan (1999, p. 71) describe 'cheap talk' information as costless (no
direct costs), non-binding (does not restrict strategic options), non-veriﬁable (to a court).
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ment (see e.g. Staw et al. 1983; Huﬀ and Schwenk 1990; Clatworthy and Jones 2003;
Merkl-Davies et al. 2007) suggests that investors will be aware that the incentives of
management for providing this type of information might be diﬀerent from their own
incentives, and management attributions therefore might provide a message of how
management may want performance to be perceived, rather than providing an accu-
rate description of events and the causal factors behind the performance outcomes.
In light of this, investors might disregard management's attributions when they assess
company performance. This, in turn, suggests that attribution statements and the
cost of equity capital are unrelated.
This proposition is supported by ﬁndings by Kothari et al. (2009), whose results
indicate that investors may have doubts about the credibility of information provided
by management and therefore disregard it, as the study ﬁnds that positive news about
a ﬁrm provided by management are not related to the cost of equity capital. Kothari
et al. (2009) point out that management has incentives to give their disclosures a
positive spin, so that investors may have doubts about the credibility and impartiality
of this information. As a consequence, investors would discount the information and
possibly not take it into consideration for valuing a stock. The study's results are con-
sistent with this proposition, as information about the ﬁrm disclosed by management
had no material eﬀect on the cost of capital. This suggests that market participants
may regard management's disclosures, and in particular attribution statements to
performance outcomes as discussed above, as not credible and not useful for equity
valuation.
On that basis, there is reason to suggest that attribution statement disclosure is
unrelated to the ﬁrm's cost of equity capital, as investors may doubt the credibility
of these explanations.
Taken together, the preceding discussion suggests that the association between
attribution statements and the cost of equity capital is not clear. However, in light
of the theoretical research that suggests that increased information disclosure can
reduce information asymmetry and potentially lead to a reduction in the ﬁrm's cost
of capital (e.g. Barry and Brown 1985; Amihud and Mendelson 1986; Diamond and
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Verrecchia 1991; Handa and Linn 1993; Coles et al. 1995; Easley and O'Hara 2004),
and that the ﬁndings by the vast majority of empirical studies on the relation between
disclosure and the cost of capital support this notion and report a negative association
(e.g. Botosan 1997; Hail 2002; Francis, Khurana and Pereira 2005; Poshakwale and
Courtis 2005; Hail and Leuz 2006; Berger et al. 2006; Ghoul et al. 2011; Dhaliwal
et al. 2011), the position taken in this thesis is that the disclosure of attribution
statements can reduce information asymmetry and thereby contribute to lowering
the cost of equity capital. On that basis, the following hypothesis is stated:
H1a: There is a negative association between attribution statement disclosure
and a ﬁrm's cost of equity capital.
In addition to the hypothesis about the general eﬀect of attributions on the cost of
equity capital, ﬁndings by previous research suggest that attributions to internal and to
external causes have their own separate eﬀect on the cost of equity capital. Baginski
et al. (2004) argue that either type of attribution can help investors understand
the ﬁrm's performance and assess future prospects, as both internal reasons and
external reasons for performance each give a diﬀerent angle and aspect of information,
thus provide useful information of their own. This notion is supported by ﬁndings
by Baginski et al. (2000) who report that both internal and external attributions,
independently of each other, aﬀect stock returns.
With regard to external attribution statements, research into stock price reactions
to the announcement of management earnings forecasts found that the price reac-
tion is greater for those forecasts accompanied by an external attribution (Baginski
et al. 2000), or is exclusively driven by external attributions while internal attributions
have no eﬀect on stock price reaction (Baginski et al. 2004). Baginski et al. (2004)
argue that information about the ﬁrm's external environment, such as competition
and regulation, is useful to investors for assessing future performance. This type of
information can help investors make a better assessment of the potential inﬂuence
of external forces, which the ﬁrm cannot control, on the ﬁrm's current and future
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performance. Being better able to judge to what extent a ﬁrm's operations and per-
formance are subject to external forces over which it has no control can help investors
in making more precise and conﬁdent estimates of future earnings potential and eq-
uity value and thereby assist in investment decisions. That is, external attributions
may reduce information asymmetry between the ﬁrm and investors. Moreover, Ba-
ginski et al. (2004) posit that the accuracy of external attributions is easier to verify,
for instance economic conditions which can be observed easily, while attributions to
ﬁrm-internal causes are not. Hence external attributions may be considered as more
credible than internal attributions (see e.g. Baginski et al. 2004). As external factors
are easily veriﬁable, investors might therefore consider external explanations in their
assessment of ﬁrm performance to obtain a better idea of, as mentioned above, the
level to which performance is inﬂuenced by the environment. Taken together, this
suggests that providing attribution statements that give external reasons for perfor-
mance are useful information for investors and can reduce information asymmetry
between the ﬁrm and the capital market.
Consistent with hypothesis H1a and the theoretical literature that suggests that
lowering information asymmetry via disclosure can lead to a lower risk premium (e.g.
Barry and Brown 1985; Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Handa and Linn 1993; Easley
and O'Hara 2004), as well as the ﬁndings by numerous empirical studies that support
this notion (e.g. Poshakwale and Courtis 2005; Hail and Leuz 2006; Ghoul et al.
2011; Dhaliwal et al. 2011), it can be argued that providing external attributions
can reduce information asymmetry and thereby lower the risk premium, thus cost of
equity capital. On that basis, the following hypothesis is stated:
H1b(i): There is a negative association between external attribution statements
and a ﬁrm's cost of equity capital.
In addition, despite the suggestion by Baginski et al. (2004) that internal at-
tribution statements may be diﬃcult to verify, there is reason to argue that those
statements can, nevertheless, also oﬀer useful information for investors' decision mak-
ing and contribute to lowering information asymmetry. Internal attributions can oﬀer
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exactly the type of information investors are looking for to gain a better understand-
ing of a ﬁrm's operations, capabilities and its performance. This information can,
for instance, give insight into internal operational processes, resources, or the ef-
fectiveness of implementing strategic plans. Baginski et al. (2004) also emphasise
the importance of information on internal strategies and competencies for assessing
performance and making investment decisions.
Internal attributions can oﬀer ﬁrm-speciﬁc information to investors that cannot
be obtained from explanations that use external reasons for performance, because
external attributions can apply to any ﬁrm and do not necessarily carry ﬁrm-speciﬁc
information. Attributions that explain performance outcomes with causes internal to
the ﬁrm can therefore improve investors' insight needed for assessing a speciﬁc ﬁrm's
operations and prospects, a dimension not oﬀered by universally applicable external
causes. Hence it can be argued that explanations that explain performance with
reasons internal to a ﬁrm, providing insight into how the ﬁrm creates value and is run,
are valuable information for judging ﬁrm performance. Moreover, internal attributions
might reveal information about a ﬁrm's strategic plans and actions, which would be
of high interest to analysts and investors and aid in their ﬁrm evaluation (see Baginski
et al. 2004). Internal attributions can therefore also be highly relevant for investor
decision making. Hence Baginski et al. (2004) argue that if ﬁrms provide internal
attributions that can potentially be costly to the ﬁrm (by revealing information about
strategic plans and actions), those might be considered as highly credible. This implies
that internal attributions that may reveal information about, for instance, the ﬁrm's
operations, strategies, or capabilities, are potentially very useful for investors and
analysts for their assessments of ﬁrm performance and prospects. Taken together, this
suggests that internal attribution statements can provide investors with information
about the inside of speciﬁc ﬁrms and so provide a better understanding of the ﬁrm
and its operations. This reduces information asymmetry between the ﬁrm and market
participants, as investors are now better informed and can be more certain about their
assessments of ﬁrm performance and prospects.
On that basis, it can be argued that, consistent with hypotheses H1a and H1b(i)
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and the theoretical literature suggesting that lowering information asymmetry via
disclosure may reduce the lower risk premium (e.g. Barry and Brown 1985; Diamond
and Verrecchia 1991; Handa and Linn 1993; Easley and O'Hara 2004), as well as the
ﬁndings by numerous empirical studies that support this notion (e.g. Poshakwale and
Courtis 2005; Hail and Leuz 2006; Ghoul et al. 2011; Dhaliwal et al. 2011), providing
internal attributions may lead to a lower risk premium for investing in the ﬁrm, thus
cost of equity capital. Therefore, the following hypothesis is stated:
H1b(ii): There is a negative association between internal attribution statements
and a ﬁrm's cost of equity capital.
There is also reason to suggest that the relationship between attribution statement
disclosure in the annual report and the cost of equity capital is mitigated by the
number of analysts following a ﬁrm. Research reported that the relationship between
disclosure and the cost of capital can be inﬂuenced by an interaction of disclosure
with factors such as a ﬁrm's accounting policy choice (Espinosa and Trombetta 2007)
or the level of corporate social responsibility disclosures (Dhaliwal et al. 2011). More
speciﬁcally, Botosan (1997) provided evidence that the eﬀect of disclosure on the cost
of capital is mitigated by the level of analyst following. While Botosan (1997) found
no relationship between disclosure and the cost of capital for the overall sample, there
was a signiﬁcant negative relationship for ﬁrms with low analyst following. Richardson
and Welker (2001) report conﬁrming evidence.
Financial analysts take a central position in the capital market as information inter-
mediaries between ﬁrms and the market for the analysis, evaluation, and distribution
of ﬁrm information (Lang and Lundholm 1996; Healy and Palepu 2001; Breton and
Taer 2001). Firms use analysts to communicate with the market (Botosan 1997),
and analysts provide additional information about ﬁrms independent from the ﬁrm's
disclosures (Richardson and Welker 2001) that can be used by investors for decision
making. From this follows that there is more information available about ﬁrms that
are followed by more analysts (Hail 2002; Daske et al. 2006). This suggests that
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for ﬁrms with higher analyst following, an important vehicle to communicate the
reasons for performance outcomes will be analysts, as they carry out the task of in-
vestigating the reasons for performance and communicating their assessments to the
market. This implies that for ﬁrms with higher analyst following, the importance to
investors of performance explanations provided by management in the annual reports
may be lower. This is because the reasons behind performance, including analysts'
evaluations of this performance, can be gained from analysts' communications, hence
reducing the need for investors to go to the annual report themselves and read the
performance explanations. Therefore, for ﬁrms with higher analyst following, attribu-
tion statements disclosed in annual reports might not be that important for investor
decision making.
For ﬁrms with lower analyst following, however, analysts as a source for indepen-
dent analysis and interpretation of corporate performance outcomes are not available
to the same extent. Investors therefore need to do more of their own research and
evaluation. This has been stressed by Previts et al. (1994) who highlight that for
ﬁrms with low analyst following, investors have to rely on their own research and
the ﬁrm's accounts, as analysts' assessments of ﬁrm information are not available
that may help them in their investment decisions. The importance of ﬁrms' own
disclosures in case of low analyst following has further been emphasised by Richard-
son and Welker (2001, p. 600) who stressed that if there is not much information
provided by analysts, the ﬁrm's own disclosures are the key source of information.
Richardson and Welker (2001) argue that in case of low analyst following, more dis-
closure can play out its full advantage. This suggests that, as investors still need to
know the reasons behind performance outcomes in case there is less analyst cover-
age of a ﬁrm, they will have to use management's own explanations to inform their
decision making. Hence, it can be argued that less analyst-provided processing and
interpretation of reported performance outcomes will lead investors to attach more
importance to analysing management's attribution statements to ﬁnd out the reasons
for performance. Hence the 'unique insight' (Cole and Jones 2005) that attribution
statements can provide on the reasons for performance from management's point of
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view might be more valuable for ﬁrms with low analyst following.
This suggests that the association between attribution statements and the cost
of capital may be inﬂuenced by the number of analysts following a ﬁrm. Hence the
following hypothesis is stated:
H2: The association between attribution statement disclosure and the cost of
equity capital is stronger for ﬁrms with lower analyst following.
4.7 Summary and conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the literature on disclosure and the cost of capital and has
developed the hypotheses regarding the eﬀect of attribution statements on the cost
of capital. First, the chapter has reviewed the theoretical literature that establishes a
link between disclosure and the cost of capital. This provides the underlying theoret-
ical foundation for establishing the association between attribution statements and
the cost of capital. Second, the chapter has reviewed the empirical literature that has
examined the link between the cost of capital and disclosure. This led to the iden-
tiﬁcation of the gap in current research. Third, hypotheses about the association of
attribution statement disclosure and a ﬁrm's cost of equity capital were formulated.
The next chapter presents the research methodology that was adopted to address
the research objectives.
CHAPTER 5
METHODOLOGY
5.1 Introduction
The preceding chapters have set the scene for the thesis. The rationale for the
investigation was laid out. The main objectives were speciﬁed as to investigate the
determinants and consequences of attributions made in annual reports of UK listed
companies. This chapter presents the research methodology adopted to answer the
research objectives. It is structured as follows: First, the research approach of the
thesis is outlined. Second, the sample selection procedure and the methods used for
data collection are presented, followed by the data analysis methods. The chapter
concludes with a summary.
5.2 Research philosophy
At the beginning of each inquiry process stands the decision on the research method-
ology to address the research questions. A research methodology is, as argued by
Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (1996, p. 13) a system of explicit rules and pro-
cedures upon which research is based and against which claims for knowledge are
evaluated. Each research methodology is based on an underlying paradigm, which
is a philosophical position that takes a certain view of the world and sets out a way
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of how this world can be made accessible by research. It operationalises a paradigm,
thus is a model, which entails theoretical principles as well as a framework that pro-
vides guidelines about how research is done in the context of a particular paradigm
. . . In simple terms, a methodology translates the principles of a paradigm into a re-
search language, and shows how the world can be explained, handled, approached or
studied (Sarantakos 1998, p. 32). In the social sciences, the literature (e.g. Saran-
takos 1998; Gill and Johnson 2002; Chua 1986) has distinguished three paradigms:
a positivist, an interpretivist, and a critical perspective. These diﬀer with regard to
their assumptions about (1) ontology, (2) epistemology, and (3) views on the nature
of science and its aims, which then translates into diﬀerent approaches to research.
In terms of ontology, positivism is based on the assumption that there is an
objective reality that can be made accessible by observation. Science is seen as . . .
the study of an objectively existing reality which lies outside the discourse of science
(Delanty 2005, p. 10). By contrast, interpretivism does not consider reality to be an
objective fact but a social construct (Ryan et al. 2002). So in order to achieve an
understanding of social phenomena, the researcher has to immerse himself into the
individual's world, thereby recognising the inﬂuence of situational factors. A diﬀerent
stance is taken by critical research, which considers reality as a construct of social
interaction. Therefore, social reality and human action are seen as not separate
but mutually dependent (Chua 1986). Reality is, however, shaped by those with
power, and constantly evolving and in a state of tension and conﬂict (Sarantakos
1998). With regard to epistemology, positivism is based on the scientiﬁc method, the
approach usually used in the natural sciences (Gill and Johnson 2002). It adheres to
the notion that only those phenomena that are observable, measurable and veriﬁable
can be considered knowledge (Bryman 1988). Therefore, positivism assumes that
the observer (subject) can be separated from the observed (object) (Gill and Johnson
2002). By contrast, interpretivism does not assume a distinction between observer
and observed, as the researcher is part of the process of reality construction (Smith
2003). Interpretivist researchers emphasise that human beings, unlike objects of study
in the natural sciences, hold beliefs about the world and give meanings to phenomena.
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Human behaviour, then, is inﬂuenced by these perceptions as well as by the context
within which individuals act, so that these subjective factors have to be considered if
human action is to be examined and understood (Gill and Johnson 2002). Similarly,
critical researchers do not adhere to the scientiﬁc method and its neutral approach to
the study of a phenomenon. They stress that knowledge is socially constructed and
a result of its history, thus there is no absolute existing knowledge, due to constant
evolution changing the prevailing paradigm (Chua 1986; Gill and Johnson 2002).
Finally, concerning views on the nature of science and its aims, positivism follows
a deductive approach. It is based on a highly structured process and starts out with
using formal logic to establish a theory about how the phenomena to be investigated
relate to each other. Subsequent empirical tests are used to conﬁrm or disprove
hypotheses regarding the relationship (Ngwenyama and Lee 1997; Gill and Johnson
2002). Positivist research stresses exact measurements and is value-free so it can
objectively describe the overarching inﬂuence of general laws (Rocco et al. 2003).
The aim is to make generalisations from the results to a wider population, to uncover
universal laws. As such, the positivist approach is . . . characterised by an ontological
belief about a generalizable world waiting to be discovered and a high degree of
reliance on deﬁnable theory with speciﬁc hypotheses to be tested. . .  (Baker and
Bettner 1997, p. 295). The interpretivist paradigm, instead, is based on an inductive
approach. Theory is not at the beginning of the process to guide the inquiry, but is
the result of the research. In contrast to positivism, the aim is to develop theories to
explain the meanings and perceptions based on the observations made (Denzin 1978).
The interpretivist paradigm is trying to investigate how individuals perceive and attach
meaning to their world (Burns 2000), that is, to understand the world from their
perspective, not to uncover universal laws. As such, this paradigm does not assume
that science is value-free. The critical perspective occupies a position in between
positivism and interpretivism (Sarantakos 1998). Whilst recognising that individuals
shape their environment, they are also subject to their environment. The distinct
feature of this approach is that it goes beyond the attempts to approve/disprove or
establish a theory. It is the belief that there are prevailing systems of domination
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which alienate[s] people from self-realisation (Chua 1986, p. 619). Individuals
are considered to be held back in their development and reaching their potential
by the dominant forces in society that secure their own status quo. Ryan et al.
(2002) point out that, due its roots in critical theory and the inﬂuence of for example
Habermas as well as that of Marx' works that stress social critique and critique of
the capitalist society, the critical perspective accords a special and negative role to
ideology in exercising dominance and maintaining the status quo in society. Hence
this paradigm does not consider science to be value-free, and critical researchers
are not only concerned with explaining and understanding a phenomenon, but aim
at criticising the existing status quo perceived as unjust. Hence the aim of critical
research is to uncover the dominance mechanisms, and ultimately try to change them
(Ngwenyama and Lee 1997; Sarantakos 1998).
In accounting research, Chua (1986), Baker and Bettner (1997) and Ryan et al.
(2002) group research into mainstream (positivist), critical and interpretive account-
ing research. The mainstream accounting research, using either archival data or
experiments, with archival studies is the most widely used approach (Libby et al.
2002). Accounting research from a positivist perspective can be seen as
a process of constructing precise and economical theories validated by well-
designed tests using large and, as far as possible, unbiased samples. Replicability and
critical evaluation of method and results are the hallmark of this type of research.
(Ryan et al. 2002, p. 8)
It relies heavily on quantitative methods, using statistical methods and economic
models to investigate the phenomena of interest (Kam 1990). A large stream of
this research is based on economic models as abstract theoretical descriptions of
reality (Ryan et al. 2002, p. 27), to test assumed associations of variables, aim-
ing at generalising the results. By contrast, interpretive accounting research is more
concerned with accounting's socially constructed nature and dimension (Ryan et al.
2002). It pursues diﬀerent objectives than positivist approaches in that it inves-
tigates the . . . metaphorical dimensions of accounting and thereby gain [ing] an
understanding denied by the more limited scope of the mainstream research perspec-
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tives (Baker and Bettner 1997, p. 305). Accounting is not only analysed from an
economic perspective, but within the framework of society in which it is embedded,
its implications for and interactions with humans and society. Accounting research
from a critical perspective claims that . . . accounting's essence can be best captured
through an understanding of its impact on individuals, organizations and societies
(Baker and Bettner 1997, p. 305). Critical researchers see accounting as a means of
control in society and in ﬁrms, giving those using it power to inﬂuence and shape the
environment (Belkaoui 1992; Baker and Bettner 1997). Critical accounting research
ultimately aims at organisational change (Gill and Johnson 2002).
In this thesis, a positivist approach is taken on several grounds. Firstly, the thesis
investigates (1) the determinants of attribution statements and (2) the statements'
association with the cost of capital in the capital market using mainly ﬁnancial data
to answer the research questions. This requires a positivist methodology because
the other paradigms focus on studying the perceptions or actions of individuals, thus
use a diﬀerent type of data and analysis. Secondly, the thesis follows a deductive
approach based on stating hypotheses about the association of (1) factors inﬂuencing
the provision of attribution statements and (2) the statements' association with the
cost of capital. The hypotheses are tested to measure how the variables relate to
each other in general.
Thus the thesis seeks to establish a general relationship between the variables,
in line with previous research (e.g. Cooke 1989; Coles et al. 1995; Botosan 1997;
Aerts 2005; Gietzmann and Ireland 2005). As both the interpretivist and the critical
perspective do not share the deductive approach with prior theorisation, they are not
suitable. Thirdly, in order to measure the association between the variables, the thesis
requires reality to be objectively measurable. For example, both the cost of capital
and attributions are quantiﬁed. As the interpretive and critical approaches do not
see reality as objectively observable, but more as a construct of human interaction,
changeable and in part depending on the beholder, the approach to use is positivist.
Finally, the thesis investigates an economic association of variables and does not
attempt to relate this to a societal dimension within a broader context. By contrast,
5.3. RESEARCH APPROACH 115
interpretive research emphasises the organisational and societal aspects of accounting,
and critical researchers focus on potential organisational change, which is clearly a
diﬀerent focus from what this study aims to achieve. The choice of a positivist
methodology has implications for the research method of the thesis, which needs to
be developed accordingly. The next section presents the research methods in the
thesis.
5.3 Research approach
An important aspect of any research is to determine the appropriate research meth-
ods for addressing the research objectives. The appropriate method for any piece of
investigation has to be considered in light of the methodology adopted. Two major
approaches in research can be distinguished: quantitative and qualitative. The quan-
titative approach is closely associated with the positivist research tradition. Quan-
titative research is characterised by an attempt to conduct objective and value-free
research, focused on the measurement of variables and their association based on
a pre-deﬁned, structured theoretical framework similar to the natural sciences (Gill
and Johnson 2002; Silverman 2000). Quantitative research employs the language of
the natural sciences; expressions concerned with `control, variables, experiment, and
measurement' (Bryman 1988) as well as the deductive approach, empirical investiga-
tions of hypotheses based on prior theory. The aim in this type of research is to make
generalisations from the sample studied to the wider population (Silverman 2000).
The methods used by quantitative research mirror its emphasis on quantiﬁcation of
variables, as data are mainly numerical (Creswell 2009). The prevailing methods
are experiments, surveys, and statistical methods (Brannen 1992; Silverman 2000).
Theories and hypotheses are mainly tested either via experiments which allow the
controlled investigation of the eﬀect of a single variable on other variables, or via
surveys and questionnaires, to generate a lot of data for subsequent testing (Bryman
1988).
Qualitative research, by contrast, is closely linked to the ontological assumptions
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of interpretivism and emphasises exploring social phenomena that cannot be mea-
sured and quantiﬁed by statistics (Silverman 2000), such as deeper meanings and
associations of phenomena. Theory does not underlie a qualitative investigation, but
may result from it. As such, it features an inductive approach, undertaking empirical
observation ﬁrst and then deriving theories and explanations for the observed (Tucker
et al. 1995; Gill and Johnson 2002). It starts with stating broad concepts regard-
ing a phenomenon and then explores potential relationships between these concepts
(Brannen 1992). Moreover, it accords an essential role to human beings and their
actions as the object of study, thus it is concerned with studying individuals and
their perception of the world (Burns 2000), which quantitative research does not.
Qualitative research considers the phenomena under investigation within the context
in which they appear, thus emphasises their subjective nature (Burns 2000), and has
a tendency . . . to describe the unfolding of social processes rather than the social
structures that are often the focus of quantitative researchers (Van Maanen 1979,
p. 520). Methods usually employed include participant observation, action research,
case studies or ethnography (Burns 2000). In addition, interviews, in general more
in-depth and mainly semi- or unstructured in nature, constitute a large portion of the
methods used. All these techniques are not for quantiﬁcation purposes, but share
the underlying notion that . . . they can provide a `deeper' understanding of social
phenomena than would be obtained from purely quantitative data (Silverman 2000,
p. 8).
In light of the research questions, the thesis uses a quantitative approach, for
three reasons. First, the thesis has adopted a positivist methodology, and the latter
is closely linked to and operationalised through quantitative methods. Second, the
thesis is based on prior theorisation to develop hypotheses about the association of
variables, which are then subjected to empirical testing using data collected for that
purpose. Third, the thesis seeks to generalise the results to a wider population, which
is UK listed companies.
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5.4 Model development
In order to address the research questions two ordinary least squares regression models
are speciﬁed below. Model 1 examines the determinants of the provision of attribu-
tion statements in annual reports of listed ﬁrms in the UK. It expresses attribution
disclosure as a function of corporate governance factors and ﬁrm-speciﬁc attributes
as discussed in chapter 3. Model 2 analyses the association of attributions and the
cost of capital, and controls for other factors known to be related with the cost of
capital. These factors are beta, ﬁrm size, gearing, analyst following, book-to-market
ratio. These are discussed below.
Attributions = β0 + β1PropNED + β2Dirown+ β3ACSize+ β4ACExp
+β5Size+ β6AF + β7Gear + β8Profit+ β9Perf
+β10Issue+  (5.4.1)
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Table 5.4.1: Deﬁnition of independent variables Model 1 and Model 2
PropNED = Proportion of non-executive directors on the board of directors,
measured as the proportion of non-executive directors on the board
of directors to the total number of directors on the board
Dirown = Executive director share ownership, measured as the percentage of
shares held by ﬁrm executive directors
ACSize = Audit committee size, measured as the number of directors on the
audit committee
ACExp = Audit committee expertise, measured as the proportion of audit
committee members with accounting and ﬁnancial management
expertise to the total size of the audit committee
Size = Firm size, measured as market value of equity at ﬁnancial year end
in ¿m
AF = Analyst following, measured as the number of analysts following a
ﬁrm
Gear = Gearing ratio, measured as long-term debt divided by long-term
debt plus shareholders' equity at ﬁnancial year end
Proﬁt = Firm proﬁtability, measured as return on assets
Perf = Change in ﬁnancial performance from the previous ﬁnancial year,
measured as indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the ﬁrm's
operating proﬁt has decreased from the previous year; 0 otherwise
Issue = Indicator variable if the ﬁrm has issued equity within the subsequent
ﬁnancial year; taking the value of 1 if the ﬁrm has issued equity
within the year following the publication of the annual report; 0
otherwise
Attributions = Attribution disclosure, measured as the percentage of words used
for attributions to the total number of words in the narrative
sections of the annual report
Beta = Firm beta, measuring a ﬁrm's systematic risk; measures the
sensitivity of a stock's return to variation in the return of the overall
market
B/M = Firm book-to-market ratio, measured as book value of equity
divided by market value of equity
Attributions*AF = Interaction variable of attribution disclosure and analyst following,
operationalised as a multiplication of the attribution disclosure
variable and analyst following
β = Regression coeﬃcient
 = Error term
CostofCapital = β0 + β1Attributions+ β2Beta+ β3Size+ β4Gear
+β5AF + β6B/M + β7Attributions ∗ AF +  (5.4.2)
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Control variables
Firm beta (Beta)
Beta is a measure for a ﬁrm's systematic risk and measures the sensitivity of a
stock's return to variation in the return of the overall market (Fama and French 2004).
The higher beta, the higher the return investors require to be compensated for that
risk (Fabozzi and Modigliani 2003). Empirical accounting research has consistently
conﬁrmed that beta is positively correlated with estimations of an implied cost of
equity capital (e.g., Botosan 1997; Hail 2002; Botosan and Plumlee 2002; Poshakwale
and Courtis 2005). A positive association between beta and the cost of equity capital
is expected in the regression.
Firm size (Size)
Prior research has found strong evidence that ﬁrm size and returns are correlated.
Banz (1981) and Keim (1983) have ﬁrst documented that smaller ﬁrms earn higher
returns, thus are deemed riskier, and subsequent empirical research has provided
further evidence for a substantial eﬀect of size on returns (e.g. Fama and French
1992; Fama and French 1993). Likewise, size is negatively correlated with implied
cost of equity capital (Botosan 1997; Gebhardt et al. 2001; Botosan and Plumlee
2005; Gode and Mohanram 2003). Studies on the relation of disclosure and the cost
of capital (e.g. Botosan 1997; Botosan and Plumlee 2002; Hail 2002; Poshakwale
and Courtis 2005; Francis, Khurana and Pereira 2005; Espinosa and Trombetta 2007)
have included ﬁrm size in their models and found a negative relation with the cost
of equity capital. From a theoretical perspective, more information is available for
bigger ﬁrms than for smaller ﬁrms, thus they should have a lower risk attached and be
associated with a lower cost of capital (Gebhardt et al. 2001). A negative association
between ﬁrm size and the cost of equity capital is expected in the regression.
Gearing (Gear)
A ﬁrm's cost of equity capital should be increasing with its gearing as pointed
out by, for instance, the work by Modigliani and Miller (1958) on capital structure.
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Debt increases the risk for the equity investor as it adds a ﬁnancial risk in addition
to the operating risk attached to investing in a stock. That means a ﬁrm with debt
has a higher systematic risk than a purely equity ﬁnanced company (Bessler et al.
2007). The higher the leverage, the higher the risk the ﬁrm may default and thus
the risk of stockholders to miss out, leading investors to require higher returns (Fama
and Miller 1972). Empirical research has conﬁrmed a positive relation of leverage
with realised returns (e.g. Fama and French 1992) and measures of implied cost of
equity capital (e.g. Gebhardt et al. 2001; Hail 2002; Gietzmann and Ireland 2005).
A positive association between gearing and the cost of equity capital is expected in
the regression.
Analyst following (AF )
The number of analysts following a ﬁrm is included as prior studies (e.g. Geb-
hardt et al. 2001; Richardson and Welker 2001; Daske et al. 2006) have repeatedly
reported a signiﬁcant negative association of analyst following with implied cost of
equity capital measures. Research has also shown that there is a negative associa-
tion between the cost of equity capital and disclosure level for ﬁrms with low analyst
following (e.g. Botosan 1997; Richardson and Welker 2001). A negative association
between analyst following and the cost of equity capital is expected in the regression.
Book-to-Market value of equity (B/M)
The ratio of a ﬁrm's book value of equity to its market value (B/M) is included as
research has consistently found evidence that ﬁrms with high B/M ratios earn higher
average returns (e.g. Stattman 1980; Rosenberg et al. 1985, Fama and French
1992; Fama and French 1993), and research using estimates of implied cost of equity
capital has repeatedly documented a systematic and signiﬁcant positive relationship
with their cost of capital measures (e.g. Gebhardt et al. 2001; Francis et al. 2004;
Botosan and Plumlee 2005; Daske et al. 2006; Hail and Leuz 2006).
The literature (see e.g. La Porta 1996; Daske et al. 2006) suggests that the B/M
eﬀect may either be the result of stocks being mispriced by investors, so that stocks
with high B/M (`value stocks') are priced too low and low B/M stocks (`growth
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stocks') are priced too high, and B/M captures this eﬀect (e.g. Lakonishok et al.
1994); or the B/M ratio may proxy for underlying risk factors (e.g. Fama and French
1992), so that high B/M stocks will have higher expected returns. A positive asso-
ciation of B/M with the cost of equity capital is expected in the regression.
5.5 Sample selection
The thesis is based on a cross-sectional analysis of a sample of ﬁrms listed on the
London Stock Exchange (LSE) in the year 2006. The population of ﬁrms from which
the sample is drawn consists of all UK listed companies on the London Stock Exchange
(LSE). There were 3200 ﬁrms listed on the LSE at 31 December 2006.1 From this
population, all overseas listed ﬁrms as well as listings from the Alternative Investment
Market (AIM) and Professional Securities Market (debt and depository receipts) were
removed, resulting in 1276 ﬁrms. In a next step, all bonds, ﬁxed interest (debentures
and loans, convertibles, preference) and listings of equity and non equity investment
instruments and ﬁrms from the ﬁnancial and the real estate sector were removed2,
leaving a total of 572 ﬁrms.
Adequate sample size depends on various factors such as population characteris-
tics, required level of accuracy and standard error, the use of statistical techniques,
or resources available (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1996; Sarantakos 1998;
Saunders et al. 2003). Various ways to determine an adequate sample size are used
in the literature. For instance, it can be derived from a table based on the desired
accuracy (see, e.g. Krejcie and Morgan 1970 and de Vaus 1986) or calculated us-
ing speciﬁc formulae (see, e.g. Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1996; Robson
1http://www.londonstockexchange.com/statistics/historic/company-ﬁles/company-ﬁles.htm;
LSE 2009.
2Firms from the ﬁnancial sector are excluded (1) due to the nature of their operations which
makes their ﬁnancial reports diﬃcult to compare to other sectors, and (2) they operate in a more
regulated environment and are subject to additional regulatory requirements; for that reason, ﬁrms
from the ﬁnancial sector are often excluded in disclosure studies, see e.g. Hail (2002); Cohen (2008).
Similarly, the real estate sector is excluded as these listings are property investment vehicles, holdings,
trusts, or Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITS), thus their operations are not directly comparable,
and their ﬁnancial reports exhibit a diﬀerent structure with an emphasis on diﬀerent performance
items that makes it diﬃcult to apply the attribution checklist.
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2002). For economic modelling, the size of the sample should relate to the number
of independent variables in the model. Various general rules have been suggested in
the literature, e.g. a minimum of at least 5 observations per independent variable
(Bartlett et al. 2001), a ratio of at least 10 observations (e.g. Bartlett et al. 2001;
Sekaran 2003) or 15 observations (Stevens 2002) per independent variable. Harris
(1975) has recommended the number of observations should be 50 plus the number
of independent variables, whereas Green (1991) has suggested the simple rule that if
the aim is to test independent variables individually, the sample size should be N>
104+m (with N=number of observations, and m=number of independent variables).
Tabachnick and Fidell (1989) have argued that at least 100 observations are required
to yield meaningful results and have suggested that 20 observations per independent
variable are desirable.
Sample size in the study was determined using the table in Krejcie and Morgan
(1970). For a population of 572, their table suggests a sample size of 234 observa-
tions. This corresponds to 41% of the population.
After the required sample size is determined, the sampling technique has to be
selected. The literature distinguishes between two general approaches (Sarantakos
1998; Robson 2002): Probability (or random) sampling in which each unit has equal
probability to be included in the sample so that the sample can be considered repre-
sentative of the population, and non-probability sampling without equal probability
of inclusion, thus not representative. The thesis uses probability sampling because it
aims at generalising the ﬁndings, and generalisations for the population can only be
made from probability samples as they are statistically representative of the popula-
tion (Robson 2002; Creswell 2009). The technique for sampling can be either simple
random or stratiﬁed. Random sampling picks the units from the population at random
until the sample size is reached, whereas stratiﬁed sampling divides the population
into groups (strata) according to their diﬀering characteristics and random sampling
is carried out in each stratum separately. When there are known diﬀerences in the
population, stratiﬁed sampling is used (see Krippendorﬀ 1980; Gill and Johnson 2002)
to prevent the introduction of bias as the technique increases accuracy in the sam-
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ple by providing a better representation of subpopulations (Moser and Kalton 1971;
Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1996). The thesis uses stratiﬁed sampling since
prior research has documented diﬀerences in attributional behavior between industries
(Bettman and Weitz 1983; Aerts 2005; Aerts and Tarca 2010). These diﬀerences in
the population, if not accounted for, introduce bias in the sample. Therefore, the
population is divided into industries (strata) and a random sample is taken from each
industry (stratum). Proportionate stratiﬁed sampling is used, that is the sample size
in each stratum is proportionate to the population size of the stratum (Moser and
Kalton 1971).
Firms were grouped into 21 industry sectors based on a review of the relevant
literature.3 The number of ﬁrms that were chosen from each industry (stratum) was
calculated as the proportionate number of ﬁrms that had to be taken from each of the
21 industries (strata) out of the population of 572 ﬁrms to obtain the total sample
of 234 ﬁrms required. The required number of ﬁrms selected from each industry is
shown in Table 5.5.1.
3For instance, Industry-Classiﬁcation-Benchmark (2010); Campbell (1996); Fama and French
(1997); Botosan and Plumlee (2002); Lee et al. (2006); Daske et al. (2006); Daske et al. (2009);
Mangena et al. (2010).
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Table 5.5.1: Industry distribution of ﬁrms and required samples
Sector Population Sample %
Aerospace and Defense 12 5 42%
Business Support Services 83 34 41%
Chemicals 14 6 43%
Construction and Construction Materials 22 9 41%
Consumer Goods (Personal + Leisure Goods) 19 8 42%
Electronic and Electrical Equipment 20 8 40%
Engineering (Automobiles and Parts + Industrial Engineering) 32 13 41%
Food and Beverages (Food Producers + Beverages + Tobacco) 28 12 43%
General Industrials 9 4 44%
Health Care Equipment and Services (Health care Providers +
Medical Equipment)
18 7 39%
Household Goods 18 7 39%
IT (Software and Computing Services + Technology Hardware
and Equipment)
65 26 40%
Media 38 16 42%
Mining and Basic Resources (Forestry and Paper + Industrial
Metals)
18 7 39%
Oil and Gas (Oil and Gas Producers + Oil Equipment, Services
and Distribution)
22 9 41%
Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology 25 10 40%
Retailers (General + Food and Drug Retailers) 55 22 40%
Telecommunication (Mobile + Fixed Line Telecommunications) 9 4 44%
Transportation 14 6 43%
Travel and Leisure 37 15 41%
Utilities (Electricity + Gas, Water, and Multiutilities) 14 6 43%
Total 572 234 41%
This initial sample of 234 companies had to be reduced during the data collection
process due to non-availability of data for 37 ﬁrms4, leaving a sample of 197 com-
panies. These sample ﬁrms were submitted to I/B/E/S to obtain analysts' forecasts
for Earnings per share (EPS) and the number of analysts following the ﬁrm. This led
to eliminating another 51 ﬁrms from the sample (32 due to non availability of data
on I/B/E/S; and 19 because the EPS data did not fulﬁl the restrictions imposed by
the model used to calculate the cost of capital.5 From the remaining 146 companies,
47 companies were in administration; 24 had been delisted due to mergers, takeovers or had
been taken private; 4 ﬁrms reported in currencies other than ¿; 2 more ﬁrms had to be dropped as
they had already been delisted in the year 2006 or were listed abroad.
5To calculate the cost of equity capital, the model requires positive earnings forecasts as well as
EPS1 < EPS2 in order to solve the equation (see Easton 2004). Hence ﬁrms with negative forecasts
or with one year ahead forecasts higher than two year ahead forecasts have to be excluded. See
section 5.6.5 for details.
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4 companies were removed due to non-disclosure of attribution statements (1 ﬁrm)
and negative equity (3 ﬁrms) in order to avoid outlier problems.6 This resulted in the
ﬁnal sample of 142 ﬁrms for the analysis. As the maximum number of independent
variables in the study is 10 in regression Model 1, 142 observations is in line with the
recommendations in the literature of a ratio of at least 10 observations (e.g. Bartlett
et al. 2001; Sekaran 2003) or 15 observations (Stevens 2002) per independent vari-
able. The distribution of the sample ﬁrms in the 21 industries is displayed in Table
5.5.2:
Table 5.5.2: Distribution of sample ﬁrms by industry
Sector Number %
Aerospace and Defense 5 3.5%
Business Support Services 23 16.1%
Chemicals 6 4.2%
Construction and Construction Materials 5 3.5%
Consumer Goods (Personal + Leisure Goods) 4 2.8%
Electronic and Electrical Equipment 6 4.2%
Engineering (Automobiles and Parts + Industrial Engineering) 6 4.2%
Food and Beverages (Food Producers + Beverages + Tobacco) 6 4.2%
General Industrials 4 2.8%
Health Care Equipment and Services (Health care Providers + Medical Equipment) 2 1.4%
Household Goods 5 3.5%
IT (Software and Computing Services + Technology Hardware and Equipment) 12 8.4%
Media 12 8.4%
Mining and Basic Resources (Forestry and Paper + Industrial Metals) 1 0.7%
Oil and Gas (Oil and Gas Producers + Oil Equipment, Services and Distribution) 6 4.2%
Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology 1 0.7%
Retailers (General + Food and Drug Retailers) 17 11.9%
Telecommunication (Mobile + Fixed Line Telecommunications) 3 2.1%
Transportation 1 0.7%
Travel and Leisure 12 8.4%
Utilities (Electricity + Gas, Water, and Multiutilities) 5 3.5%
Total 142 100%
A full list of the sample ﬁrms is provided in Appendix A.1.
6See Tabachnick and Fidell 2007 for a discussion of the inﬂuence of outlying values in regression
analysis.
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5.6 Data collection methods
5.6.1 Data sources
The thesis uses data for the year 2006 and was collected from diﬀerent sources. This
year was chosen for analysis as it represents the most recent year of economic activity
under regular conditions before the turmoil in the ﬁnancial sector started to unfold
in 2007 and the subsequent recession started aﬀecting the wider economy in 2008.
This ensures that the data is not inﬂuenced by the ﬁnancial crisis. For example,
attributions made for the year 2006 would not be inﬂuenced by the impact of the
recession, but would likely reﬂect normal attributional behaviour. This ensures that
the investigation into performance attributions and the cost of capital is not unduly
inﬂuenced by the eﬀects of this major external event on the ﬁrms' operations. Several
potential data sources are available to the project, as ﬁrms can provide explanations
for corporate performance outcomes in various forms. In more formal and regulated
documents such as the annual report, interim reports, or the preliminary results an-
nouncements; or in less formal and regulated ways, such as during conference calls
or analyst presentations, press releases, websites, or newsletters. This thesis uses the
annual report for a number of reasons. The annual report is the main document with
which a ﬁrm communicates with the outside and its investors (Adams and Harte 1998;
Snidal 2007), it is published in regular intervals (Gray, Kouhy and Lavers 1995), and
researchers can access it easier than other corporate documents (Woodward 1998).
This ensures that the information provides a reliable base for investigation. The an-
nual report has been used in previous disclosure studies (Singhvi and Desai 1971;
Cooke 1989; Wallace et al. 1994; Wallace and Naser 1995; Gray, Meek and Roberts
1995; Hossain et al. 1995; Ho and Wong 2001; Haniﬀa and Cooke 2005) and at-
tribution studies (e.g. Aerts 2005; Aerts and Tarca 2010; Tessarolo et al. 2010).7
Causal attributions play a major role in the justiﬁcation of performance and corpo-
rate accountability (Pfeﬀer 1981; Staw et al. 1983; Aerts 2005). Since annual reports
7Exceptions include, for instance, Baginski et al. (2000) and Baginski et al. (2004) who use
management earnings forecasts, yet their focus lies on the market's reaction to the publication.
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are considered the main document of communication with the outside (as reported
above), it can be argued that the annual report is the main document for ﬁrms to
justify performance and to provide accountability to investors. This view is seconded
by the observation that the annual report has become a corporate Public Relations
document ﬁrms use to promote a certain image and identity of themselves (Lee 1994;
Stanton and Stanton 2002; Beattie et al. 2008). Attributions, as a primary means for
justifying performance and convincing the public of the strength of the business, will
therefore occupy an important part in the image-building role of the annual report.
More importantly, research suggests that analysts, amongst the major users of
ﬁnancial information (Schipper 1991) ﬁnd the information contained in the annual
report useful for valuation and investment decision making. For instance, Eng and Teo
(1999) found that analysts revise their forecasts after the annual report is published,
and Hope (2003) demonstrated that the accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts is
positively related to annual report disclosure level. Additional evidence for the use-
fulness of annual reports has been provided by studies on private shareholders. These
demonstrated that private shareholders not only widely use the narrative parts of
annual reports to obtain information (e.g. Jones 1996; Bartlett and Chandler 1997),
but that the annual report contains information that is useful for investment decision
making for non-sophisticated and smaller investors (e.g. Kaplan et al. 1990; Cready
and Mynatt 1991; Rippington and Taer 1995). The annual reports were obtained
from various sources: Via download from the companies' websites, from databases
(such as morningstar.co.uk; annualreports.com), and in case of non-availability online,
by written request to ﬁrms.
5.6.2 Measuring causal attributions
5.6.2.1 Content analysis
The thesis uses content analysis in order to generate the measures of attributions
for the subsequent statistical analysis. Content analysis is a research technique that
allows a researcher to make inferences from data regarding the sender, the content,
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or the receiver of the message (Weber 1990). The text under study is reduced to
content categories and the units of analysis are classiﬁed into these categories based
on similar meanings or connotations. The units of analysis may range from words
or sentences to themes, paragraphs, or any other textual unit. After coding, the
coded content is expressed in quantitative terms to allow further statistical analysis
(Hackston and Milne 1996; Smith 2003). The content analysis technique is widely
used in accounting and business research to examine corporate communication.8 For
example, it has been used to investigate social and environmental disclosures (see
Milne and Adler 1999 and Duriau et al. 2007) or intellectual capital disclosures (e.g.
Bozzolan et al. 2003; Beattie and Thomson 2007). With regard to causal attributional
statements in corporate narratives, content analysis is the method of choice by prior
investigations of ﬁrms' attributional behavior in annual reports (e.g., Staw et al. 1983;
Bettman and Weitz 1983; Aerts 2005).
5.6.2.2 Development of research instrument
In order to measure attributions using the content analysis method, a checklist of
the items to which ﬁrms may make attributions was developed. Marston and Shrives
(1991) have emphasised that choosing the appropriate items to include in the index is
crucial for its usefulness. Therefore, consistent with other previous studies (see e.g.,
Botosan 1997; Mangena and Pike 2005; Seah and Tarca 2006), the development of
the checklist for this study started with a review of the existing literature on attribu-
tions (e.g. Staw et al. 1983; Bettman and Weitz 1983; Salancik and Meindl 1984;
Ford 1985; Huﬀ and Schwenk 1990; Clapham and Schwenk 1991; Clatworthy and
Jones 2003; Baginski et al. 2000; Baginski et al. 2004; Lee et al. 2004; Aerts 1994;
Aerts 2005; Hooghiemstra 2003; Aerts and Tarca 2010), other disclosure literature
(e.g. Gray, Meek and Roberts 1995), in particular regarding Management Commen-
tary (e.g. Robb et al. 2001; Beattie et al. 2004; Cole and Jones 2005), as well as
oﬃcial requirements by standard setters and law makers (e.g. SEC 2003; ASB 2006;
Companies Act 2006; IASB 2010).
8See Jones and Shoemaker (1994) and Duriau et al. (2007), for reviews on research using content
analysis in this area.
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The review resulted in an initial list of 20 items of performance outcomes to which
ﬁrms may give attributions, encompassing items from the income statement, balance
sheet, cash ﬂow statement. This checklist was pilot tested on a random sample of
15 annual reports of UK LSE-listed companies (not included in the ﬁnal sample) to
determine the items of corporate performance that ﬁrms give attributions to. Based
on the results of the pilot, comparisons with the literature on attributions, and further
discussions with the thesis supervisor, the checklist was adjusted to ensure that it
reﬂects the potential attributions that ﬁrms make. This process lead to dropping
15 items, because (1) ﬁrms were not found to give explanations to them and (2)
they were not universal enough to apply to every ﬁrm. The ﬁnal checklist contains 5
items of corporate performance outcomes to which ﬁrms can be expected to provide
attributions. These are sales/revenues, costs, proﬁt, cash ﬂow, debt.9 The categories
of revenues, costs, proﬁt have also been used by previous research (e.g. Aerts 2005;
Aerts and Tarca 2010). This instrument was used to measure disclosure of attributions
in the annual reports. Appendix A.2 contains examples of attribution statements to
each of these ﬁve performance outcome categories.
5.6.2.3 Identiﬁcation of attribution statements
A content analysis procedure requires clear instructions according to which the vari-
ables of interest can be systematically identiﬁed and coded (see Weber 1990; Marston
and Shrives 1991). This requires a clear deﬁnition of what constitutes an attribution
and how they can be identiﬁed in the text, so as to guarantee a valid subsequent clas-
siﬁcation (Holsti 1996). Consistent with prior research on attributions (e.g. Bettman
and Weitz 1983; Aerts 2005), a causal attributional statement is deﬁned as:
A causal attributional statement is a sentence or phrase (or sentences) that ex-
plains a corporate performance outcome (e.g., proﬁt, revenues, etc.) by linking it to
a cause or a reason for that outcome.
Attributional statements can either be implicit or explicit. Explicit attributions
9These performance outcomes cover the areas of (1) results of operations, (2) ﬁnancial position,
and (3) liquidity, and are the three areas highlighted by standard setting bodies such as the SEC 2003,
the ASB 2006, and the IASB 2009 to which ﬁrms shall provide explanations in their Management
Commentaries.
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state a clear causal relationship between an accounting outcome and a reason. They
are often identiﬁable by searching for explicit connection words in the documents,
such as `because of', `due to', or `resulting from'. Previous research (e.g. Salancik
and Meindl 1984; Clatworthy and Jones 2003; Aerts 2005) has successfully used these
connecting words to locate causal attributions in annual reports. Implicit attributions,
by contrast, do not directly and explicitly relate a cause to an outcome, nor do they
use connecting words. Following Aerts (2005), implicit attributions are only taken
into consideration if a cause-eﬀect relationship can be identiﬁed from the document.
In addition, as pointed out by Bettman and Weitz (1983), cause and eﬀect have to
be located closely to each other in the document, e.g. within one or two sentences,
to fulﬁl the criterion of an attribution.
Performance outcomes can be explained by ﬁrm-internal reasons or external causes.10
Internal reasons are those that the ﬁrm and management can inﬂuence or control,
and include issues such as strategy, product pricing, introduction of new products
(See Baginski et al. 2004). For example, in its 2006/7 annual report, British Airways
attributes its positive performance to its cost controls: For the ﬁrst time ever we
achieved an operating proﬁt margin of 10 per cent in 2006/07. Continuing tight
control of our costs played a crucial role in hitting this important target. . .  (British
Airways 2007, p. 9). That is, performance is attributed to a factor that lies within
the ﬁrm and that management can inﬂuence. A further example of a ﬁrm explaining
a performance outcome with an internal reason can be found in the Vitec (2006, p.
10) annual report, which states that operating proﬁt before signiﬁcant items at ¿1.7
million (2005: ¿1.2 million) was up 41.7% due to the Winter Olympics contract,
better equipment utilisation and continued good cost control.
External causes that inﬂuence performance outcomes are factors the ﬁrm and
management cannot control, such as overall state of the economy, changes in gov-
ernment regulations, competitors' actions (Baginski et al. 2004). For example, British
Airways (2007, p. 14) attributes a negative outcome to external factors: Landing
fees and en route charges cost us ¿528 million, up 2.1 per cent. This was partly
10See the literature review in chapter 2.
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due to rate increases and adverse exchange movements, primarily the stronger Euro.
Similarly, AEA Technology (2006, p. 2) attributes their turnover growth to an ex-
ternal factor. The ﬁrm highlights that the major driver for turnover growth was
the increase in demand from Government and the Devolved Administrations for more
policy advice and support in energy security and climate change as well as a strong
continuation of the Government outsourcing trend.
5.6.2.4 Measures of the level of attribution
Using the checklist and criteria above, attribution statements were identiﬁed and a
measure based on the word count for each attribution statement was developed. The
word count measures the volume of explanations contained in the ﬁrm's narrative
sections to capture the emphasis a ﬁrm places on explaining performance outcomes
(Bettman and Weitz 1983) and to measure disclosure in more detail (Zeghal and
Ahmed 1990) than other units.11 The approach is similar to previous studies (e.g.
Zeghal and Ahmed 1990; Deegan and Gordon 1996; Wilmshurst and Frost (2000);
Haniﬀa and Cooke 2005; Li et al. 2008). A number of studies have applied the word
count method to measure disclosure in annual reports. For example, Arshad et al.
(2011) have used the number of words to measure the disclosure of Management
Commentary. Li et al. (2008) applied the word count method to measure the extent
of intellectual capital disclosure in UK listed companies' annual reports. Haniﬀa and
Cooke (2005) and Zeghal and Ahmed (1990) used the word count measure to measure
social responsibility disclosure.
To compute the measure, the number of words in all the attribution statements
for each ﬁrm is divided by the total number of words in the narrative sections of the
11Various measures for disclosure volume in corporate documents are used in the literature: Num-
ber of sentences (e.g. Hackston and Milne 1996; Milne and Adler 1999) can be classiﬁed accurately
and carry the meaning (Hackston and Milne 1996), but do not take into account grammatical
diﬀerences, so that two diﬀerent authors may use a similar number of words yet this may result in
a diﬀerent number of sentences (Unerman 2000); number of pages (e.g. Cowen et al. 1987; Dee-
gan and Rankin 1997) and proportion of pages (e.g. Gray, Kouhy and Lavers 1995; Hackston and
Milne 1996) allow for capturing not only narrative information but for instance additionally pictorial
information (Gray, Kouhy and Lavers 1995), but have been criticised because they are exposed to
the inﬂuence of various presentational factors such as font size, blank pages or column size (see
e.g. Gray, Kouhy and Lavers 1995; Unerman 2000). Against the background of the advantages and
limitations of the various approaches, measuring the number of words was considered to be most
appropriate for this study.
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ﬁrm's annual report, including the Operating and Financial Review (OFR), Chair-
man's Statement, and Chief Executive's Review, to form an attribution word count
(WCN) index. This index expresses attribution statement provision at ﬁrm-level as
the percentage of words used for attributions to the total number of words in the
narrative sections of the annual report. Three indices were developed: the overall
WCN index; and two subcategories, the internal word count (WCN_INT ) and exter-
nal wordcount (WCN_EXT ). The two subcategories capture whether an internal or
an external cause was given as an explanation and help address research questions 1,
2, 3 and 5 as speciﬁed in chapter 1. The formula used for computing the disclosure
index is as follows:
WCN j =
∑mj
i=1Xij
nj
where
WCNj = Attribution wordcount index for jth ﬁrm
nj = total wordcount in the narrative sections for jth ﬁrm
mj = number of attribution statements for jth ﬁrm
Xij = total wordcount of each attribution statement for jth ﬁrm
so that 0 5 WCNj 5 1
The use of word count has been justiﬁed in the literature (see Zeghal and Ahmed
1990; Deegan and Gordon 1996; Wilmshurst and Frost 2000). Wilmshurst and Frost
(2000) have taken the view that the number of words used in disclosures can be
considered as representing management's responsiveness to legitimising performance,
because space in the annual report is limited, thus it will be ﬁlled with information
which is perceived to be important to users. The more space a ﬁrm devotes to
explaining its performance outcomes, the better investors will be able to understand
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these outcomes and to draw conclusions about the future prospects of the entity.
This suggests that a wordcount based measure is particularly suited to capture
the usefulness of attribution statement disclosure. Previous attribution studies did
not take this dimension into consideration, measuring attributions as, for instance,
the presence or absence of an attribution (e.g. Baginski et al. 2000; Baginski et al.
2004), the number of positive or negative attribution statements in relation to the
total number of attributions (e.g. Aerts 2005), or sentences that contain attributions
to the total number of sentences (e.g. Bettman and Weitz 1983; Luz et al. 2009).
Yet in particular in the context of analysing the usefulness of attribution statements,
a measure that captures the detail and the emphasis ﬁrms put to explain their perfor-
mance outcomes in their annual reports can be considered a more relevant measure,
as it can be argued that more detailed and elaborate explanations of performance
outcomes will be more useful to investors than short concise explanations. This sug-
gests that the measure used in this thesis oﬀers a suitable gauge of usefulness of
attribution statements.
5.6.2.5 Reliability and validity assessments of the disclosure measure
The attribution disclosure measure was tested for reliability and validity. The ﬁrst
test was for reliability. In order to produce valid and replicable inferences, it is of
paramount importance that the content analysis procedure is reliable (Weber 1990;
Milne and Adler 1999). Reliability refers to the property of the measuring instrument
delivering the same results when used on the same data repeatedly by the same
researcher or reproduced by another person (Weber 1990), and implies that category
construction is based on shared meanings among the researchers involved (Gray,
Kouhy and Lavers 1995). Weber (1990) has highlighted that ambiguity both of
word meanings and in the construction of coding categories poses a problem when
using content analysis, thus may reduce reliability. In addition, Beattie and Thomson
(2007) have highlighted that reliability not only requires a coding instrument with
reliable categories and coding rules, but it requires also consistency in coding using
multiple coders and points in time. The reliability assessments used in this thesis
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are described in the following. Krippendorﬀ (1980) has distinguished three types
of reliability: stability, reproducibility, accuracy. Stability means that coding results
do not change over time when the same coder does repeated coding. As only one
coder is involved, it is considered the weakest form of reliability. Reproducibility,
or intercoder reliability, is more sophisticated and measures the level of agreement
over the classiﬁcation of items when more than one coder is involved. Accuracy is
the highest level of reliability and measures the results of the coding in reference
to a standard or norm. The thesis uses reproducibility (intercoder reliability) to
measure the reliability of the coding instrument because (1) this is the minimum level
a content analysis should achieve (Krippendorﬀ 1980; Weber 1990), and (2) for the
highest level, accuracy, there is no existing standards to which the coding could be
compared.12
In order to assess the reproducibility of the content analysis procedure in this
thesis, a second coder coded a randomly chosen 10 annual reports out of the total
sample and the codings were compared to those of the main researcher. There
is a number of methods available to calculate intercoder reliability (see Milne and
Adler 1999), which range from a simple coeﬃcient of agreement between the coders
(that does not take into account agreement by chance) to measures taking account
of chance agreements such as the Cohen (1960) kappa, the Scott (1955) pi, the
Krippendorﬀ (1980) alpha. This thesis uses the Krippendorﬀ (1980) alpha to assess
intercoder reliability since this measure takes chance agreement into consideration and
can be used with data at all measurement levels (Lombard et al. 2003; Hayes and
Krippendorﬀ 2007). A level of agreement of 0.800 or better is seen as the threshold
for the coding to be reliable (Krippendorﬀ 1980; Neuendorf 2002). The results of the
analysis are presented in Table 5.6.1.
12Weber (1990) remarks that accuracy is indeed rarely used in research as there are usually no
existing standards as benchmark for comparison.
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Table 5.6.1: Reliability test attribution disclosure measures (Krippendorﬀ alpha)
WCN WCN_INT WCN_EXT
Level of intercoder agreement 0.875 0.835 0.962
As can be seen from the Table, the level of agreement between the two coders is
above 0.800 for each disclosure measure. These results suggest that the measures of
attribution disclosure are reliable.
In addition to reliability of the content analysis procedure, the validity of the
attribution word count index (WCN) was assessed. To assess whether WCN is a valid
measure of attribution disclosure of companies, the association with ﬁrm size, gearing,
and proﬁtability was analysed. Previous research has found that these factors inﬂuence
the disclosure of attribution statements (see Bettman and Weitz 1983; Salancik and
Meindl 1984; Baginski et al. 2004; Baginski et al. 2008; Aerts 2005; Aerts and Tarca
2010; Aerts and Cheng 2011; see also chapter 3). If the attribution measure in this
thesis is valid, it should show a positive association with ﬁrm size and gearing, and
an association with proﬁtability (positive or negative). That is, attribution disclosure
level should be higher for ﬁrms which are larger and have higher gearing. For more
proﬁtable ﬁrms, it can be either higher or lower.
The results presented in Table 5.6.2 show that WCN is associated with ﬁrm size,
consistent with results by previous studies (e.g. Baginski et al. 2004; Baginski et al.
2008). The negative association suggests that larger ﬁrms have a lower volume of
performance explanations contained in their narrative reviews. This ﬁnding is consis-
tent with Aerts (2005), who reported a negative association between ﬁrm size and
defensive (excuses, denials) attribution tendencies. WCN also exhibits a negative
association with proﬁtability, indicating that more proﬁtable ﬁrms also have a lower
volume of performance explanations contained in their narrative reviews. The neg-
ative association between attribution disclosure and proﬁtability is consistent with
prior research (Salancik and Meindl 1984; Aerts 2005; Aerts and Tarca 2010). The
insigniﬁcant association with Gear suggests that a ﬁrm's level of gearing does not
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inﬂuence attribution disclosure. This is consistent with the results by Aerts and Tarca
(2010), and mixed ﬁndings by Aerts 2005. Taken together, these results suggest that
WCN is a reasonably valid measure of companies' attribution disclosure level.
5.6.3 Measurement of the cost of capital
The cost of equity capital can be seen as the discount rate investors use to discount
a ﬁrm's future cash ﬂows in order to determine current share price (Botosan and
Plumlee 2005; Lee et al. 2006). Two approaches for the calculation of the cost
of equity capital can be distinguished in the literature (see Botosan 2006). First,
estimations based on an asset pricing model using a set of predetermined priced risk
factors and historical returns. Second, estimations of an implied cost of equity capital
based on a reformulation of the dividend discount formula. The next section discusses
these approaches and then presents the model chosen for the thesis.
5.6.3.1 The cost of capital model
Methods using predetermined risk factors and realised returns
The methods in this group include the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) by
Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), its extension, the Fama and French (1992) and
Fama and French (1993) Three-Factor Model, or the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT)
Model by Ross (1976). They are all based on the notion that a predetermined set of
risk factors may explain returns, and use average realised returns to calculate estimates
of the expected rate of return. Yet despite the CAPMs prevalence in the ﬁnance and
asset pricing literature and widespread use by companies (Bruner et al. 1998; Bessler
et al. 2007), it is not suitable for this investigation. First, realised returns were shown
to be poor proxies for expected returns (see Black 1995; Fama and French 1997;
Elton 1999). Second, and more importantly, the model does not give a clear role for
information and disclosure (Botosan 2006). It assumes that only variations in a ﬁrm's
systematic risk (beta) explain variations in its cost of equity capital in cross-section,
thus there is no role for diﬀerences in disclosure levels (Botosan 1997). This leads
Botosan (2006, p. 32) to the conclusion that the CAPM's estimates of the cost of
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equity capital are not useful for empiricists analysing the link between disclosure and
the cost of equity capital.
Methods estimating an implied cost of equity capital
A second and more recent stream in the literature has developed various models
that estimate an implied cost of equity capital.13 These models originate from the
classic dividend discount formula that calculates a stock's value as the present value
of its expected future dividends (cash ﬂows) (see Gebhardt et al. 2001; Botosan
2006):
P t =
∞∑
i=1
Et(Dt+i)
(1 + r)i
where
Pt = Current stock price at time t
Et(Dt+i) = Expected future dividends at time t+1
r = Cost of equity capital
Rearranging the formula for r expresses the implied cost of equity capital as the
internal rate of return that equates a company's current share price to the present
value of its future cash ﬂows (Gebhardt et al. 2001; Botosan 2006). The models
can be grouped into two diﬀerent approaches: (1) Those using a residual income
valuation (RIV) approach such Gebhardt et al. (2001), and (2) those methods based
on abnormal earnings growth (AEG) implemented by Gode and Mohanram (2003)
and the price-earnings growth (PEG) model by Easton (2004).14 The inputs to all
those models are current stock price and analysts' consensus earnings forecasts (to
proxy for future cash ﬂows), but they diﬀer mainly in their assumptions about the
13Easton (2007) oﬀers a very comprehensive overview and critique of the methods, their imple-
mentation (and issues), as well as the limitations of their use.
14Additional methods such as the Gordon Growth Model Gordon and Gordon (1997) or the RIV-
based method by Claus and Thomas (2001) are not discussed here as are they are infrequently
used by the literature (e.g., by Hail and Leuz 2006, for the latter). The Claus and Thomas (2001)
model is similar to the Gebhardt et al. (2001) method, yet diﬀers in terms of assumptions regarding
forecast horizon and earnings growth after the horizon.
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forecast and growth rates and data requirements (Guay et al. 2005).15 These methods
are the methods of choice in accounting research on the link between disclosure and
the cost of capital (e.g. Gietzmann and Ireland 2005; Hail and Leuz 2006; Daske
2006; Daske et al. 2008) because they allow, as Botosan (2006, p. 33) has argued,
to explore whether a particular type of risk is priced.16
The Residual Income Valuation model by Gebhardt et al. (2001)
The Residual Income Valuation model (RIV) by Gebhardt et al. (2001) (GLS)
is an extension of the Dividend Discount Formula (see Ohlson 1995, and Feltham
and Ohlson 1995) in that it incorporates annual report accounting data into the
estimation of ﬁrm value. The model uses the clean surplus relation assumption17
and abnormal earnings instead of dividends (it deﬁnes abnormal earnings as earnings
minus the expected cost of equity capital from the prior period (Bessler et al. 2007)).
Stock price is expressed as the sum of equity book value plus the discounted residual
earnings. The drawback of this model is that the equations cannot be directly solved,
but r has to be deduced by a mathematical iteration procedure (Botosan and Plumlee
2005). The model is calculated as follows:
P t = Bt +
FROEt+1 − r
(1 + r)
∗Bt + FROEt+2 − r
(1 + r)2
∗Bt+1 + TV (5.6.1)
Notation:
15Recent research has introduced modiﬁcations to these models which do not use analysts' con-
sensus earnings forecasts as provided by databases such I/B/E/S, but for instance use a time series
of earnings forecasts (Allee 2011), or forecast earnings using a cross-sectional model (Hou et al.
2012).
16In addition, the implied cost of capital approach is increasingly used in the asset pricing literature
(e.g. Pástor et al. 2008; Hughes et al. 2009; Chava and Purnanandam 2010).
17The clean surplus relation states that every change in a ﬁrm's book value of equity that is not
due to transactions between shareholders and the company (such as dividends or stock issues or
repurchases) must be included in reported earnings (Claus and Thomas 2001).
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Pt = Price per share at time t
Bt = Book value of equity per share at time t
r = Cost of equity
FROEt+i = Forecasted return on equity (ROE) for the period t+i. For
the ﬁrst three years, this is computed as FEPSt+i/Bt+i−1,
where FEPSt+i is the mean earnings per share (EPS)
forecast for year t+i and Bt+i−1 is the book value per share
for year t+i-1. Beyond the third year, FROE is forecasted
using a linear interpolation to the industry median ROE
Bt+ i = Bt+i−1 + FEPSt+i - FDPSt+i, where FDPSt+i is the dividend
per share forecast for year t+1, estimated using the current
dividend payout ratio (k). It is assumed that FDPSt+i =
FEPSt+i* k
The terminal value is calculated as follows:
TV =
T−1∑
i=3
FROEt+i − r
(1 + r)i
∗Bt+i−1 + FROEt+T − r
r ∗ (1 + r)T−1 ∗Bt+T−1
Gebhardt et al. (2001) make speciﬁc assumptions about forecast period and return
on equity forecasts, the terminal value, and the dividend payout ratio. Earnings
forecasts for 12 years in the future are made and a terminal value beyond the 12
years is estimated. For the ﬁrst three years, they explicitly use analyst forecasts for
earnings per share (EPS) and the dividend payout ratio (set as a constant fraction of
forecasted earnings) to forecast future book values and ROE. For the following nine
years, earnings are forecast implicitly by assuming that ROE reverts to the industry
median ROE. Industry ROE is computed as the moving median of previous years'
EPS from all ﬁrms in the same industry. The terminal value after year 12 is assumed
to be the present value of residual income in year 12 in perpetuity.
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The Abnormal Earnings Growth model by Ohlson and Juettner-Nau-
roth (2005)
The abnormal earnings growth (AEG) model by Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth
(2005) (OJN) uses next period earnings per share (EPS) and their growth as in-
puts to derive the present value of a stock.18 The required rate of return is derived
as a function of the forward-looking Earnings-to-Price ratio (E/P) and the expected
short- and long term growth rate of earnings. The OJN model does not require
the clean surplus assumption, nor data on book values and ROE, and uses earnings
instead of dividends (Gode and Mohanram 2003). The AEG calculates the implied
cost of equity capital as follows:
rOJN = A+
√
A2 +
(
epst+1
Pt
)
∗
(
epst+2 − epst+1
epst+1
− (γ − 1)
)
(5.6.2)
Notation:
A = 1
2
(
(γ − 1) + dpst+1
Pt
)
18OJN (2005) note that their model may be seen as a generalisation of the Gordon Growth model
(1997) as it oﬀers an easing of the latter's more restrictive and special assumptions, that is earnings
and dividends do not have to grow with the same rate as well as that this growth rate and the
dividend payout ratio may vary independently.
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rOJN = Implied cost of equity capital
epst+2 = two-year-ahead analysts' consensus earnings forecast for the
ﬁrm
epst+1 = one-year-ahead analysts' consensus earnings forecast for the
ﬁrm
Pt = Current share price
dpst+1 = one-year-ahead analysts' dividend per share forecast for the
ﬁrm
γ − 1 = rate of inﬁnite growth in abnormal earnings beyond the
forecast horizon
The Price-Earnings Growth model by Easton (2004)
The Price-Earnings Growth (PEG) model by Easton (2004) is a special case of the
abnormal earnings growth (AEG) model by Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005). A
key component of the model is the role of short-term earnings forecasts for valuation,
and it isolates the roles of (1) forecasts of next period's accounting earnings, (2)
forecasts of accounting earnings two periods ahead, and (3) expected accounting
earnings beyond the two-year forecast horizon (Easton 2004).
The model is based on earnings and earnings growth, and thereby expresses Price-
Earnings-Growth (PEG) as a special case. The PEG ratio is the ratio of a stock's price
to its earnings divided by its short-term earnings growth rate. The Easton (2004)
model oﬀers an amelioration of the PEG ratio in that it simultaneously estimates the
expected rate of return and the long-term growth rate in abnormal earnings beyond
the explicit forecast horizon. This method can then be used to estimate the expected
rate of return. The expected rate of return is equal to the square root of the inverse
of the PEG ratio multiplied by 100.
The model is derived from equation 5.6.2 above by making two more restricting
assumptions: (1) no dividends are paid after year t (dpst+1 = 0), and (2) no growth
in abnormal earnings after the explicit forecast horizon (γ = 1). The calculation of
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the implied cost of equity capital using the Easton (2004) model is as follows:
rPEG =
√
epst+2 − epst+1
Pt
rPEG = Implied cost of equity capital
epst+2 = two-year-ahead analysts' consensus earnings forecast after
annual report release date
epst+1 = one-year-ahead analysts' consensus earnings forecast after
annual report release date
Pt = Current share price
With regard to data requirements, the model is easy to implement. As the OJN
(2005) model, the PEG model does not require the clean surplus assumption, nor
data on book values, ROE, and dividends. It only requires stock price and analysts'
consensus earnings forecasts of 1-year and 2-years ahead. Note, however, that the
model requires increasing earnings forecasts, that is EPS1 < EPS2, otherwise the
term under the square root cannot be solved (Easton 2004).
Decision on the method: The PEG model by Easton (2004)
Against the background that empirical studies (e.g., Daske 2006; Hail and Leuz
2006) report that the various methods produce fairly similar estimates and are highly
correlated, the method selected for the study is the PEG model by Easton (2004).
The reasoning behind the choice of this model is outlined in the following. First
of all, the PEG model oﬀers practical advantages compared to the other models,
particularly the RIV. It has less demanding data requirements compared to other
methods (see Botosan and Plumlee 2005; Francis, Khurana and Pereira 2005) and
only requires price and earnings (forecasts of one and two years ahead), whereas other
methods additionally require book value and dividend forecasts, or both. The fact
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that important inputs to the RIV models' forecasts are not readily available and have
to be assumed and inferred from other variables led Gode and Mohanran (2001, p.
2) to the conclusion that a . . . valuation model that does not use book values as
its underpinnings is thus more appealing. This conclusion is supported by Penman
(2007) who calls for parsimonious equity valuation models that are comparatively
easier to implement and require less information for their use. In addition, the PEG is
easier to handle because its pricing equation can be solved for the rate of return via
a closed form solution (Guay et al. 2005), whereas in the RIV based models the rate
of return has to be obtained from numerical approximation (Botosan and Plumlee
2005). Second, the PEG model does not require the clean surplus condition which,
in practice, may be violated on a per share basis as well as by many accounting rules
(Daske 2006; Gode and Mohanran 2001). This criterion is important because Chen
et al. (2004) showed that in European countries the RIV delivers inferior estimates
to the PEG and the AEG because the clean surplus assumption is more frequently
violated in European countries than in other jurisdictions. In addition, the authors
showed that the PEG was slightly superior to the AEG. These ﬁndings are consistent
with Lee et al. (2006) who conclude from a review of the literature that the PEG
model is the most appropriate method for Europe. Third, research has demonstrated
that the PEG model outperforms the other approaches (AEG, RIV) with regard to
the association with risk proxies (Botosan and Plumlee 2005; Easton and Monahan
2005; Botosan et al. 2011). Botosan and Plumlee (2005) compared 5 methods19 and
show that the PEG outperforms the other methods because it is, unlike the others,
associated with various risk proxies in a consistent and predictable way. A comparison
of 12 models by Botosan et al. (2011) has come to similar conclusions. This criterion
is crucial for the thesis, since its primary objective is the analysis of cross-sectional
variation in the cost of capital associated with causal attributions. Cooper (2006)
argued that for research that examines the association between disclosure and the
cost of capital, the accuracy of absolute measures of the cost of capital is of less
19The Gebhardt et al. (2001), the Gordon Growth model Gordon and Gordon (1997), the Ohlson
and Juettner-Nauroth (2005), the PEG ratio by Easton (2004) and the target price method (Botosan
and Plumlee 2002).
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importance; more important is that the method captures the relative diﬀerences in
the estimates between ﬁrms. Further, Botosan and Plumlee (2005, p. 25) point out
that research on the association between disclosure and the cost of capital is more
about exploring a directional hypothesis. Therefore, Botosan and Plumlee (2005)
stress that an analysis of the cross-sectional variation in cost of capital requires a
method that produces estimates which reliably capture this variation that is, which
is consistently and predictably related to risk. Finally, the PEG model has been
successfully used in previous research and has provided robust estimates of the implied
cost of capital (e.g., Francis et al. 2004; Francis, Khurana and Pereira 2005; Hail
and Leuz 2006; Christensen et al. 2007; Kim and Shi 2011). Moreover, the thesis'
estimates may be compared to those by Lee et al. (2006) and Mangena et al. (2010)
who also used the PEG model on UK data.
5.6.3.2 Validation of the measurement
The implied cost of equity capital measure is used as a proxy for the ex-ante un-
observable cost of equity capital. In order to assess the validity of this measure,
its behaviour and correlation with other well-known risk measures was tested. For
that purpose, its association with the ﬁrm's beta, ﬁrm size, gearing, and the ratio of
book-to-market value (B/M) was analysed. Prior research has reported that these
factors inﬂuence the cost of equity capital (e.g. Botosan 1997; Gebhardt et al. 2001;
Poshakwale and Courtis 2005; Francis, Khurana and Pereira 2005; Gietzmann and
Ireland 2005; Francis et al. 2008). If the cost of equity capital measure in this study
is valid, it should show a positive association with beta, gearing, and B/M, and a
negative association with ﬁrm size. The regression model used to test the validity of
the cost of capital estimates is as follows:
CostofCapital = β0 + β1Beta+ β2Size+ β3Gear + β4B/M + (5.6.3)
All the variables included are already deﬁned in the previous section 5.4 above.
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The results are reported in Table 5.6.3. In the ﬁrst four models, the individual
variables are included, and in model 5 all variables are included. The results discussed
are only those of the model including all variables (model 5).
Beta has the expected positive sign, but is insigniﬁcant. Although some previ-
ous studies (e.g. Botosan 1997; Hail 2002; Poshakwale and Courtis 2005) found
a signiﬁcant positive association, others also found, consistent with this study, a
positive, but not signiﬁcant relationship (e.g. Gietzmann and Ireland 2005; Berger
et al. 2006; Espinosa and Trombetta 2007). Firm size (MVE ) shows the expected
negative association, indicating that larger ﬁrms have a lower cost of equity capital.
This is consistent with the ﬁndings by prior research (e.g. Botosan 1997; Hail 2002;
Poshakwale and Courtis 2005; Espinosa and Trombetta 2007). Gearing (Gear) is
insigniﬁcant, but positive as expected. The diﬀerence with the signiﬁcant positive
results reported by previous research (e.g. Hail 2002; Gietzmann and Ireland 2005; Es-
pinosa and Trombetta 2007) may stem from diﬀerences in measuring gearing. While
this study measures gearing as long-term debt to long-term debt plus equity, those
studies have tended to use debt-to-market value of equity to measure leverage. The
book-to-market ratio (B/M), as expected, shows a positive relationship with the cost
of equity capital, hence ﬁrms with a higher B/M ratio have a higher cost of equity
capital, as had been reported by a number of previous studies (e.g. Gebhardt et al.
2001; Botosan and Plumlee 2005; Daske et al. 2006). Taken together, the results
presented here suggest that the measure of cost of equity capital used in this thesis
is a reasonably valid measure of a ﬁrm's cost of equity capital.
5.6.3.3 Data sources
The data required to calculate the implied cost of equity were obtained from Datas-
tream (stock prices) and I/B/E/S (analysts' earnings forecasts). All required informa-
tion had to be available for a ﬁrm to be included in the sample. The current earnings
forecasts 6 months after the ﬁscal year end were collected for each ﬁrm. Stock prices
were taken on the same day the forecast was issued. The implied cost of equity
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capital was then estimated 6 months after the ﬁscal year end and the publication of
the results. This ensures that the information is publicly available and contained in
stock price (Hail and Leuz 2006).20
5.7 Data analysis
The chapter so far has laid out the methodology to conduct the thesis as well as
the sources of the data used. This section discusses the data analysis process and
the techniques used. Data analysis encompasses descriptive statistics followed by
univariate and multivariate analysis.
5.7.1 Descriptive statistics
As a ﬁrst step in the analysis, descriptive statistics for the dependent and indepen-
dent variables provide a preliminary understanding of the data and its distribution.
The statistics analysed include the maximum, minimum, mean, median, as well as
measures of dispersion for (1) the disclosure measure, (2) the ﬁrm characteristics,
(3) corporate governance characteristics, and (4) the cost of capital.
5.7.2 Univariate analysis
As the second step in the analysis process, univariate analysis examines the correla-
tions between the dependent and the independent variables for each model separately
(disclosure determinants and consequences). Since potential failures of the normality
assumption in the data will have been assessed and remedied before the univariate
analysis (for details see chapters 7 and 8), the thesis uses the parametric Pearson
product moment correlation coeﬃcient, a test that requires normal data and is more
powerful than non-parametric tests (see Field 2009). The strength and direction of
the correlation between the variables is given by the correlation coeﬃcient r, which
lies between -1 and +1, where a positive (negative) value signals a positive (negative)
20This 6 month period is the usual approach taken in the literature, see e.g. Gebhardt et al.
(2001); Gode and Mohanram (2003); Lee et al. (2006).
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association. The higher the value, the stronger the association (Kenny 1987; Bryman
and Cramer 2009). The correlation coeﬃcients and the signs of the associations pro-
vide a ﬁrst insight into the direction and the magnitude of the associations between
attribution disclosure and the explanatory variables. In addition, this allows a ﬁrst
assessment of potential multicollinearity problems within the variables (This issue will
be discussed in more detail in the next section).
5.7.3 Multivariate analysis
As the third step in the analysis process, multivariate regression is used to test the
hypotheses regarding (1) the determinants of attribution disclosure, and (2) the eﬀect
of attribution disclosure on the cost of capital. The two regression models speciﬁed
in section 5.4 above are used to investigate these two issues.
The multivariate regression allows isolating the contribution of each independent
variable to explaining variation in the dependent variable by holding the eﬀect of
the other variables constant (Gujarati 2003). Regression analysis is based on a set of
assumptions which have to be tested before the analysis in order to ensure the validity
of the results and the inferences drawn from the analysis (see e.g. Greene 1993;
Tabachnick and Fidell 2007; Studenmund 2001; Gujarati 2003). These assumptions,
along with the procedures the study used to ensure they are met, are presented in
the following.
5.7.3.1 Normality
The normality assumption states that the data are normally distributed. If not, para-
metric tests (such as regression analysis) cannot be used (Pallant 2007). Therefore,
it is important to check the data for any normality failures. Whether a distribution
is normal can be assessed by analysing skewness and kurtosis of the data (see e.g.
Greene 1993, Bryman and Cramer 2009): Skewness refers to the symmetry around
the mean, with positive (negative) skewness meaning more observations lying left
(right) of the mean and a longer tail of the distribution right (left) of the mean.
Kurtosis refers to the peakedness of a distribution. Positive kurtosis means a piling
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up of values around the mean, thus more peaked than a normal distribution, whereas
negative kurtosis means a ﬂatter distribution than the normal distribution. If a dis-
tribution is normal, the values for both skewness and kurtosis should be zero or close
to zero (Field 2009; Bryman and Cramer 2009).
The thesis uses two ways to assess normality of the variables: Visual inspection
of the shape of the data and formal numerical tests of normality. Visual inspection
of the data is done by examining histograms (to assess inhowfar the distribution of
the data follows a normal curve) and normal QQ-plots. 21
A more objective numerical test of normality of the distribution is the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test. A signiﬁcant result (p < 0.05) indicates that the distribution diﬀers
signiﬁcantly from a normal distribution (Field 2009).
If the tests reveal that the distribution of the data is not normal, a common
approach is to transform the data by performing a mathematical operation to achieve
a distribution that resembles more a normal one, so parametric tests can be used
(see e.g. Kenny 1987; Tabachnick and Fidell 2007). Another advantage of data
transformations is that it reduces the inﬂuence of outliers and other failures to the
assumptions (see Tabachnick and Fidell 2007). Which type of data transformation
is appropriate to remedy normality deviations depends on the strength and direction
of the normality violation.22 The data transformations used in this study are natural
log, winsorisation of the data, and the normal score transformation using the Van der
Werden approach (See chapters 7 and 8 for details on the approach and the variables
transformed).
5.7.3.2 Linearity
The linearity assumption states that there is a linear relationship between the vari-
ables, that is a straight line relationship. Linearity is assessed via residual plots which
plot the regression residuals against predicted values, and non-linearity is present when
21In a normal QQ-plot, the observed values of a variable are plotted against expected values
derived from a normal distribution which is shown as a straight line; if the distribution is normal,
the observed values will fall along the line; if not, the values will spread around the line, above and
below.
22See Tabachnick and Fidell 2007 and Pallant 2007 for a discussion and an overview of common
data transformations.
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the residuals do not follow a straight line but are for instance curved (Field 2009).
Non-linearity reduces the power of the analysis, but can be corrected by transfor-
mation of the variables (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007; Stevens 2002). The plots are
provided in the Appendix.
5.7.3.3 Homoscedasticity
Homoscedasticity assumes constant variance of the residuals (Studenmund 2001).
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) point out that this assumption is related to that of
normality because if the distribution is normal, then homoscedasticity is met. Ho-
moscedasticity is assessed via visual inspection of residual plots; failure of the assump-
tion is present if the residuals are not randomly and evenly distributed around zero,
but exhibit a funnel shape (see Field 2009). As with non-linearity, heteroscedasticity
reduces the power of the analysis, but can be corrected by transformation of the
variables (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007).
5.7.3.4 Independence of errors
Another assumption to be tested is that the regression residuals are independent from
each other and there is no correlation. This is done via the Durbin-Watson test. A
value of 2 indicates there is no correlation and Field (2009) suggests that values close
to 2 are ﬁne, whereas values <1 and >3 are problematic.
5.7.3.5 Additional tests
Multicollinearity
Another important issue to examine is multicollinearity. Multicollinearity exists
when there is a strong correlation between independent variables (see Stevens 2002;
Field 2009). This increases the standard errors of their regression coeﬃcients, and
reduces the precision of the estimates and may increase the probability of falsely
rejecting a predictor variable (Gujarati 2003).23
23Furthermore, multicollinearity (1) makes it diﬃcult to estimate the individual contribution of
each variable separately, (2) limits R2 because of overlapping variances of the variables, (3) increases
the variances of the regression coeﬃcients with the result that the predictor equations are unstable
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The thesis uses two ways of testing for multicollinearity: First, prior to the regres-
sion analysis, the Pearson correlation coeﬃcients between the independent variables
are examined in a correlation matrix. The literature suggests that a value in excess of
0.8 to 0.9 is a cause for concern (Gujarati 2003; Haniﬀa and Cooke 2005). Second, as
part of the ex post regression diagnostics, the Variance Inﬂation Factor (VIF) of the
independent variables are analysed, which show whether there exists a strong linear
relationship between a variable and the other variables. There is no set value for the
VIF to indicate problems (Field 2009), but a widely accepted rule of thumb states
that multicollinearity constitutes a problems if the value exceeds 10 (Stevens 2002;
Gujarati 2003; Field 2009).
If multicollinearity is a problem, strategies for remedying include for instance:
combining highly correlated variables or dropping one of them, principle components
analysis to reveal the main factors underlying the predictors (Studenmund 2001;
Stevens 2002), or run diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the regression model, excluding one
of the correlated variables at a time (e.g. Cooke 1989; Chavent et al. 2006).
Inﬂuential data points
As part of the post regression diagnostics of the model, it has to be assessed
whether any observations have undue inﬂuence on the results, that is the capacity
to inﬂuence or change the regression coeﬃcients (see Field 2009; Tabachnick and
Fidell 2007). The study uses Cook's distance which analyses how the overall model
is inﬂuenced by one single observation; values above one are considered problematic
(Cook and Weisberg 1982).
5.8 Summary
This chapter has presented the methodology for answering the research questions.
First, the research philosophy and approach, along with the sample selection and
data sources were discussed. Second, the data collection methods together with the
development of the research instrument were laid out, as well as the data analysis
(Stevens 2002; Field 2009).
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methods.
The study takes a quantitative approach to analyse (1) the determinants of attri-
bution statement provision and (2) whether the provision of attribution statements
inﬂuences the cost of capital. Regression analysis investigates the associations be-
tween the variables. Content analysis is used to identify attribution statements and
the level of attribution disclosure is measured with a disclosure index based on the
wordcount of attribution statements to capture the ﬁrms' emphasis on performance
explanations. The cost of capital is measured using the PEG model that estimates
an implied cost of capital. Various analytical techniques are then used to analyse the
data and answer the research questions.
CHAPTER 6
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
6.1 Introduction
The previous chapter has described the methodology that is used to address the
research questions of the thesis. This chapter describes the sample used in the
analysis and provides descriptive statistics for the level of attribution disclosure and
the cost of capital estimates.
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 6.2 describes the sample characteris-
tics. In Section 6.3, the descriptive results for the cost of equity capital are exhibited.
Section 6.4 presents the descriptive statistics for the attribution disclosure measure.
Section 6.5 concludes the chapter with a summary.
6.2 Sample characteristics
In this section, the sample used in the thesis is described. As discussed in chapter 5,
the description covers the ﬁrm characteristics beta (market risk), market capitalisation
(ﬁrm size), gearing (ﬁnancial risk), book-to-market value (growth potential), return
on assets (ﬁrm proﬁtability), analyst following (number of analysts following a ﬁrm),
change in ﬁnancial performance, and issue (ﬁrm issuing shares the following ﬁscal year
or not). Also summarised are the corporate governance characteristics (proportion of
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non-executive directors on the board of directors, executive director share ownership,
audit committee size, and audit committee expertise). The statistics for these sample
characteristics are presented in Table 6.2.1.
Panel A of Table 6.2.1 presents the ﬁrm characteristics of the sample companies.
The sample of ﬁrms has an average Beta of 0.971 (median 0.970) and exhibits a
minimum of 0.390 to a maximum of 1.790, suggesting the sample includes both
low and high risk ﬁrms. The ﬁrm size measure (MVE ) indicates a large variation
in size within the sample. The average market value (MVE ) is ¿1955.944m with
a much lower median of ¿402.400m. The lower median, together with a minimum
(maximum) market value of ¿13.170m (¿26323.570m) and a lower (upper) quartile
of ¿123.400m (¿1419.730m) indicates the presence of many smaller to medium-sized
ﬁrms in the sample. Gearing (Gear) is 40.4% on average (median 41.5%) with a lower
(upper) quartile of 19.7% (55.0%). The wide range of gearing observed, with a low
of 0% to a high of 146% suggests that the sample contains a broad variety of ﬁrms
ranging from ﬁrms with no gearing to very highly geared ﬁrms. The lower gearing
is consistent with the notion that UK ﬁrms use more equity ﬁnance than debt (see
Mangena et al. 2010). The book-to-market ratio (B/M) of the sample ﬁrms has a
mean of 0.444 (median 0.370) with a minimum of 0.010 to a maximum of 2. Looking
at the mean value of 0.444 indicates that the capital market on average assesses good
future prospects for the sample ﬁrms, as having a low B/M ratio (low book value
of equity relative to market value) suggests higher valuation and better earnings
prospects (see Fama and French 1992). For proﬁtability (Proﬁt), the average return
on assets (ROA) in the sample is 5.9% (median 5.7%) and a lower (upper) quartile of
3.3% (8.6%). The range of values is large, from a minimum of -25% to a maximum
of 24%, and suggests that the sample contains a number of highly proﬁtable ﬁrms
as well as a number of ﬁrms with negative returns (14 ﬁrms with negative return on
assets). For performance change (Perf ), slightly more sample ﬁrms reported worse
performance than the previous year (measured as change in return on assets, ROA),
with 56% reporting a decline in ROA from the previous ﬁscal year, and 44% reporting
an increase. On average, the sample ﬁrms are followed by approximately 8 analysts
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Table 6.2.1: Descriptive statistics for the independent variables
Mean Std. Dev. Median 25% 75% Min Max
Panel A: Firm characteristics
Beta 0.971 0.252 0.970 0.790 1.120 0.390 1.790
Size (MVE) 1955.944 4165.979 402.400 123.400 1419.730 13.170 26323.570
Gear 0.404 0.255 0.415 0.197 0.550 0.000 1.460
B/M 0.444 0.325 0.370 0.237 0.532 0.010 2.000
Proﬁt (ROA) 0.059 0.059 0.057 0.033 0.086 -0.250 0.240
Perfchange 0.563 0.497 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
AF 7.590 6.212 5.000 3.000 12.000 0.000 26.000
Issue 0.200 0.400 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Panel B: Corporate governance characteristics
PropNED 0.511 0.126 0.500 0.430 0.570 0.250 0.870
Dirown 0.056 10.748 0.009 0.002 0.049 0.000 0.567
ACSize 3.295 0.913 3.000 3.000 4.000 2.000 6.000
ACExp 0.475 0.246 0.500 3.300 6.700 0.000 1.000
Variable deﬁnitions
Beta = Firm beta. Size = Market value of equity at ﬁnancial year end in ¿m.
Gear = Gearing ratio, measured as long-term debt to long-term debt plus equity.
B/M = Book-to-market ratio, measured as the ratio of book value of equity to
the market value of equity. Proﬁt (ROA) = Firm proﬁtability, measured as return
on assets. Perfchange = Dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if the ﬁrm's
performance has deteriorated from the previous ﬁnancial year, measured as the
percentage change in return on assets from the previous year; 0 otherwise. AF =
Number of analysts following a ﬁrm. Issue = Indicator variable if the ﬁrm has
issued equity within the subsequent ﬁnancial year; taking the value of 1 if the ﬁrm
has issued equity within the year following the publication of the annual report; 0
otherwise. PropNED = Proportion of non-executive directors on the board of
directors, measured as the proportion of non-executive directors on the board of
directors to the total number of directors on the board. Dirown = Executive
director share ownership, measured as the percentage of ﬁrm shares held by
executive directors. ACSize = Audit committee size, measured as the number of
directors on the audit committee. ACExp = Audit committee expertise, measured
as the proportion of audit committee members with accounting and ﬁnancial
management expertise to the total size of the audit committee.
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(median 5). At the lower (upper) quartile, ﬁrms are followed by 3 (12) analysts, with
a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 26. Share issues in the ﬁscal year following the
year under review (Issue) were carried out by 28 sample ﬁrms (20%).
Panel B of Table 6.2.1 presents the descriptive statistics for corporate governance
structures for the sample ﬁrms. On average 51% of the members are non-executive
directors (PropNED), with the proportion ranging from 25% to 87%. The UK Cor-
porate Governance Code (FRC 2010b) recommends that the board should have a
balanced combination of executive and non-executive directors to avoid one group
dominating the other. Hence, a distribution of 51% (49%) non-executive (executive)
directors suggests that the sample ﬁrms' practice is consistent with this recommen-
dation of achieving a balanced representation. Executive Directors' holdings in their
ﬁrm's shares (Dirown) is on average 5.6%. The median, however, is only 0.9% and
the values for the lower and upper quartile are 0.2% and 4.9%. This indicates that
the sample contains a number of ﬁrms with low director shareholdings. The aver-
age size of the audit committee (ACSize) of the sample ﬁrms is about 3 directors
(median of 3) with a minimum of 2 and a maximum of 6 members. As the recom-
mendations by the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999), the Smith Committee (2003),
and the UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC 2010b) advocate a minimum of three
members, this suggests that the majority of sample ﬁrms complies, but some ﬁrms
do not.1 The proportion of the audit committee members that possess experience or
a qualiﬁcation in ﬁnancial management or audit (ACExp) as advocated by the Smith
Committee (2003) and the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) is on average 47.5%.
There are, however, ﬁrms that do not have a designated expert on the audit commit-
tee. Given that the UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC 2010b) recommends that
UK ﬁrms' audit committees have a minimum of at least one member with relevant
qualiﬁcations or experience, this suggests that, although the majority of ﬁrms follows
1Inspection of the annual reports found that these ﬁrms were smaller ﬁrms with corresponding
smaller board of directors and only 2 non-executive directors (NEDs), and the audit committee
was composed of both these directors. These smaller ﬁrms having 2 NEDs is in line with the
recommendations of the UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC 2010b). Thus these ﬁrms are in
compliance with the recommendations of having audit committees composed of NEDs only. Also,
2 ﬁrms stated that one of the three audit committee members left during the year and they were
looking for a replacement.
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this recommendation, there are still ﬁrms that do not follow the recommendations.2
6.3 Descriptive analysis for the cost of equity
capital
Table 6.3.1 presents the cost of equity capital estimated for the sample ﬁrms. Panel
A exhibits the average cost of equity capital of the sample ﬁrms, and Panel B provides
the distribution of the cost of equity capital estimates.
Table 6.3.1: Descriptive statistics for the cost of equity capital
N Mean Std. Dev. Median 25% 75% Min Max
Panel A: Average cost of equity capital
CoC - Full
sample
142 0.0976 0.0406 0.0925 0.0758 0.1079 0.0110 0.2860
CoC - Reduced
sample
136 0.1010 0.0380 0.0940 0.0781 0.1101 0.0410 0.2860
Panel B: Distribution of cost of equity capital
Full sample Reduced sample
No % No %
< 5% 8 5.6% 2 1.5%
5% to < 10% 87 61.3% 87 64.0%
10% to < 15% 35 24.6% 35 25.7%
15% to < 20% 8 5.6% 8 5.9%
20% to < 25% 3 2.1% 3 2.2%
≥25% 1 0.7% 1 0.7%
Total 142 100% 136 100%
As can be seen from Panel A, the mean cost of equity capital for the full sample
of ﬁrms is 9.76% (median 9.25%), with a lower (upper) quartile of 7.58% (10.79%).
The mean value is comparable in magnitude to the values reported by other recent
studies using the Easton PEG model and UK data to estimate the cost of capital. For
example, Lee et al. (2006) reported 10.48% whilst Mangena et al. (2010) reported
10.29%. In order to understand the distribution of the cost of equity capital, the
estimates were classiﬁed into six groups. Table 6.3.1 Panel B reports on the classiﬁ-
2The reason for non-compliance provided in the annual reports was that the ﬁrms judged the
audit committee members to have the required expertise and experience to eﬀectively carry out
their task despite the lack of a formal qualiﬁcation that fulﬁls these requirements.
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cation. For the full sample of ﬁrms, it can be seen that the majority of ﬁrms has a
cost of equity capital between 5% and less than 15% (85.9% of ﬁrms in total), with
more than half of the sample ﬁrms having a cost of equity capital between 5% and
less than 10% (61.3% of ﬁrms). For the rest of the sample ﬁrms, 5.6% have a cost
of equity capital of below 5%, 5.6% of ﬁrms have a cost of equity capital between
15% and less than 20%, and a total of 2.8% of ﬁrms has a cost of equity capital of
20% or higher.
In the full sample, the minimum estimate for the cost of equity capital of 1.1%
is very low and suggests the presence of one or more outlying values3 as the yield
on British 10-year government bonds, as a proxy for the risk-free rate, was within
the range of 4.1% to 4.73% during the year 2006 (Bank of England 2010). Close
inspection of the data revealed that 6 observations had cost of equity capital estimates
of 4% or less.
In order to gauge the inﬂuence of these 6 observations on the sample distribution,
all ﬁrms with cost of equity capital estimates of below 4.1% were removed, leading
to a reduced sample of 136 ﬁrms. Table 6.3.1 Panel A shows that the mean cost of
equity capital for the reduced sample of ﬁrms increases to 10.10% (median 9.40%),
with the lower (upper) quartile increasing slightly to 7.81% (11.01%). This mean
value for the reduced sample is a bit closer to the values reported by other recent
studies using the Easton PEG model and UK data to estimate the cost of capital
than the value for the full sample, for example the 10.48% reported by Lee et al.
(2006), or the 10.29% reported by Mangena et al. (2010). For the reduced sample,
Table 6.3.1 Panel B shows an increase in the percentage of ﬁrms that has a cost of
equity capital between 5% and less than 15% to 89.7% of ﬁrms, and for those ﬁrms
having a cost of equity capital between 5% and less than 10% (64.0% of ﬁrms). For
the rest of the sample ﬁrms, 1.5% have a cost of equity capital of below 5%, 5.9%
of ﬁrms have a cost of equity capital between 15% and less than 20%, and a total
of 2.9% of ﬁrms has a cost of equity capital of 20% or higher.
In Table 6.3.2, the cost of equity capital estimates of the full sample by industry
3Outliers are observations with extreme values that may unduly inﬂuence the analysis; for a
discussion of the inﬂuence of outliers see eg. Stevens (2002) or Bryman and Cramer (2009).
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are reported. This helps to compare ﬁrms' cost of equity capital across industries. As
previous studies have shown, the cost of equity capital diﬀers across industries (e.g.
Gebhardt et al. 2001; Daske et al. 2006). The industries are presented in descending
order of the cost of equity capital.
Table 6.3.2: Cost of equity capital by industry
N Mean Std. Dev. Median 25% 75% Min Max
Cost of equity capital by industry
IT 12 0.120 0.050 0.099 0.087 0.146 0.079 0.246
Aerospace and
Defense
5 0.107 0.030 0.092 0.088 0.133 0.084 0.157
Chemicals 6 0.106 0.024 0.117 0.079 0.121 0.069 0.130
Electronic and
Electrical
Equipment
6 0.106 0.025 0.098 0.083 0.136 0.081 0.140
Retailers 17 0.101 0.046 0.091 0.069 0.128 0.021 0.210
Utilities 5 0.100 0.048 0.095 0.067 0.136 0.041 0.176
Business Support
Services
23 0.099 0.023 0.098 0.083 0.112 0.059 0.160
Household Goods 5 0.089 0.021 0.099 0.067 0.105 0.062 0.111
Construction and
Construction
Materials
5 0.084 0.018 0.084 0.066 0.102 0.060 0.106
Engineering 6 0.082 0.011 0.079 0.072 0.095 0.071 0.097
Media 12 0.079 0.017 0.080 0.065 0.094 0.049 0.105
Food and Beverages 6 0.078 0.013 0.077 0.071 0.084 0.062 0.102
Travel and Leisure 12 0.074 0.032 0.078 0.059 0.083 0.014 0.139
Oil and Gas 6 0.069 0.049 0.071 0.017 0.113 0.011 0.133
Other* 16 0.128 0.061 0.114 0.084 0.150 0.032 0.286
*Other subsumes industries with less than 5 observations and includes Consumer Goods,
General Industrials, Healthcare Equipment and Services, Mining and Basic Resources,
Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology, Telecommunication, Transportation.
As can be seen from Table 6.3.2, the industries with the highest mean cost of
equity capital are IT (12%), Aerospace and Defense (10.7%), Chemicals (10.6%) and
Electronic and Electrical Equipment (10.6%).
IT has the highest average cost of equity capital in the sample. Lee et al. (2006)
attribute this to the fact that IT is an industry with high growth, short product life-
cycles, and intense competition. The Aerospace and Defense industry is characterised
by long product cycles, large capital commitments, exposure to the overall economic
conditions, and often depends on large bulk orders or government spending (see
6.3. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS FOR THE COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL 161
Bollinger et al. 2009). Against that backdrop it can be argued that Aerospace and
Defense represents an industry with a high risk attached to whether the projected re-
turns on capital materialise as planned. Hence investors would require a higher equity
risk premium. Likewise, the Chemicals industry is capital intensive and considered
risky (Cassidy et al. 2011) so that investors may require a higher risk premium for
investing in ﬁrms in this sector.
The industries with the lowest mean cost of equity capital are Oil & Gas (6.9%),
followed by Travel & Leisure (7.4%), Food and Beverages (7.8%), and Media (7.9%).
The lowest value of a ﬁrm's cost of equity capital throughout the sample comes from
Oil & Gas (1.1%), followed by Travel and Leisure (1.4%) and Retailers (2.1%). The
Food & Beverages industry has low capital intensity (GlobalEdge 2011) and they
supply products every individual needs on a regular basis. Hence there is a stable and
persistent demand, and it is diﬃcult to reduce consumption of the industry's products
(apart from switching to lower priced food products), so ﬁrms are relatively shielded
form cyclical swings of the economy. This suggests that investors consider this indus-
try to be a fairly low risk industry, and would accordingly require a lower rate of return.
Media ﬁrms on average have a low cost of equity capital. The sample contains a
number of business-to-business media services, television companies, and companies
providing specialist publications. These ﬁrms cater to speciﬁc market needs, hence
they will face a more stable demand for their services, which might explain a poten-
tially lower risk premium. In addition, and more general, media consumption across
the diﬀerent media channels in the industry taken together is relatively stable or even
increasing as there is always demand by users for consumption of these products (see
KPMG 2011). This might also explain a lower cost of equity capital. That Travel
& Leisure ﬁrms have a low cost of equity capital on average might be due to the
composition of the industry. While some ﬁrms' business in the industry is to a certain
extent cyclical and exposed to the overall economic conditions the industry, hence
the sample, also encompasses a wide range of businesses from casino and betting, to
service businesses to the industry, to operators of public transport. It can be argued
that these businesses are more shielded from swings in economic conditions and pro-
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vide services for which demand is more stable and predictable. This might reduce the
risk premium attached to the industry and explain the ﬁndings of a low average cost
of equity capital. That Oil & Gas has the lowest average cost of equity capital is
inconsistent with arguments that there is considerable risk attached to ﬁrms that are
involved in exploration of resources and their exploitation. Oil & Gas ﬁrms face the
risk of not ﬁnding adequate resources to replace current resources or increase them,
which then reduces their future prospects. The ﬁndings presented here, however,
suggest that ultimately Oil & Gas ﬁrms may not be as risky as commonly perceived.
A comparison of these results to those reported by other studies (e.g. Lee et al.
2006; Mangena et al. 2010) shows that they are broadly consistent. The ﬁndings
are consistent with Lee et al. (2006) for IT and Electronic and Electrical Equipment
for the highest cost of equity capital, and for Media and Food & Beverage for the
lowest cost of equity capital. There are, however, some diﬀerences as well. While this
thesis ﬁnds that Aerospace & Defense and Chemicals are among the industries with
the highest cost of equity capital, Lee et al. (2006) ﬁnd these industries to be below
average. Moreover, the results for Oil & Gas are inconsistent, being at the opposite
range of the results in the two studies.
Regarding Mangena et al. (2010), the ﬁndings are consistent for Aerospace &
Defense and IT (high cost of equity capital), Food & Beverages and Engineering
(low cost of equity capital), as well as Business Services (average cost of equity
capital). However, they are diﬀerent for Electronic and Electrical Equipment for
which Mangena et al. (2010) report a below average value in their sample, hence
the opposite of this study's ﬁndings. Similarly, Media here has a below average
cost of equity capital, whereas Mangena et al. (2010) report an above average value.
Moreover, while this study ﬁnds Chemicals to be one of the industries with the highest
cost of equity capital, Mangena et al. (2010) ﬁnd the opposite.
The diﬀerences with the studies by Lee et al. (2006) and Mangena et al. (2010)
may be due to two reasons. First, the results by Lee et al. (2006) are based on a
time-series average of an 11-year period (1995-2005), whereas this thesis is based on
a cross-sectional analysis of ﬁrms with a ﬁscal year-end in 2006. Second, industry
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deﬁnitions diﬀer between the studies. For instance, while Lee et al. (2006) use 29
industries, this study uses 21 industries based a review of industry classiﬁcations in
the relevant literature.4
Regarding Mangena et al. (2010), their study uses 14 industries compared to
the 21 industries used here. More importantly, the industries analysed diﬀer. For
instance, this thesis analyses Travel & Leisure and Oil & Gas, which are found to
be among the industries with the lowest values, but they have no equivalent in the
Mangena et al. (2010) study. In turn, their study analyses Banks & Insurance and
Real Estate, two industries excluded from analysis in this investigation. Against that
backdrop, it may be diﬃcult to directly compare the ﬁndings of this thesis with their
results.
6.4 Descriptive statistics for the attribution dis-
closure measure
This section presents the descriptive statistics of the attribution disclosure measure
of the sample ﬁrms. The statistics are presented in two categories. The ﬁrst category
is the aggregate disclosure measure. The second category is the statistics of the
disclosure measure by industry.
6.4.1 Analysis of the aggregate disclosure measure
Table 6.4.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the aggregate disclosure measure.
4For instance, Industry-Classiﬁcation-Benchmark (2010); Campbell (1996); Fama and French
(1997); Botosan and Plumlee (2002); Lee et al. (2006); Daske et al. (2006); Daske et al. (2009);
Mangena et al. (2010).
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Table 6.4.1: Descriptive statistics for the attribution disclosure measure
N* Mean StdDV Median 25% 75% Min Max
WCN 142 0.052 0.034 0.045 0.027 0.068 0.003 0.237
WCN_INT 140 0.037 0.026 0.030 0.020 0.047 0.001 0.125
WCN_EXT 1 113 0.019 0.020 0.013 0.007 0.025 0.0003 0.149
*N varies as not every ﬁrm provided both internal and external attributions.
1WCN = Wordcount of attributions per narrative disclosures, measured as the percentage of
words used for attributions to the total number of words in the narrative sections of the annual
report. WCN_INT = Wordcount of internal attributions per narrative disclosures, measured as
the percentage of words used for internal attributions to the total number of words in the
narrative sections of the annual report. WCN_EXT = Wordcount of external attributions per
narrative disclosures, measured as the percentage of words used for external attributions to the
total number of words in the narrative sections of the annual report.
The ﬁrst measure of attributions is the aggregate wordcount for causal attributions
as percentage of total words in the narrative sections (WCN). As can be seen from
the table, WCN ranges from a minimum of 0.003 to a maximum of 0.237 with a
mean value of 0.052 (median 0.045).
These results show that the percentage of words used for attributions to the
total number of words in the narrative sections of the annual report is generally
low. This indicates that ﬁrms do not accord much space in their discussions of the
ﬁnancial year to explaining performance outcomes. Moreover, all three wordcount
measures have a very low standard deviation (3.4%, 2.6%, and 2% respectively),
which indicates that the percentage of space devoted to explaining the results is
fairly stable across ﬁrms and does not vary much. This ﬁnding is consistent with Luz
et al. (2009) who, albeit measuring attribution provision as sentences that contain
attributions to the total number of sentences in the annual report, also reported a low
percentage. In terms of categories, internal attributions (WCN_INT ) has a mean of
0.037 (median 0.030), with a minimum of 0.001 and a maximum of 0.125. As for
external attributions (WCN_EXT ), the scores range from a minimum of 0.0003 to
a maximum of 0.149. The mean WCN_EXT value is 0.019 (median 0.013) which is
lower than the internal attribution scores. This suggests the tendency of the sample
ﬁrms to attribute outcomes more to internal than to external causes, perhaps as an
attempt by managers to show their ability to run the business successfully. Such
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attempts are widespread in annual reports. For example, in an attempt to show
that their growth strategy of acquisitions is improving ﬁrm performance, one report
provides that the operating margin increased to 14.8% (2005: 13.1%), as savings
from the integration of the acquisitions made over the last three years are realised
(Johnson Services Group 2006, p. 6). Another example for highlighting the success
and appropriateness of a ﬁrm's strategy as the basis for good performance is to
stress that this performance reﬂected a key feature of Telecoms' success, namely
the good returns earned from the continuing high level of investment in new product
development designed to satisfy demanding requirements of the leading players in
the market (Anite 2006, p. 8). Companies also emphasise how the competence
and capabilities of management led to a successful outcome, as the annual report of
Filtrona (2006, p. 4) exhibits: The Company achieved an 81% improvement in net
cash inﬂow before ﬁnancing activities, increasing from ¿15.8m in 2005 to ¿28.6m.
This was largely achieved by operational management focusing on stronger working
capital control.
These examples suggest that ﬁrms may want to emphasise their own role in
delivering performance, and provides support for the argument by Salancik and Meindl
(1984) that ﬁrms would claim responsibility for performance outcomes in order to
demonstrate that they are in control of the situation. Against the backdrop of the
suggestion by Salancik and Meindl (1984) that management uses attributions to
demonstrate to their stakeholders that management is in control of the ﬁrm's course
in an attempt to both reassure and foster existing investors' conﬁdence as well as to
attract potential investors to the ﬁrm, it can be argued that attributing performance
outcomes to internal causes rather than to external causes may constitute an attempt
to convince investors that management masters the situation and the ﬁrm is well
positioned for success. This may help the ﬁrm obtain capital on better terms as
investors may feel reassured that managers are in control. It may also be beneﬁcial
for managers' job security (Clatworthy and Jones 2003; Baginski et al. 2004).
Nevertheless, there is also a tendency to attribute bad performance to external
causes. For example,  lower consumer spending in the stationery market has soft-
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ened stationery sales (WH Smith 2006, p. 9). This implies that poor performance
is not due to management failures, but to causes outside management's control.
Similarly, an explanation such as proﬁts per unit in the existing business were down
year on year mainly due to the weakness in the new car market (Pendragon 2006,
p. 6) suggests that management is not directly responsible for the outcome, but
the overall market conditions are the reason. This implies that management cannot
be blamed for the outcome, so these explanations may be an attempt at manag-
ing the impressions of shareholders (see Staw et al. 1983; Merkl-Davies et al. 2007).
Blaming negative outcomes on external factors that management cannot control con-
stitute defensive actions. Denying responsibility for an outcome by blaming external
factors that cannot be controlled may make seem management less responsible for
the negative performance (Aerts 2005). Thus management may try to convince in-
vestors that, despite their best eﬀorts, external factors caused the weak performance,
in an attempt to reduce investors' negative impressions of the company and build
conﬁdence in management.
The tendency by ﬁrms to elaborate more on performance outcomes to internal
than to external causes reported in Table 6.4.1 is consistent with the tendency found
by Aerts (1994) and Aerts (2005). Aerts (1994) found that for both positive and neg-
ative performance outcomes, ﬁrms attribute more to internal than to external causes,
in particular, in case of positive outcomes. Aerts (2005) provided evidence that, for
the total number of attributions, ﬁrms tend to attribute performance outcomes to
internal rather than to external causes.
As prior research reported that ﬁrms tend to exhibit self-serving attribution be-
haviour by attributing success to internal factors but negative outcomes to external
factors (e.g. Bettman and Weitz 1983; Aerts 1994; Baginski et al. 2000; Aerts 2005;
and see also chapter 2), Table 6.4.2 presents the distribution of internal and external
attribution statements separately for ﬁrms with an increase in ﬁnancial performance
from the prior ﬁscal year and for those with a decrease in ﬁnancial performance.
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Table 6.4.2: Distribution of internal and external attributions for ﬁnancial perfor-
mance change
Mean StdDV Median 25% 75% Min Max
Positive performance change
N: 62 ﬁrms
No of attribution statements
Internal 5.650 3.535 5.000 3.000 7.250 0.000 19.000
External 1.94 1.424 2.000 1.000 3.000 0.000 5.000
WCN1
WCN_INT 0.036 0.027 0.030 0.017 0.048 0.000 0.118
WCN_EXT 0.012 0.014 0.008 0.001 0.015 0.000 0.072
Negative performance change
N: 80 ﬁrms
No of attribution statements
Internal 5.940 4.393 5.000 3.000 7.000 1.000 22.000
External 2.820 2.886 2.000 1.000 4.000 0.000 15.000
WCN
WCN_INT 0.037 0.026 0.030 0.022 0.043 0.003 0.125
WCN_EXT 0.018 0.022 0.011 0.002 0.024 0.000 0.148
1WCN = Wordcount of attributions per narrative disclosures, measured as the percentage of words used for
attributions to the total number of words in the narrative sections of the annual report. WCN_INT =
Wordcount of internal attributions per narrative disclosures, measured as the percentage of words used for
internal attributions to the total number of words in the narrative sections of the annual report. WCN_EXT
= Wordcount of external attributions per narrative disclosures, measured as the percentage of words used for
external attributions to the total number of words in the narrative sections of the annual report.
It can be seen from the table that unlike previous research, the results do not
show major diﬀerences between ﬁrms with increasing performance and those with
decreasing performance. Both performance groups show a strong tendency to at-
tribute positive as well as negative performance changes to reasons internal to the
ﬁrm. This is found for the attribution disclosure measures (WCN_INT/EXT ) and
for the number of attribution statements that are given to internal and to external
causes respectively.
Taking responsibility for a good outcome may be an attempt at stressing the
strengths of the company and to convince investors that the ﬁrm is a good investment
and has good prospects. For example, an explanation that increasing performance
reﬂected the strong underlying demand for ESAB products and ongoing operational
eﬃciency gains, including recent capacity additions in lower cost locations around the
world  (Charter 2006, p. 10) clearly points to the strong positioning of the ﬁrm in
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its market and further potential for improvements. Stressing internal factors as cause
for good performance puts a good light on management and the ﬁrm's capabilities.
Moreover, an explanation that increased proﬁt reﬂects improvements in cigarette
market share and the beneﬁts of price increases (Imperial Tobacco Group 2006, p.
19) could show investors that the company has pricing power in the market, pointing
to a strong position and potential for stable returns.
In case of decreasing performance, pointing to internal factors may also be beneﬁ-
cial. As Salancik and Meindl (1984) point out, this may be used to signal to investors
that the ﬁrm is aware of the problem and working on solving it. For example, by ac-
knowledging that the major cause behind the fall in these proﬁts was the inability
of our Hospitality Division to secure new revenues from a diﬃcult marketplace (Al-
phameric 2006, p. 8). This acknowledgement was followed in the annual report
by a description how the ﬁrm has already taken action to cut costs and restructure
the division to prevent similar outcomes in the future (Alphameric 2006, p. 8). This
corresponds to the suggestion by Salancik and Meindl (1984) that, in order to demon-
strate to investors that management is in control of the situation, they may also take
responsibility for negative outcomes, not only good results. Blaming external factors
may be perceived as management not being in control of matters, which may actu-
ally decrease investor conﬁdence in the ﬁrm and have negative eﬀects for share price.
Moreover, internal reasons cited for a downturn in performance may be that the ﬁrm
had taken active steps to position the ﬁrm successfully for the future. This includes
investments in the business and products to generate good future returns, so that a
drop in proﬁt was  impacted by investment in ebooks and developing export markets
(Dawson Holdings 2006). Although these measures taken by the ﬁrm had a negative
eﬀect on performance in the period just passed, they may oﬀer future beneﬁt for
shareholders. This is an example in which a ﬁrm may point to internal reasons to
explain decreased performance in order to highlight to investors that management is
actively shaping and improving the ﬁrm's medium- to long-term prospects, even if
these measures may have a negative short-term eﬀect.
Regarding attributions to negative performance outcomes, the ﬁnding that ﬁrms
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do not attribute negative performance chieﬂy to external factors is consistent with
results by Aerts (1994) and Aerts (2005) who ﬁnds a rather balanced distribution
between internal and external attributions. Similar to Aerts (1994) and Aerts (2005),
the ﬁndings of this thesis suggest that UK companies might not exhibit the same
self-serving attribution behaviour as US ﬁrms.
In order to gain an understanding of the distribution of the disclosure measure,
the achieved disclosure scores are separated into 4 groups. Table 6.4.3 presents the
results.
Table 6.4.3: Distribution of WCN
Distribution WCN scores
No. %
< 0.0594 101 71.1
0.0594 to < 0.1188 33 23.2
0.1188 to < 0.1782 7 4.9
0.1782 to 0.2376 1 0.7
Total 142 100
WCN = Wordcount of attributions per narrative disclosures, measured as the percentage of words used for
attributions to the total number of words in the narrative sections of the annual report.
It can be seen from the table that 101 sample ﬁrms (71.1%) have an attribution
disclosure score lower than 0.0594, which constitutes the majority of ﬁrms. An at-
tribution disclosure score between 0.0594 and less than 0.1188 is found for 33 ﬁrms.
Taking these two groups together, this means that 134 sample ﬁrms (94.3%) have
an attribution disclosure score of less than half of the maximum score achieved by a
sample ﬁrm. This further suggests that the extent to which sample ﬁrms provided
explanations for performance outcomes is generally very low. For the rest of the
sample ﬁrms, 7 ﬁrms (4.9%) have a disclosure score between 0.1188 and lower than
0.1782. One sample ﬁrm has a disclosure score higher than 0.1782, which is the ﬁrm
that achieved the maximum score found in the sample of 0.2376.
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6.4.2 Attribution statement analysis by industry
Prior research has provided evidence that ﬁrms' attribution behaviour diﬀers among
industries (e.g. Bettman and Weitz 1983; Aerts 2005; Aerts and Tarca 2010). This
study therefore analyses the attribution disclosure measures on an industry basis.
Table 6.4.4 and Table 6.4.5 present the statistics for WCN and for WCN_INT /
WCN_EXT separately.
Table 6.4.4: Analysis of WCN by industry
N Mean StdDV Median 25% 75% Min Max
Chemicals 6 0.067 0.040 0.051 0.040 0.107 0.027 0.133
IT 12 0.059 0.034 0.052 0.033 0.080 0.004 0.123
Retailers 17 0.051 0.029 0.045 0.026 0.060 0.020 0.120
Construction & Construction
Materials
5 0.051 0.027 0.043 0.027 0.080 0.023 0.089
Travel and Leisure 12 0.048 0.022 0.043 0.031 0.064 0.022 0.098
Business Support Services 23 0.048 0.037 0.036 0.019 0.052 0.003 0.129
Engineering 6 0.047 0.032 0.043 0.015 0.076 0.015 0.094
Electronic and Electrical
Equipment
6 0.045 0.034 0.037 0.022 0.065 0.014 0.109
Food and Beverages 6 0.042 0.020 0.043 0.023 0.059 0.022 0.068
Aerospace and Defense 5 0.040 0.023 0.041 0.020 0.060 0.011 0.071
Oil and Gas 6 0.040 0.015 0.036 0.032 0.048 0.023 0.068
Utilities 5 0.040 0.037 0.021 0.011 0.078 0.006 0.093
Household Goods 5 0.039 0.009 0.045 0.030 0.047 0.027 0.048
Media 12 0.035 0.023 0.029 0.014 0.056 0.005 0.075
Other* 16 0.087 0.046 0.078 0.059 0.099 0.046 0.237
*Other subsumes industries with less than 5 observations and includes Consumer Goods,
General Industrials, Healthcare Equipment and Services, Mining and Basic Resources,
Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology, Telecommunication, Transportation.
Table 6.4.4 shows that the industry with the highest average percentage of words
used for performance explanations in the narrative review sections (WCN) is Chemi-
cals (6.7%), followed by IT (5.9%), Retailers (5.1%) and Construction and Construc-
tion Materials (5.1%). This suggests that ﬁrms in these industries provide the most
extensive explanations in terms of space they occupy in the narrative sections of the
annual report. For chemical companies, the reason for providing these extensive expla-
nations might be that the industry could be considered as rather risky, as was reﬂected
in the higher industry cost of equity that was found in section 6.3, and ﬁrms therefore
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provide more performance explanations to counter this perception. The chemicals in-
dustry can be considered a more risky and changing industry, characterised by margin
pressure, competition, and changing demand and industry structures (Cassidy et al.
2011). Hence to counter perceptions of risk and to ultimately alleviate investor con-
cerns about investing in such an industry, chemical companies may need to explain
their performance outcomes more in depth and extensive than other industries to
allow a thorough understanding of the reasons for performance and the ﬁrm's future
prospects. This may help the ﬁrms attract capital and ﬁnancing at better terms.
Regarding IT, it might be that the fast-paced nature of the industry with constant
technological changes and at times short product cycles requires ﬁrms to extensively
discuss their performance outcomes to give investors clear guidance as to which prod-
ucts and segments contribute to good or bad performance. For example, ﬁrms in the
industry may want to explain where the contribution to revenues and proﬁts comes
from, for instance whether the majority of revenues and proﬁts comes from mature
or soon-to-be obsolete products, or from new products in a new market segment with
high growth potential. An example for such a fast changing environment can be found
in the annual report of Pace Microtechnology (2006, p. 14). The company reported a
loss for the year and explained that delays in the development of the HD PVR for US
cable mean that the design uses components many of which were ordered, and prices
ﬁxed, over a year ago. Newer and less expensive components are now available to
use on new designs. The delay also aﬀects the anticipated product life of the existing
design. This may prompt the ﬁrm to be more forthcoming. Retailers also provide
extensive performance attributions. Retailers are very much exposed to the state of
the overall economy and therefore tend to be seen as indicator of the direction of
the economy, hence their performance is closely followed by analysts, investors, and
business in general (United States Census Bureau 2012). This suggests an increased
interest by investors in the reasons behind retailers' performance so as to gain more
insight into the development of the overall economy to assist in asset allocation. This
might lead companies in the retail industry to provide more extensive performance
explanations to respond to these expectations.
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The lowest word count is found in Media (3.5%) and Household Goods (3.9%),
followed by Utilities, Oil and Gas, and Aerospace and Defense (all 4.0%). Household
Goods is considered a mature sector with fairly stable sales and earnings, and low vul-
nerability to swings in the economy (Seidman 2012). This suggests that performance
of ﬁrms in this industry might be more predictable, with deviations from expectations
less signiﬁcant and fewer big surprises at earnings announcements than in other in-
dustries. For this reason, it is possible that demand for ﬁrm-provided performance
explanations is lower, and Household Goods ﬁrms disclose less. For the Media in-
dustry, competitive pressures might lead ﬁrms to provide less extensive performance
explanations. The industry is going through a period of signiﬁcant change regarding
issues such as business models, technology, revenue creation (Deloitte 2012; Ernst &
Young 2012). These pressures might make ﬁrms more protective of their businesses
and, as a consequence, they might be reluctant to be too forthcoming about the rea-
sons for their performance. As for Utilities, it is a regulated industry, so that ﬁrms in
this sector face higher information demands by regulatory bodies that are charged with
monitoring their actions and performance, which will lead to more information being
disclosed to satisfy these demands (Clapham and Schwenk 1991). Firms therefore
may have to provide more information of all types to satisfy the demand by regulators
and the public, so that the information about the ﬁrm's operations provided in the
narrative sections becomes more voluminous than for ﬁrms in not regulated indus-
tries. Following from that, the overall percentage of word count used for explaining
performance outcomes reduces. For Oil & Gas, Meek et al. (1995) found that ﬁrms
in the oil industry provided higher non-ﬁnancial disclosure and suggested that these
ﬁrms might be more sensitive to social accountability and therefore disclose more. It
can be argued that these ﬁrms operate in more environmentally sensitive industries
and will be under higher public scrutiny to ensure no environmental damage is done.
Hence it is possible that these have to devote a substantial part of their narrative
sections to explaining their operations, environmental policies and the impact of the
business, in order to reassure the stakeholders that the company is conducting a re-
sponsible and sustainable business. Providing more of this type of information in the
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narrative sections of the annual report might therefore reduce the space available for
explaining performance outcomes.
Table 6.4.5 presents the descriptive statistics for the distribution of the amount
of space in the narrative sections given to internal versus external explanations
(WCN_INT and WCN_EXT ) by industry.
As can be seen from the table, in all industries, there is a clear tendency for a
higher word count for internal explanations than for external explanations relative
to the total word count in the narrative review sections. This means ﬁrms in all
the industries tend to elaborate more on internal causes than on external causes for
performance. Comparing these results with those reported by prior research that
looked at the quantity of attribution statements (e.g. Bettman and Weitz 1983;
Aerts 2005; Aerts and Tarca 2010) reveals that, while in this thesis ﬁrms show a clear
tendency to emphasise internal attributions, other studies ﬁnd a somewhat more
mixed picture.
The results reported here are most consistent with those by Bettman and Weitz
(1983) who found that three of the four industries they analysed (Aerospace, Scientiﬁc
Instruments, Telephone) showed a slight tendency to provide more internal attribu-
tions, while only Metal Mining ﬁrms showed a tendency to use external attributions.
By contrast, Aerts (2005) found that ﬁrms from Mining & Metals/Production, as
well as those from Construction gave signiﬁcantly more external attributions than
internal, but the authors did not detect a tendency regarding internal attributions.
Moreover, Aerts and Tarca (2010) reported that Food Processors provide signiﬁcantly
more internal attributions, whereas signiﬁcantly more external attributions were given
by Building Materials, Pharmaceuticals, and again Food Processors.
6.5 Summary and conclusion
This chapter has described the sample used in the analysis and provided descriptive
statistics for the level of attribution disclosure and the cost of capital estimates. The
statistics show that the volume taken up by attributions of the total space of the
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narrative sections (WCN) is generally low, and the low standard deviation indicates
that the volume is fairly stable across ﬁrms and does not vary much.
Focusing on internal and external attributions separately (WCN_INT /WCN_EXT )
shows that ﬁrms have a clear tendency to explain performance outcomes with internal
factors rather than with external reasons. The ﬁnding of a predominance of internal
attributions provides some support for the suggestion by Salancik and Meindl (1984)
that ﬁrms would attribute performance more to causes internal to the ﬁrm in order to
demonstrate they are in control. This tendency is present for ﬁrms with increasing as
well as decreasing performance, thus a self-serving attribution behaviour (attributing
good outcomes to internal reasons but bad outcomes to external reasons) as reported
by previous research is not present in the sample. Looking at the attribution disclo-
sure by industry conﬁrms the tendency for using internal over external attributions.
Firms across all industries tend to use internal attributions rather than external attri-
butions to explain their performance outcomes and give more space to internal than
to external explanations.
This chapter has also presented the descriptive statistics for the sample ﬁrms'
cost of equity capital estimates. The mean cost of equity capital of the sample ﬁrms
is 9.76%, with the majority of ﬁrms having a cost of equity capital between 5% and
below 15%. Analysing the industry cost of equity capital showed that the industries
with the highest average cost of equity capital are IT, Aerospace and Defense, Chem-
icals, and Electronic and Electrical Equipment whereas those with the lowest are Oil
& Gas, Travel and Leisure, Food and Beverages, and Media.
Having done the descriptive analysis for the variables and obtained a ﬁrst overview
of the data, the next chapter presents the results from the regression analysis on the
determinants of attribution statement disclosure.
CHAPTER 7
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, FIRM-SPECIFIC
FACTORS AND ATTRIBUTION STATEMENTS
7.1 Introduction
Performance attributions are an important part of a ﬁrm's information disclosures to
the capital market. Chapter 3 has presented a theoretical framework for explaining
attribution disclosure. It has also established a number of hypotheses about how a
ﬁrm's corporate governance and ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics inﬂuence the disclosure
of performance explanations in UK listed ﬁrms' annual reports. In the previous chap-
ter 6, the data collected in order to test the hypotheses was described. This chapter
now reports the results of tests of the hypotheses on the relationship between attri-
bution provision and corporate governance and ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics discussed
in chapter 3.
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 7.2 presents the regression model.
Section 7.3 describes the tests for normality of the data and any data transformations
carried out prior to further analysis. Section 7.4 presents the univariate correlations
between the attribution disclosure measures and the independent variables. Section
7.5 presents the results of the multiple regression analysis, and Section 7.6 reports
on additional tests that were carried out. The chapter concludes with a summary in
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Section 7.7.
7.2 Regression model
The regression model used to investigate the determinants of attribution disclosure
has been speciﬁed in chapter 5 as follows:
Attributions = β0 + β1PropNED + β2Dirown+ β3ACSize+ β4ACExp
+β5Size+ β6AF + β7Gear + β8Profit+ β9Perf
+β10Issue+ 
(7.2.1)
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PropNED = Proportion of non-executive directors on the board of directors,
measured as the proportion of non-executive directors on the board
of directors to the total number of directors on the board
Dirown = Executive director share ownership, measured as the percentage of
shares held by ﬁrm executive directors
ACSize = Audit committee size, measured as the number of directors on the
audit committee
ACExp = Audit committee expertise, measured as the proportion of audit
committee members with accounting and ﬁnancial management
expertise to the total size of the audit committee
Size = Firm size, measured as market value of equity at ﬁnancial year end
in ¿m
AF = Analyst following, measured as the number of analysts following a
ﬁrm
Gear = Gearing ratio, measured as long-term debt divided by long-term
debt plus shareholders' equity at ﬁscal year end
Proﬁt = Firm proﬁtability, measured as return on assets
Perf = Change in ﬁnancial performance from the previous ﬁnancial year,
measured as indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the ﬁrm's
operating proﬁt has decreased from the previous year; 0 otherwise
Issue = Indicator variable if the ﬁrm has issued equity within the subsequent
ﬁnancial year; taking the value of 1 if the ﬁrm has issued equity
within the year following the publication of the annual report; 0
otherwise
Attributions = Attribution disclosure, measured as the percentage of words used
for attributions to the total number of words in the narrative
sections of the annual report
β = Regression coeﬃcient
 = Error term
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As the measure for attribution statement disclosure in the regression analysis, the
thesis uses the wordcount of attributions as percentage of the total wordcount of the
ﬁrm's narrative disclosures (WCN). Three separate regressions are run using (1) the
aggregate measure of attributions (WCN), (2) the internal attributions (WCN_INT )
and (3) the external attributions (WCN_EXT ) separately.
7.3 Normality tests and data transformations
In chapter 5, section 7.3, the importance of data normality for regression analysis was
discussed. This section reports the results of normality tests for both the dependent
and the continuous independent variables. In order to test for deviations from nor-
mality, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test as well as an inspection of histograms was
carried out. If a distribution is normal, the values for skewness and kurtosis should
be zero or close to zero (see, Field 2009; Bryman and Cramer 2009). For normal
distributed data, the KS statistic will be insigniﬁcant (p>0.05). The test results are
provided below in Table 7.3.1.
It can be seen from Table 7.3.1 Panel A that only Gear is normally distributed
and the remaining variables show deviations from a normal distribution. This ﬁnding
is supported by visual inspection of histograms which show that all variables except
Gear are not normally distributed. All exhibit positive skewness except for Proﬁt,
which is slightly negatively skewed. Inspection of QQ-plots shows that for several
variables there are deviations of the observations from the expected straight line.
Moreover, the visual inspection procedure detected the presence of outlying values in
several variables, in particular for Proﬁt. Histograms and QQ-Plots are provided in
the Appendix (A.3.1 - A.3.5).
Based on these ﬁndings, it was decided to transform the variables with severe
normality failures. A transformation also helps reduce outlier problems (see Tabach-
nick and Fidell 2007). Which type of data transformation is appropriate depends on
the strength and direction of the normality violation. For positive skewness, common
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Table 7.3.1: Normality tests and transformations
Mean Median StdDV Skew. Kurt.
K-S
Lilliefors
K-S
Sign.
Panel A: Untransformed variables
Firm characteristics
Size 1955.944 402.400 4165.979 3.685 15.217 0.320 0.000
Gear 0.404 0.415 0.255 0.561 0.918 0.066 0.200*
Proﬁt 0.059 0.057 0.059 -0.579 6.230 0.121 0.000
AF 7.590 5.000 6.212 0.905 -0.096 0.183 0.000
Corporate governance characteristics
PropNED 0.511 0.500 0.126 0.469 0.107 0.129 0.000
ACSize 3.295 3.000 0.913 0.850 0.859 0.303 0.000
ACExp 0.475 0.500 0.246 0.503 0.135 0.171 0.000
Dirown 0.056 0.009 10.748 2.655 7.175 0.301 0.000
Disclosure measures
WCN 0.052 0.045 0.034 1.640 5.264 0.140 0.000
WCN_INT 0.037 0.030 0.026 1.440 2.126 0.139 0.000
WCN_EXT 0.019 0.013 0.020 2.985 14.149 0.219 0.000
Panel B: Transformed variables
Size Ln 6.233 6.173 1.796 0.129 -0.693 0.060 0.200*
Proﬁt WS95a 0.056 0.051 0.046 0.396 0.242 0.085 0.048
Dirown Ln -0.137 -0.069 2.289 -0.259 -0.244 0.057 0.200*
WCN NS 0.031 0.034 0.964 -0.026 -0.194 0.010 0.200*
WCN_INT NS 0.034 0.017 0.955 0.025 -0.242 0.011 0.200*
WCN_EXT NS 0.023 0.042 0.975 -0.050 -0.296 0.016 0.200*
Size = Firm size, measured as market value of equity at ﬁnancial year end in ¿m. Gear = Gearing ratio,
measured as long-term debt to long-term debt plus equity. Proﬁt = Firm proﬁtability, measured as return on
assets. AF = Number of analysts following a ﬁrm, measured as the number of analysts following a ﬁrm.
PropNED = Proportion of non-executive directors on the board of directors, measured as the proportion of
non-executive directors on the board of directors to the total number of directors on the board ACSize =
Audit committee size, measured as the number of directors on the audit committee. ACExp = Audit
committee expertise, measured as the proportion of audit committee members with accounting and ﬁnancial
management expertise to the total size of the audit committee. Dirown = Executive director ownership,
measured as the percentage of shares held by executive directors. WCN = Wordcount of attributions per
narrative disclosures, measured as the percentage of words used for attributions to the total number of words
in the narrative disclosures of a ﬁrm excluding the notes to the ﬁnancial statements. WCN_INT =
Wordcount of internal attributions per narrative disclosures, measured as the percentage of words used for
internal attributions to the total number of words in the narrative disclosures excluding the notes to the
ﬁnancial statements. WCN_EXT = Wordcount of external attributions per narrative disclosures, measured
as the percentage of words used for external attributions to the total number of words in the narrative
disclosures excluding the notes to the ﬁnancial statements.
*This is a lower bound of the true signiﬁcance
aWS95 = Winsorised at 95% level; NS = Normal score transformation.
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transformations are taking the square root (for mild departures from normality) or
the log of a variable (for more severe cases) (see Tabachnick and Fidell 2007, Pallant
2007, and Field 2009). Table 7.3.1 Panel B exhibits the transformed variables. Size
and Dirown were transformed using natural log due to their positive skewness and
strong deviations from normality. Proﬁt has no severe issues with skewness but vi-
sual inspection indicated a multitude of outliers at the lower end of the distribution.
Therefore, the decision was taken to winsorise the data, a technique used to reduce
the inﬂuence of outliers (see, e.g. Tabachnick and Fidell 2007; Muino and Trombetta
2009). When data are winsorised, the top and bottom ends of the distribution are
set equal to a speciﬁed percentile or value of the data. This procedure reduces the
inﬂuence of extreme values at both ends of the distribution without removing the
observations from the sample, and so improves the distribution of the data. In this
thesis, Proﬁt was winsorised at the 5th and 95th percentile, that is values below
the 5th percentile were set to the value at the 5th percentile, and values above the
95th percentile were set to the value at the 95th percentile, resulting in a normally
distributed variable.
Gear remained untransformed as the tests showed a normal distribution. The vari-
ables AF, PropNED, ACSize, and ACExp remained untransformed as well because 1)
regarding AF, and ACSize, Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) recommend leaving variables
untransformed which are measured on a meaningful scale (as is the case for AF and
ACSize: number of analysts or members measured as integers) as a transformation
makes interpretation more complicated; 2) for PropNED and ACExp the values for
skewness and kurtosis were judged as being reasonably close to zero.
Regarding the disclosure measures, it can be seen from Table 7.3.1 Panel A that
the disclosure measures show deviations from a normal distribution. To correct for
these violations, the attribution disclosure variables were transformed using normal
scores, a technique frequently applied to disclosure measures in the literature (see e.g.
Cooke 1998; Haniﬀa and Cooke 2002; Haniﬀa and Cooke 2005; Mangena and Pike
2005). The normal scores approach is a transformation technique which replaces the
value of an observation with the scores on the normal distribution, and is appropriate
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when the relationship between the dependent and independent variables is non-linear
but monotonic (Cooke 1998). The advantage of the normal scores approach is that
a non-normal dependent variable can be transformed to a normally distributed one,
and it produces tests that have exact statistical properties (see Cooke 1998; Haniﬀa
and Cooke 2005). Moreover, the method reduces the inﬂuence of outliers in the
attribution measures which were revealed by visual inspection.
7.4 Univariate Analysis
This section presents the results of investigating the univariate correlations between
the attribution disclosure measure and the independent variables. The correlation
between the attribution disclosure measure and each independent variable provides
a ﬁrst understanding of how each independent variable relates to disclosure. In the
previous section the data was tested for normality and measures were taken, where
appropriate, to obtain a more normal distribution of variables with normality viola-
tions. Hence the analysis is carried out on the transformed variables using the Pearson
product moment correlation coeﬃcient, which is appropriate for normally distributed
data (Field 2009). Table 7.4.1 shows the Pearson correlations between the disclosure
measures and the continuous independent variables.
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Table 7.4.1: Correlations attribution disclosure measures and continuous independent
variables
WCN WCN_INT WCN_EXT
Panel A: Corporate Governance characteristics
PropNED 0.078 0.106 -0.113
Dirown 0.191** 0.199** 0.224**
ACSize -0.225*** -0.293*** -0.152
ACExp 0.127 0.086 0.073
Panel B: Firm characteristics
Size -0.286*** -0.219*** -0.364***
Gear -0.081 -0.141 -0.233**
Proﬁt -0.202** -0.111 -0.198**
AF -0.283*** -0.253*** -0.310***
*** Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
* Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed)
PropNED = Proportion of non-executive directors on the board of directors, measured as the proportion of
non-executive directors on the board of directors to the total number of directors on the board ACSize =
Audit committee size, measured as the number of directors on the audit committee. ACExp = Audit
committee expertise, measured as the proportion of audit committee members with accounting and ﬁnancial
management expertise to the total size of the audit committee. Dirown = Executive director ownership,
measured as the percentage of shares held by executive directors. Size = Firm size, measured as market value
of equity at ﬁnancial year end in ¿m. Gear = Gearing ratio, measured as long-term debt to long-term debt
plus equity. Proﬁt = Firm proﬁtability, measured as return on assets. AF = Number of analysts following a
ﬁrm, measured as the number of analysts following a ﬁrm. WCN = Wordcount of attributions per narrative
disclosures, measured as the percentage of words used for attributions to the total number of words in the
narrative disclosures of a ﬁrm excluding the notes to the ﬁnancial statements. WCN_INT = Wordcount of
internal attributions per narrative disclosures, measured as the percentage of words used for internal
attributions to the total number of words in the narrative disclosures excluding the notes to the ﬁnancial
statements. WCN_EXT = Wordcount of external attributions per narrative disclosures, measured as the
percentage of words used for external attributions to the total number of words in the narrative disclosures
excluding the notes to the ﬁnancial statements.
Panel A of Table 7.4.1 presents the correlations of the attribution measures with
the ﬁrm's corporate governance characteristics. WCN shows a signiﬁcant positive
association with director ownership (p<0.05) and a signiﬁcant negative association
with audit committee size (p<0.01). The proportion of non-executive directors and
audit committee expertise are insigniﬁcant. WCN_INT has a signiﬁcant positive
association with director ownership (p<0.05) and a signiﬁcant negative association
with audit committee size (p<0.01). WCN_EXT shows a signiﬁcant positive asso-
ciation with director ownership (p<0.05). These results suggest that at the overall
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attribution provision level, ﬁrms in which executive directors hold a signiﬁcant stake
give more space to explaining performance outcomes, and such attributions are more
likely to give more internal and external factors. The results for the audit committee
size suggests that the larger the audit committee, the lower the level of attribution,
particularly internal attributions.
Panel B of Table 7.4.1 presents the correlations of the attribution measures
with ﬁrm characteristics. For WCN, ﬁrm size shows a signiﬁcant negative associ-
ation (p<0.01), as does proﬁtability and analyst following with a signiﬁcance level
of p<0.05 and p<0.01, respectively. Gearing is insigniﬁcant. This suggests that
more space is given to performance explanations by ﬁrms that are smaller, less prof-
itable, and are followed by fewer analysts. The INT/EXT components of wordcount
show slightly diﬀerent associations with ﬁrm characteristics than the aggregateWCN.
WCN_INT exhibits signiﬁcant negative associations with ﬁrm size (p<0.01) and an-
alyst following (p<0.01), consistent with aggregate WCN, yet proﬁtability is insignif-
icant. Thus ﬁrms that are smaller and are followed by fewer analysts give more space
for attributions to internal reasons. WCN_EXT has a signiﬁcant negative associ-
ation with all ﬁrm characteristics, ﬁrm size (p<0.01), analyst following (p<0.01),
proﬁtability (p<0.05) and gearing (p<0.05). Hence more space to external perfor-
mance explanations seems to be given by smaller, less proﬁtable, and lower geared
ﬁrms, that are followed by fewer analysts.
Table 7.4.2 presents the analysis of the associations of the disclosure measures
with the categorical independent variables.
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Table 7.4.2: Independent samples t-tests for disclosure measures and categorical
independent variables
WCN WCN_INT WCN_EXT
Perf a
Neg Pos Neg Pos Neg Pos
Nb 80 62 80 60 63 50
Mean 0.111 -0.072 0.057 0.007 0.169 -0.159
StdDV 0.954 0.987 0.915 1.011 0.992 0.931
t-value 1.125 0.328 1.797*
Issue
Yes No Yes No Yes No
N 28 114 28 112 23 90
Mean -0.245 0.099 -0.215 0.096 -0.047 0.042
StdDV 0.900 0.971 0.873 0.967 0.788 1.021
t-value -1.709* -1.551 -0.388
*** Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
* Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed)
aPerf : Performance change from last ﬁnancial year (negative = 1, positive = 0) measured as
the percentage change in return on assets from the previous year; Issue: Issue of shares in the
ﬁscal year following the publication of the annual report; taking the value of 1 if the ﬁrm has
issued equity within the year following the publication of the annual report; 0 otherwise.
bN varies as not every ﬁrm provided both internal and external attributions.WCN is based on
142 observations, WCN_INT is based on 140 observations, and WCN_EXT is based on 113
observations.
WCN = Wordcount of attributions per narrative disclosures, measured as the percentage of words
used for attributions to the total number of words in the narrative disclosures of a ﬁrm excluding the
notes to the ﬁnancial statements. WCN_INT = Wordcount of internal attributions per narrative
disclosures, measured as the percentage of words used for internal attributions to the total number
of words in the narrative disclosures excluding the notes to the ﬁnancial statements. WCN_EXT =
Wordcount of external attributions per narrative disclosures, measured as the percentage of words
used for external attributions to the total number of words in the narrative disclosures excluding the
notes to the ﬁnancial statements.
The results in Table 7.4.2 show that there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the space
given to external attribution statements (WCN_EXT p<0.10) between ﬁrms with
increasing or decreasing performance (Perf ) from the previous ﬁnancial year. This
suggests that ﬁrms whose performance has decreased give more space to attributing
performance outcomes to external reasons. For share issue (Issue), WCN shows a
signiﬁcant diﬀerence (p<0.10), suggesting that ﬁrms issuing shares in the next ﬁnan-
cial year devote a lower percentage of their narrative disclosures to explaining their
ﬁnancial performance.
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7.5 Multiple regression analysis
Whilst the correlation analysis provides some insights into the relationship between
attribution provision and the diﬀerent factors, one cannot conclude that relationships
exist because univariate analysis suﬀers from the omitted variables problem. In this
case the relationships observed might be a result of other variables not controlled for.
In order to address this problem, multiple linear regression analysis was carried out.
The results are reported in the following sections.
7.5.1 Regression assumptions
Multiple regression analysis is based on a number of assumptions in order to ensure
validity of the results. These assumptions have been discussed in chapter 5, section
5.7.3, and include normality, linearity, homoscedasticity, and independence of error
terms. Additionally, multicollinearity of the data and the existence of inﬂuential data
points has to be ruled out. To test whether these assumptions were met, both visual
and numerical methods were used.
Multicollinearity between the independent variables was assessed by means of the
correlation matrix presented in Table 7.5.1. The table reveals a number of signiﬁcant
correlations between the independent variables. However, except for the correlation
between the ﬁrm size measure (Size) and analyst following (AF ), all of the correlations
are below the cut-oﬀ limit of 0.8 to 0.9 suggested in the literature as problematic
(see Gujarati 2003; Field 2009). The high correlation between analyst following and
ﬁrm size (0.873) means that analyst following and ﬁrm size cannot be included in
the same regression model.
In addition to examining the correlation matrix, the Variance Inﬂation Factor
(VIF) were also examined. The results, as included in the regression statistics in the
next section show that, after separating analyst following and the ﬁrm size measures
into separate regression models, none of the values comes close to or exceeds the
value of 10 suggested as a limit for VIF (see e.g. Stevens 2002, Gujarati 2003).
Hence multicollinearity is not considered to be a problem. In order to assess whether
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any observations have undue inﬂuence on the regression results, that is the capacity
to inﬂuence or change the regression coeﬃcients (see Field 2009; Tabachnick and
Fidell 2007), Cook's distance was used and revealed that there are no inﬂuential
data points that might inﬂuence the results as all values are below the limit of 1
(Cook and Weisberg 1982). Furthermore, to ascertain that the regression residuals
are independent from each other and there is no correlation, the Durbin-Watson
test (DW) was employed. The DW statistics of around the value of 2 demonstrate
independence of the error terms (see Field 2009) (test statistics for both tests are
provided in Appendix A.4.1). Finally, to assess whether the regression assumptions of
linearity (existence of a linear relationship between the variables) and homoscedasticity
(constant variance of the residuals) are met, plots of the regression residuals versus
expected values were analysed. The plots show that the assumptions are met, as the
data points are randomly dispersed in the scatterplot and do not follow any pattern
indicative of a failure of these assumptions. The data plots for normality, linearity,
and homoscedasticity are provided in the Appendix (A.3.6 - A.3.8).
7.5.2 Multiple regression results
This section presents the results from the multiple regression analysis. The ﬁrst step
is to obtain an overview of model ﬁt and the signiﬁcance of variables. Table 7.5.2
exhibits the results.
As noted in section 7.2, there are three models: the aggregate attribution (WCN)
model; the internal attribution (WCN_INT ) model and the external attribution
(WCN_EXT ) model. For each of the three models, two separate sub-models were
created to deal with the multicollinearity problem between ﬁrm size (Size) and an-
alyst following (AF ). In respect of the aggregate attribution (WCN) model, Table
7.5.2 shows that the model has an Adjusted R2 of 12.9% and 12.8% and F-value of
3.314 and 3.305, for the Size model and AF model respectively. The signiﬁcance of
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p<0.01 suggests that it has signiﬁcant power to explain variation in the volume of
attribution provided in the narrative sections of the annual report.
Four of the variables in the model are signiﬁcantly associated with the volume of
explanations provided. In terms of the corporate governance factors and for both the
Size model and the AF model, the results show that PropNED is positively related
to attributions at the 5% level or better. ACSize is negatively related to attributions
at the 5% level or better for both the Size and the AF model. The variables Dirown
and ACExp, although positively related to attribution measure, are not signiﬁcant.
With respect to the ﬁrm characteristics, the results show that Proﬁt and Issue are
both negative and signiﬁcantly related to attributions at the 5% level or better.
However, Size, AF, Gear and Perf are all not signiﬁcantly related to attributions.
With regard to the internal attribution (WCN_INT ) model, the analyses are based
on a reduced sample of 140 observations (instead of the total of 142) because only
ﬁrms that provided internal attributions were included. Two ﬁrms did not provide
internal attributions and were excluded. For the internal attribution (WCN_INT )
model, Table 7.5.2 shows that the model has an Adjusted R2 of 10.8% and 11.1%
and F-value of 2.871 and 2.929, for the Size model and AF model respectively.
The signiﬁcance of p<0.01 suggests that the model has signiﬁcant power to explain
variation in the volume of internal attributions provided in the narrative sections of the
annual report. Four of the variables in the Size model are signiﬁcantly associated with
the volume of internal attributions provided, whereas in the AF model three variables
show a signiﬁcant association with the volume of internal attributions. In terms of
the corporate governance factors and for both the Size model and the AF model, the
results show that PropNED is positively related to internal attributions at the 5%
level or better. ACSize is negatively related to internal attributions at the 5% level
or better for both the Size model and the AF model. The results show that Dirown
(p<0.10) is positive and signiﬁcantly related to internal attributions at the 10% level
in the Size model, but not the AF model. Regarding ﬁrm characteristics, the results
show that Issue is negative and signiﬁcantly associated with internal attributions at
the 10% level in both the Size model and the AF model. The results also show
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that ACExp, Size, AF, Gear, Proﬁt and Perf are all not signiﬁcantly related to
internal attributions. With regard to the external attribution (WCN_EXT ) model,
the analyses are based on a reduced sample of 113 observations because only ﬁrms
that provided external attributions were included. Those ﬁrms that did not attribute
performance outcomes to external factors were excluded. Table 7.5.2 shows that the
external attribution (WCN_EXT ) model has an Adjusted R2 of 11.0 and 9.0 and
F-value of 2.531 and 2.227, for the Size model and AF model respectively. The
signiﬁcance of p<0.05 for both the Size model and the AF model suggests that the
model oﬀers signiﬁcant explanatory power to explain the variability in the volume
of external attributions in the narrative sections of the annual report. Two of the
variables in the Size model are signiﬁcantly associated with the volume of external
attributions provided, whereas in the AF model one variable shows a signiﬁcant
association with the volume of external attributions. In terms of corporate governance
factors, the results show that none of the four corporate governance factors has
a signiﬁcant association with external attributions. ACExp and PropNED show a
negative relation with external attributions, and Dirown and ACSize show a positive
association with external attributions. With respect to ﬁrm characteristics, the results
show that Size is negative and signiﬁcantly related to external attributions at the 10%
level. Gear is negative and signiﬁcantly related to external attributions at the 10%
level or better in both the Size and the AF model. However, AF, Proﬁt, Perf and
Issue are all not signiﬁcantly related to external attributions.
7.5.3 Discussion of the regression results
The discussion of the regression results is split into two sections: corporate governance
factors and ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors.
7.5.3.1 Corporate governance factors and attribution statements
A summary of the results of the association between the four corporate governance
factors and attribution statements in annual reports is provided in Table 7.5.3.
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Table 7.5.3: Summary of multiple regression results for the eﬀect of corporate gov-
ernance factors on attribution statement disclosure
WCN (Ha) WCN_INT
(Hb(i))
WCN_EXT
(Hb(ii))
Sign
Pred.
Sign Obs. &
Signif.
Sign
Pred.
Sign Obs. &
Signif.
Sign
Pred.
Sign
Obs. &
Signif.
Model MVE AF MVE AF MVE AF
PropNED (H1) + +** +** -/+ +** +** -/+ - -
Dirown (H2) -/+ + + -/+ +* + -/+ + +
ACSize (H3) + -** -** -/+ -** -** -/+ + +
ACExp (H4) + + + -/+ + + -/+ - -
*** Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); ** Correlation
signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); * Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.10
level (2-tailed)
Sign Pred. = Sign of the association predicted; Sign Obs. & Signif. =
Sign of the association observed & Signiﬁcance level
PropNED = Proportion of non-executive directors on the board of directors, measured as the proportion of
non-executive directors on the board of directors to the total number of directors on the board. Dirown =
Executive director ownership, measured as the percentage of shares held by executive directors. ACSize =
Audit committee size, measured as the number of directors on the audit committee. ACExp = Audit
committee expertise, measured as the proportion of audit committee members with accounting and ﬁnancial
management expertise to the total size of the audit committee. WCN = Wordcount of attributions per
narrative disclosures, measured as the percentage of words used for attributions to the total number of words
in the narrative disclosures of a ﬁrm excluding the notes to the ﬁnancial statements. WCN_INT =
Wordcount of internal attributions per narrative disclosures, measured as the percentage of words used for
internal attributions to the total number of words in the narrative disclosures excluding the notes to the
ﬁnancial statements. WCN_EXT = Wordcount of external attributions per narrative disclosures, measured
as the percentage of words used for external attributions to the total number of words in the narrative
disclosures excluding the notes to the ﬁnancial statements.
The proportion of non-executive directors on the board shows a signiﬁcant positive
association with both WCN (p<0.05) as well as with WCN_INT (p<0.05). Hence
both Hypothesis H1a on the volume of attributions and Hypothesis H1b(i) on the
volume of internal attributions are supported. The ﬁndings are consistent with those
by, for instance, Chen and Jaggi (2000), Cheng and Courtenay (2006), Patelli and
Prencipe (2007), Lim et al. (2007), and Baek et al. (2009) for overall disclosure levels,
and by Li et al. (2008) for intellectual capital disclosure. The signiﬁcant positive
association with the volume of attribution disclosure (H1a) provides support for the
argument that non-executive directors on the board contribute to better monitoring
of management activities, which then can translate into enhanced discussions of
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the factors inﬂuencing performance. These results are in line with Schaﬀer (2002)
and Barton and Mercer (2005) who suggest that attributions are used by the board
to assess managerial performance, and in this context, the NEDs might push for
detailed attributions of performance to help them monitor. Schaﬀer (2002) argues
that when the board of directors evaluates management's performance, NEDs will be
less constrained by loyalties to the CEO or the fear of retaliation if they criticise the
CEO, thus could be more free and objective in their assessment of ﬁrm performance.
This suggests that NEDs, less subject to such 'social constraints' (Schaﬀer 2002)
and more motivated by their duty of accountability to shareholders, might be more
strict when scrutinising performance, thus would make management provide more
detailed performance explanations to allow a thorough and well-grounded assessment
of management performance.
In terms of the classiﬁcation of attributions into internal and external, the signiﬁ-
cant positive association between the proportion of non-executive directors and inter-
nal attributions and the negative, although insigniﬁcant association with WCN_EXT
indicates that ﬁrms with more non-executive directors on the board have the tendency
to elaborate more on internal reasons to explain performance outcomes. These ﬁnd-
ings support Hypothesis H1b(i), but not H1b(ii). The arguments brought forward by
Schaﬀer (2002) about the diﬀerent attribution patterns by inside and outside directors
can oﬀer a guide to explaining this ﬁnding. Schaﬀer (2002) states that inside direc-
tors might be less critical of management, thus more 'predisposed' to make external
attributions, due to either their proximity to the CEO or the fear of retaliation in case
of being critical. Non-executive directors, less constrained by these issues, can be
more open and direct in the assignment of responsibility, and thus forcing managers
to accept responsibility for organisational outcomes instead of blaming external fac-
tors for performance. Alternatively, since board of directors consider attributions for
performance when assessing managers (Schaﬀer 2002; Barton and Mercer 2005), the
managers might be inclined to provide detailed attributions for internal causes of per-
formance in order to inﬂuence the board's decision. A good assessment is important
for managers because of the related compensation and employment prospects.
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However, it is also possible that non-executive directors might not necessarily be
more eﬃcient monitors of management's actions (see Schaﬀer 2002; Armstrong et al.
2010; Brickley and Zimmerman 2010). In this case it can be argued that due to time
constraints and their very role as outsiders that denies them full and ready access to
all the detailed information they would require (as much as inside directors have),
non-executive directors might have to decide on a limited information basis. This
would lead them to be less critical of management's explanations and more readily
accept what is being presented to them. Hence, it would be easier for management
to show self-serving behaviour and to claim responsibility for performance outcomes
so as to show that they are in control and sending a conﬁdent and reassuring message
to its stakeholders.
As the summary Table 7.5.3 shows, the association between executive director
ownership and aggregate attributions (WCN) is positive but insigniﬁcant. This sug-
gests that the level of executive director ownership does not inﬂuence aggregate
attributions (WCN) provided in the annual report, thus Hypothesis H2a is not sup-
ported. The insigniﬁcant association is consistent with results by, for instance, Forker
(1992), Mangena and Pike (2005), Kelton and Yang (2008), Donnelly and Mulcahy
(2008) who also fail to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant association of director ownership with gen-
eral disclosure. The positive sign, however, implies that ﬁrms with higher managerial
ownership would provide more detailed attributions.
Contrary to the results for the aggregate measure, executive director ownership
shows a signiﬁcant positive association with the volume of internal attribution state-
ments (WCN_INT ), thus providing support for Hypothesis H2b(i) of a signiﬁcant
association of director ownership with internal attributions. There is, however, no sig-
niﬁcant association between external attributions and executive director ownership,
thus Hypothesis H2b(ii) is not supported. These results suggest that ﬁrms in which
the executive directors own a higher percentage of the ﬁrm's shares are signiﬁcantly
more likely to provide detailed internal attribution statements than they would provide
external attributions. Attributing performance to the ﬁrm's own actions might create
an impression of conﬁdence in management's abilities among existing and potential
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investors, leading to positive eﬀects for the ﬁrm's share price. This might beneﬁt the
directors (1) as they might be perceived as doing a good job, which improves their
own job prospects, or (2) if they want to buy/sell shares in the ﬁrm.
Audit committee size shows a signiﬁcant negative association with attribution
statement provision. This is not consistent with Hypothesis H3a which suggested a
positive relationship between ACSize and aggregate attribution disclosure (WCN),
but is consistent with Hypothesis H3b(i) which suggested an association between
ACSize and internal attribution disclosure (WCN_INT ). The results are consistent
with Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) who also ﬁnd a negative relationship between
ACSize and management earnings forecasts. Similar to the arguments presented by
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005), a smaller audit committee may be more eﬀective in
monitoring corporate reporting processes and might be in a better position to chal-
lenge management on their attribution behaviour. Larger groups may be less eﬀective
due to internal coordination problems and poorer communication and decision mak-
ing, hence reducing monitoring and control capabilities (see Lipton and Lorsch 1992;
Jensen 1993; John and Senbet 1998). Hence previous research argues (e.g. Kara-
manou and Vafeas 2005; Felo et al. 2003) that when the audit committee is large,
responsibilities are less clear and decisions are not eﬀectively made. Also a large com-
mittee may become easy to control by managers (see Alexander et al. 1993; Jensen
1993), which can further reduce monitoring eﬀectiveness. The signiﬁcant negative
association between ACSize and internal attributions (WCN_INT ) provides support
for H3b(i) and suggests that ﬁrms with smaller audit committees would provide more
extensive explanations to internal reasons for performance. Hypothesis H3b(ii) is not
supported as there is no signiﬁcant association between audit committee size and
external attributions (WCN_EXT ). This suggests that audit committee size does
not aﬀect the provision of explanations that give external reasons for performance.
Finally, the results reveal that the relationship between audit committee expertise
and attribution statements is not signiﬁcant in all three models, hence Hypothe-
sis H4a, H4b(i) and H4b(ii) have to be rejected. The results suggest that audit
committee expertise does not inﬂuence how extensive managers explain the ﬁrm's
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performance outcomes. This result is not consistent with previous disclosure studies
showing that audit committee expertise is associated with disclosure (e.g. Felo et al.
(2003); Karamanou and Vafeas 2005; Mangena and Pike 2005; Kelton and Yang
2008).
7.5.3.2 Firm-speciﬁc factors and attribution statements
A summary of the results of the association between ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors and attri-
bution statements in annual reports is provided in Table 7.5.4.
Table 7.5.4: Summary of multiple regression results for the eﬀect of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
factors on attribution statement disclosure
WCN (Ha) WCN_INT (Hb(i)) WCN_EXT (Hb(ii))
Sign
Pred.
Sign
Obs. &
Signif.
Sign
Pred.
Sign
Obs. &
Signif.
Sign
Pred.
Sign
Obs. &
Signif.
Model MVE AF MVE AF MVE AF
Size (H5) + - -/+ - -/+ -*
AF (H6) + - -/+ - -/+ -
Gear (H7) + + + -/+ - - -/+ -* -*
Proﬁt (H8) -/+ -* -** -/+ - - -/+ - -
Perf (H9) + - - -/+ - - + + +
Issue (H10) + -** -** + -* -* -/+ - -
*** Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); ** Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level
(2-tailed); * Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed)
Sign Pred. = Sign of the association predicted; Sign Obs. & Signif. = Sign of the association
observed & Signiﬁcance level
Size = Firm size, measured as market value of equity at ﬁnancial year end in ¿m. AF = Analyst
following, measured as the number of analysts following a ﬁrm. Gear = Gearing ratio, measured as
long-term debt to long-term debt plus equity. Proﬁt = Firm proﬁtability, measured as return on
assets. Perfchange = Dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if the ﬁrm's performance has
deteriorated from the previous ﬁnancial year, measured as the percentage change in return on assets
from the previous year; 0 otherwise. Issue = Indicator variable if the ﬁrm has issued equity within the
subsequent ﬁnancial year; taking the value of 1 if the ﬁrm has issued equity within the year following
the publication of the annual report; 0 otherwise. WCN = Wordcount of attributions per narrative
disclosures, measured as the percentage of words used for attributions to the total number of words
in the narrative disclosures of a ﬁrm excluding the notes to the ﬁnancial statements. WCN_INT =
Wordcount of internal attributions per narrative disclosures, measured as the percentage of words
used for internal attributions to the total number of words in the narrative disclosures excluding the
notes to the ﬁnancial statements. WCN_EXT = Wordcount of external attributions per narrative
disclosures, measured as the percentage of words used for external attributions to the total number
of words in the narrative disclosures excluding the notes to the ﬁnancial statements.
The ﬁndings show that, contrary to Hypothesis H5a and H5b(i), ﬁrm size is
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not signiﬁcantly related to aggregate attribution (WCN) and internal attributions
(WCN_INT ). This implies that ﬁrm size does not inﬂuence the detail by which ﬁrms
attribute performance outcomes. These results are consistent with Aerts (1994) who
also did not ﬁnd an association between ﬁrm size and attributions. The results are in
contrast to previous disclosure literature that found a signiﬁcant positive association
between disclosure and ﬁrm size (e.g. Wallace and Naser 1995; Meek et al. 1995;
Hossain et al. 1995; Cerbioni and Parbonetti 2007; Lim et al. 2007). They are also
inconsistent with other attribution disclosure studies (e.g. Aerts 2005; Baginski et al.
2004; Baginski et al. 2008) that also report a positive association. The diﬀerences
between this study and Baginski et al. (2004) and Baginski et al. (2008) may be the
result of diﬀerences in the way attributions were measured. The two studies used
a 1/0 (disclosed/not disclosed) measure of attribution disclosure, only recording the
presence/absence of an attribution statement in management's earnings forecasts,
whereas this study measures attribution provision as the percentage of words of a
ﬁrm's attribution statements to the total wordcount of the annual report narratives.
However, the relationship between external attributions (WCN_EXT ) and ﬁrm
size is negative and signiﬁcant, thus supporting Hypothesis H5b(ii). The negative
coeﬃcient suggests that large ﬁrms provide less detail in attributing performance
outcomes to external factors. These results are inconsistent with Baginski et al.
(2004) and Baginski et al. (2008), but they are in line with Aerts (2005). Aerts (2005)
found a signiﬁcant negative association between ﬁrm size and external attribution
tendencies, and a signiﬁcant positive association with internal (and self-acclaiming)
attributions. A possible explanation for the negative association found here is that
large ﬁrms have a multitude of other issues to report in their narrative sections,
compared to smaller ﬁrms, such that the wordcount for attributions can be a very
insigniﬁcant proportion of the total word count in the narrative sections. Additionally,
larger ﬁrms tend to be followed by more analysts (see e.g. Lang and Lundholm 1996;
Botosan 1997), and analysts hold private meetings with managers in which the factors
for performance might have been discussed (see Holland 1998). Therefore, large
ﬁrms might not be under pressure to provide detailed explanations to the market.
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Moreover, it can be argued that bigger ﬁrms have larger resources at their disposal
and would be less susceptible than smaller ﬁrms to the eﬀect of external shocks and
factors that can inﬂuence performance. This suggests that bigger ﬁrms would have
less need to explain performance with external reasons as they are less vulnerable to
such inﬂuences. This also suggests that if larger ﬁrms blamed the environment for
their performance, it might be perceived as less credible.
For the number of analysts following a ﬁrm (AF ), no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the
overall volume nor on the type of attribution statements was found, hence Hypothesis
H6a, H6b(i) and H6b(ii) have to be rejected. The negative sign for the aggregate
disclosure measure (WCN) is contrary to expectations. This suggests the possibility
that analyst following has a negative eﬀect on the detail of performance explanations.
Potentially analysts have access to detailed information via diﬀerent routes (for in-
stance, direct meetings with management, conference calls), hence the information
needs of this user group are met in another way already.
In terms of gearing (Gear) the association between gearing and attributions is not
signiﬁcant for aggregate attributions (WCN) and internal attributions (WCN_INT ),
hence Hypotheses H7a and H7b(i) are rejected. These ﬁndings are similar to previous
disclosure research (e.g. Wallace and Naser 1995, Haniﬀa and Cooke 2005, Mangena
and Pike 2005, Lim et al. 2007). However, the association between Gear and external
attributions (WCN_EXT ) is negative and signiﬁcant at the 10% level or better, thus
supporting Hypothesis H7b(ii). It is possible that highly geared ﬁrms, given that
they are perceived as riskier by investors, might be prepared to take responsibility
for performance to demonstrate that they are in control. By attributing performance
outcomes less to external inﬂuences, management can send a message to investors
that performance is not subject to outside factors but that management has control
over the outcomes and shapes the course of the ﬁrm. This may alleviate investor
concerns about the safety of their investment in a ﬁrm with higher gearing. Thus, in
line with signalling theory, management may try and convince investors that the ﬁrm
is not as risky as perceived and that investors' claims against the ﬁrm are safe (see
Salancik and Meindl 1984).
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In line with the ﬁndings by Wallace and Naser (1995) and Chen and Jaggi (2000)
regarding overall disclosure, the association between proﬁtability (Proﬁt) and the
volume of aggregate attributions (WCN) is negative and signiﬁcant at the 5% level
or better, thus H8a is supported. These ﬁndings suggest that more proﬁtable ﬁrms
would provide less extensive attributions. Proprietary costs theory suggests that, al-
though non-disclosure of information can be perceived negative by the capital market
(Verrecchia 2001), ﬁrms may decide to provide less information for fear of providing
valuable information about the ﬁrm to competitors (e.g. Dye 1986; Gibbins et al.
1990). In this case, highly proﬁtable ﬁrms may avoid explaining the reasons for their
performance in more detail as this may provide competitors with valuable information
about their operations. Another possible reason is that proﬁtable ﬁrms may have less
pressure from the market to explain the reasons for their good performance in more
detail because the market might be content with the good results.
The association of proﬁtability and both internal attributions (WCN_INT ) and
external attributions ( WCN_EXT ) is insigniﬁcant, thus Hypothesis H8b(i) and
H8b(ii) are not supported. The negative sign, however, is in line with the results
for aggregate attributions, and suggests that more proﬁtable ﬁrms would provide
less extensive attribution statements regardless of whether they are to internal or to
external factors that inﬂuenced performance. Providing less extensive internal expla-
nations for proﬁtability might be motivated by proprietary cost considerations, while
providing less extensive explanations with external reasons might be an attempt to
take responsibility for the good outcome and give less credit to external inﬂuences.
Focusing on performance change (Perf ), the association between performance
change and aggregate attribution disclosure (WCN) is not signiﬁcant. Thus Hypoth-
esis H9a which suggests that ﬁrms that experience a decline in ﬁnancial performance
face an increased need to explain this bad outcome and therefore will provide more
attributions is not supported. Similarly, Hypothesis H9b(i) and H9b(ii) that ﬁrms
with declining performance would show a diﬀerent attribution behaviour in terms of
internal and external explanations and tend to use external attributions to explain
their performance is not supported.
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Finally, share issue (Issue) is negatively associated with aggregate attributions
(WCN) and internal attributions (WCN_INT ) at the 5% level or better. Hence
Hypothesis H10a and H10b(i) which proposed a positive association are both not
supported. This implies that ﬁrms intending to access the capital market in the fol-
lowing year devote less space for attributing performance outcomes in their narrative
disclosures than non-share issuing ﬁrms. A possible explanation for this result is that,
as ﬁrms increase the overall disclosure and provide more information in their narrative
sections prior to issuing shares (see Gibbins et al. 1990; Lang and Lundholm 1993;
Lang and Lundholm 2000), the proportion of word count for performance explanations
decreases as a result of the increase in total word count of the narrative sections. The
Hypothesis that share issue (Issue) is associated with external attribution disclosure
(WCN_EXT ) is not supported (H10b(ii)).
7.6 Additional analysis
In order to assess the robustness of the results, three additional analyses were carried
out. The tests suggest that the results of the main analysis are robust.
First, the main analysis found that audit committee expertise is not related to
the disclosure of attribution statements. To explore whether the insigniﬁcance stems
from expertise being measured with a proportion measure (proportion of the audit
committee members with accounting and ﬁnancial management expertise to the total
size of the audit committee), the analysis is re-run with expertise measured with a 1/0
indicator variable indicating whether the audit committee has a member with relevant
experience or not. It can be argued that already the basic diﬀerence of whether an
audit committee has a member with relevant expertise or not will signiﬁcantly improve
its oversight capabilities, and inﬂuence the disclosure of attribution statements and
lead to improvements in their provision. The proportion of experts on the audit
committee, that is how many of the committee members have relevant expertise,
constitutes a step further and might carry less signiﬁcance for further improvements
in attribution statement provision compared to the potential improvement introduced
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by having an expert or not. Given that the sample contains a number of small ﬁrms,
this suggestion may be of particular importance for smaller ﬁrms. That is, maybe
just the fact of having an expert on the committee can improve the provision of
attribution statements in smaller ﬁrms, while the proportion of experts may be of
less signiﬁcance for improving attribution statement provision once the committee
contains a member that can potentially initiate improvements.
An examination of the sample shows that 14.8% of ﬁrms have no designated
expert on the committee, whereas 85.2% have a least one member on the audit
committee that has relevant accounting or ﬁnancial management expertise.1 The
results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 7.6.1.
With regard to the aggregate attribution (WCN) measure, it can be seen from
the table that the results are unchanged from the main ﬁndings, and ACExp remains
insigniﬁcant. Of the remaining corporate governance factors, PropNED is positive
and signiﬁcant at the 5% level, and ACSize is signiﬁcant and negative at the 5%
level. Dirown remains insigniﬁcant. Regarding the ﬁrm characteristics, Proﬁt and
Issue are signiﬁcant and negative at the 10% and 5% level, respectively. Size, Gear
and Perf remain insigniﬁcant.
With regard to the internal attribution (WCN_INT ) measure, the results are also
consistent with the main results, only PropNED is less signiﬁcant in the AF model.
PropNED is positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level in the Size model, but only at
the 10% level in the AF model, down from the 5% level in the main analysis. ACSize
remains signiﬁcant and negative at the 5% level. Dirown remains signiﬁcant at the
10% level in the Size model and insigniﬁcant in the AF model. ACExp remains
insigniﬁcant. Regarding the ﬁrm characteristics, Issue is signiﬁcant and negative at
the 10% level. Size, Gear, Proﬁt and Perf remain insigniﬁcant.
With regard to the external attribution (WCN_EXT ) measure, the results are
consistent with the main results. Consistent with the main analysis, none of the cor-
1See previous chapter 6, section 2.
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porate governance factors shows a signiﬁcant association with the attribution mea-
sure. Regarding the ﬁrm characteristics, Size remains negative and signiﬁcant at the
10% level in the Size model. Gear remains negative and signiﬁcant at the 10% level
in the Size model, and increases signiﬁcance to the 5% level in the AF model. The
remaining ﬁrm characteristics remain insigniﬁcant. To sum up, the fact that ACExp
remains insigniﬁcant across the disclosure measures supports the results in the main
analysis and suggests that they are not sensitive to the measure of audit committee
expertise.
The second analysis replaces the ﬁrm size measure used in this thesis, market
value of equity, with total assets2 as in other studies (e.g. Cooke 1989; Wallace and
Naser 1995; Haniﬀa and Cooke 2005; Cerbioni and Parbonetti 2007). The results are
presented in Table 7.6.2.
2Tests for a normal distribution of Total assets (TA) showed a strong deviation from normality.
Based on the values for skewness and kurtosis, a Natural Log transformation was applied that
resulted in a more normal distribution (see Appendix A.4.2).
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Table 7.6.2: Multiple regression results for the eﬀect of corporate governance and
ﬁrm characteristics (using Total assets) on attribution statement disclosure
WCN WCN_INT WCN_EXT
Variable VIF VIF VIF
Constant 1.257 0.946 2.233**
PropNED 2.261** 1.211 2.493** 1.211 -0.320 1.217
Dirown 1.473 1.532 1.754* 1.543 0.234 1.540
ACSize -1.999** 1.550 -2.483** 1.533 0.241 1.620
ACExp 0.470 1.096 0.231 1.104 -0.129 1.124
Size (TA) -0.962 2.255 -0.222 2.237 -1.662* 2.305
AF
Gear 0.189 1.404 -0.423 1.392 -1.767* 1.395
Proﬁt -2.521** 1.175 -1.765* 1.162 -2.074** 1.223
Perf -0.198 1.176 -0.633 1.179 0.933 1.262
Issue -2.105** 1.038 -1.956* 1.038 -0.447 1.029
Adj.R2 12.8 10.8 9.8
F-value 3.299 2.877 2.358
SE 0.900 0.901 0.919
Sign. 0.001 0.004 0.018
N 142 140 113
*** Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); ** Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
* Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed); VIF = Variance inﬂation factor
Constant = Regression constant. Adj. R2 = Explanatory power of the regression model for variance
in WCN. F-value = Indicator for statistical signiﬁcance of the regression model. SE = Standard
Error. Sign. = Signiﬁcance level for the predictive ability of the regression model. PropNED =
Proportion of non-executive directors on the board of directors, measured as the proportion of
non-executive directors on the board of directors to the total number of directors on the board.
Dirown = Executive director ownership, measured as the percentage of shares held by executive
directors. ACSize = Audit committee size, measured as the number of directors on the audit
committee. ACExp = Audit committee expertise, measured as the proportion of audit committee
members with accounting and ﬁnancial management expertise to the total size of the audit
committee. Size = Firm size, measured as a ﬁrm's total assets at ﬁnancial year end in ¿m. AF =
Number of analysts following a ﬁrm, measured as the number of analysts following a ﬁrm. Gear =
Gearing ratio, measured as long-term debt to long-term debt plus equity. Proﬁt = Firm proﬁtability,
measured as return on assets. Perfchange = Dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if the ﬁrm's
performance has deteriorated from the previous ﬁnancial year, measured as the percentage change in
return on assets from the previous year; 0 otherwise. AF = Number of analysts following a ﬁrm.
Issue = Indicator variable if the ﬁrm has issued equity within the subsequent ﬁnancial year; taking
the value of 1 if the ﬁrm has issued equity within the year following the publication of the annual
report; 0 otherwise. WCN = Wordcount of attributions per narrative disclosures, measured as the
percentage of words used for attributions to the total number of words in the narrative disclosures of
a ﬁrm excluding the notes to the ﬁnancial statements. WCN_INT = Wordcount of internal
attributions per narrative disclosures, measured as the percentage of words used for internal
attributions to the total number of words in the narrative disclosures excluding the notes to the
ﬁnancial statements. WCN_EXT = Wordcount of external attributions per narrative disclosures,
measured as the percentage of words used for external attributions to the total number of words in
the narrative disclosures excluding the notes to the ﬁnancial statements.
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For the aggregate attribution (WCN) model, the results are consistent with those
in the main analysis using market value of equity, as the same four variables are
signiﬁcant and the sign is consistent. For corporate governance factors, PropNED
is positive and signiﬁcantly related with attribution disclosure at the 5% level, and
ACSize has a negative and signiﬁcant association at the 5% level. Regarding ﬁrm-
speciﬁc characteristics, Proﬁt is negative and signiﬁcantly associated with attribution
disclosure at the 5% level (using MVE to measure ﬁrm size, the association is at the
10% level), and Issue is also negative and signiﬁcantly associated with attributions
at the 5% level. Dirown, ACExp, Size, Gear and Perf are insigniﬁcant.
For the internal attributions (WCN_INT ) model, the results are also broadly con-
sistent with the main analysis, in that the same four variables are signiﬁcant, with the
same sign and at the same signiﬁcance levels. In addition to that, Proﬁt becomes
also signiﬁcant at the 10% level compared to the main analysis. In terms of corpo-
rate governance factors, PropNED shows a positive and signiﬁcant association with
internal attributions at the 10% level, and Dirown is positive and signiﬁcantly related
to internal attributions at the 10% level. The relationship between ACSize and in-
ternal attributions is negative and signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Regarding ﬁrm-speciﬁc
factors, the negative but insigniﬁcant association between internal attributions and
Proﬁt observed in the main analysis becomes now signiﬁcant at the 10% level, while
Issue is negative and signiﬁcant at the 5% level. ACExp, Size, Gear and Perf are
insigniﬁcant.
The results for the external attribution (WCN_EXT ) model are also consistent
with the main analysis, except that Proﬁt becomes signiﬁcant. In terms of corporate
governance factors, none of the factors is associated with external attribution disclo-
sure, thus PropNED, Dirown, ACSize and ACExp are insigniﬁcant. Regarding ﬁrm
characteristics, Size and Gear remain negative and signiﬁcantly related to external
attributions at the 10% level. Proﬁt is negative and becomes signiﬁcantly related to
external attributions at the 5% level, while the variable was found insigniﬁcant in the
main analysis. As this thesis measures proﬁtability as return on assets, it might be
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suggested that the signiﬁcance of proﬁtability is inﬂuenced by the inclusion of total
asset size as measure of ﬁrm size. Perf and Issue are insigniﬁcant. Taken together,
these results suggest that the ﬁndings are largely unaﬀected by using a diﬀerent
measure for ﬁrm size.
Third, previous attribution studies found industry diﬀerences in attribution be-
haviour (e.g. Bettman and Weitz 1983; Aerts 2005; Aerts and Tarca 2010). The
main analysis in this thesis did not contain a control for industry diﬀerences in order
to avoid too many independent variables in the main model and to maintain a ratio of
independent variables to observations that allows strong conclusions to be drawn (see
chapter 5). Hence, this additional analysis now examines potential industry eﬀects
on the results. Firms were classiﬁed into four industries based on the classiﬁcation
by Meek et al. (1995), and 1 (0) dummy variables were used to indicate a ﬁrm's
membership in an industry. These industries are (1) engineering, (2) metals, building
materials and construction, (3) consumer goods and services, and (4) oil, chemicals
and mining. Further studies that used the Meek et al. (1995) classiﬁcation include,
for example, Mangena and Pike (2005) and Mangena and Tauringana (2007). The
results of the regression are reported in Table 7.6.3.
As can be seen from the Table, the results for the corporate governance variables
and the ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors are consistent with the main results, except one signiﬁ-
cant industry dummy in the external attribution (WCN_EXT ) model. With regard
to the aggregate attribution (WCN) model, the only diﬀerence is that proﬁtability
shows an increased signiﬁcance level (5%) as compared to the main model (10%)
when ﬁrm size is used. The attribution measure (WCN) is not associated with any of
the industry dummies, suggesting that overall attribution disclosure is not associated
with industry membership.
With regard to the internal attribution measure (WCN_INT ), the results remain
unchanged from the main analysis in terms of sign of the correlation and signiﬁcance
level. The only diﬀerence is Issue, which is now signiﬁcant negative at the 5% level
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(10% in the main model). None of the industry dummies is signiﬁcant, suggesting
that the disclosure of internal attribution statements is not associated with industry
membership. The results for the external attribution measure (WCN_EXT ), how-
ever, diﬀer from the main results in two respects. First, when ﬁrm size is used, ﬁrm
size loses signiﬁcance and gearing remains the only signiﬁcant variable (10% level).
Second, when analyst following is used, although gearing remains negative and sig-
niﬁcant (with an increased signiﬁcance level of 5% compared to the 10% in the main
analysis), the results also show a positive and signiﬁcant association between engi-
neering ﬁrms (Industry 2) and the external attribution measure at the 10% level in the
AF model. This suggests that engineering ﬁrms provide more extensive attributions
to external reasons for performance.
The results for WCN_EXT suggest that industry membership inﬂuences the dis-
closure of external attribution statements, and also suggest that, if industry mem-
bership is included, there is no signiﬁcant relationship between external attribution
disclosure and ﬁrm size. These ﬁndings, however, have to be considered in light of
the reduced sample size of 113 observations that is used for the external attribution
model (as only those ﬁrms that provide external attributions are included) having to
deal with the increase in the independent variables to 12 by including the industry
dummies, as compared to 9 variables in the main analysis. The resulting ratio of
observations to independent variables therefore drops to 9.42, which is below the
minimum of 10 recommended for regression analysis in the literature (see e.g. Green
1991; Bartlett et al. 2001; VanVoorhis and Morgan 2001; Sekaran 2003). As the lit-
erature (e.g. Bartlett et al. 2001; Tabachnick and Fidell 2007) stresses, a ratio that
is too low can limit the reliability and accuracy of the results, thus the generalisability
of the ﬁndings. Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) highlight that a sample with a ratio
that is too low would make it easier to detect signiﬁcant relationships than when
an adequate ratio was used. This suggests that the results for external attribution
statements in the model including the industry dummies may be inﬂuenced by the
low ratio of observations to independent variables, thus not necessarily be reliable and
robust. The results for the aggregate attribution (WCN) measure and the internal
7.7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 212
attribution (WCN_INT ) measure, by contrast, are not subject to the same limitation
in terms of the observation to variables ratio as they are based on the total sample
size of 142 (140 observations for internal attributions), and these results are consis-
tent with the main analysis. Hence it can be concluded from this analysis that no
reliable inﬂuence of industry membership on attribution disclosure can be detected.
7.7 Summary and conclusion
This chapter has presented the results of tests of the hypotheses on the relationship
between attribution provision and corporate governance and ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteris-
tics. The multiple regression analysis has provided evidence for a signiﬁcant inﬂuence
of a number of these factors on the disclosure of performance explanations.
Regarding the corporate governance variables, the analysis has revealed that at-
tribution disclosure is signiﬁcantly associated with PropNED, Dirown and ACSize.
Hence Hypotheses H1a and H1b(i), H2b(i), and H3a and H3b(i) are supported. For
the remaining corporate governance factor, ACExp, no evidence was found that it
inﬂuences attribution disclosure, thus Hypothesis H4a and H4b were not supported
by the data.
A higher proportion of non-executive directors on the board is associated with a
higher volume of attribution statements, and with a higher volume of internal attri-
butions in the narrative sections of the annual report. This supports the argument
that non-executive directors contribute to better monitoring and to stressing man-
agement's accountability for the ﬁrm's actions, which then can translate into better
disclosure. The ﬁndings also support arguments that inside and outside directors
attribute performance diﬀerently. The level of director ownership is not associated
with the volume of aggregate attributions provided, but shows a signiﬁcant positive
association with the volume of internal attribution statements. This result lends some
support to the suggestion that the higher management's stake in the ﬁrm, the easier
it might be for them to attribute performance to their own actions, which might be
an attempt to create an impression of conﬁdence in management's abilities among
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existing and potential investors and the wider public. Firms with larger audit com-
mittees provide less extensive attribution statements and elaborate less on internal
explanations in their narrative sections. This suggests that smaller audit committees
might be more eﬀective monitors.
For the ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics, the analysis has revealed that attribution
disclosure is signiﬁcantly associated with Firm size, Gear, Proﬁt, and Issue. Hence
Hypotheses H5b(ii), H7b(ii), H8a, are supported. Although Issue is negative and sig-
niﬁcant, the hypotheses suggested a positive association, thus H10a and H10b(i) are
not supported. For the remaining ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics, performance change
from the previous year and analyst following, no evidence was found that they inﬂu-
ence attribution disclosure, thus Hypotheses H6 and H9 were not supported.
Larger ﬁrms' attribution statements to external reasons are less extensive. It is
possible that, as larger ﬁrms tend to be followed by more analysts, details might
be given to them in private meetings, thus reducing the need for public disclosure.
Moreover, larger ﬁrms might be less vulnerable to external inﬂuences on performance,
thus blame the environment less. Higher geared ﬁrms elaborate less in their narrative
sections on external attributions for performance. This might be seen as an attempt
at trying to downplay the perceived riskiness of high gearing, by demonstrating to
the market that management itself is in control of the ﬁrm's course, not external
events out of their control. Firms which are more proﬁtable give less space in their
narrative sections for attribution statements. This suggests that proﬁtable ﬁrms may
disclose less detailed explanations for their performance as they do not want to provide
information that might help competitors. Firms that issue equity in the following
year provide less detailed attributions in their narrative sections. It is possible that if
these ﬁrms increase their overall disclosure prior to issuing equity, the proportion of
wordcount for performance explanations decreases as a result of the increase in total
wordcount of the narrative sections.
Three additional analyses were carried out that tested the association between
attribution disclosure and diﬀerent measures of audit committee expertise and ﬁrm
size, as well as the association between attribution statement disclosure and industry
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membership of the sample ﬁrms. The results and the conclusions remain on the
whole unchanged.
Having investigated the determinants of attribution statement provision in this
chapter, the next chapter reports on the results of the regression analysis of the
eﬀect of attribution statements on the cost of equity capital.
CHAPTER 8
COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL AND
ATTRIBUTIONS
8.1 Introduction
One of the key objectives of this thesis was formulated as to examine whether attribu-
tion statements provided in annual reports aﬀect the cost of equity capital. As noted
in chapter 4, there is a broad consensus in the theoretical literature that information
asymmetry between the ﬁrm and the capital market can be overcome by disclosing
information, and that this action may have beneﬁcial eﬀects for the ﬁrm's cost of
equity capital. Although several empirical studies have examined the cost of capital
eﬀects of diﬀerent disclosure types, there is very scarce literature investigating the
cost of capital eﬀects of attribution statements. Chapter 4 presented the theoretical
framework to explain how information disclosure in general, and causal attributions to
corporate ﬁnancial performance outcomes in particular, can inﬂuence the ﬁrm's cost
of equity capital. Also in chapter 4, hypotheses on the relationship between causal
attribution disclosure and the cost of equity capital were discussed. The purpose of
the current chapter is to test the hypotheses on the eﬀect of causal attributions on
the cost of equity capital.
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 8.2 restates the regression model
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as speciﬁed in chapter 5. Section 8.3 describes the tests for normality of the data
and any data transformations that were carried out prior to further analysis. Section
8.4 presents the results of the multiple regression analysis, and Section 8.5 reports
on additional tests that were carried out. The chapter concludes with a summary in
Section 8.6.
8.2 Regression model
Chapter 4 speciﬁed the hypotheses to be tested in this chapter as follows:
H1a: There is a negative association between causal attribution disclosure and a
ﬁrm's cost of equity capital.
H1b(i): There is a negative association between external attribution statements
and a ﬁrm's cost of equity capital.
H1b(ii): There is a negative association between internal attribution statements
and a ﬁrm's cost of equity capital.
H2: The association between attribution statement disclosure and the cost of
equity capital is stronger for ﬁrms with lower analyst following.
To test these hypotheses, the basic regression model below was employed.
CostofCapital = β0 + β1Attributions+ β2Beta+ β3Size+ β4Gear
+β5B/M + β6AF + β7Attributions ∗ AF + 
(8.2.1)
8.2. REGRESSION MODEL 217
Attributions = Attribution disclosure, measured as the percentage of words
used for attributions to the total number of words in the
narrative sections of the annual report
Beta = Firm beta, measuring a ﬁrm's systematic risk; measures the
sensitivity of a stock's return to variation in the return of the
overall market
Size = Firm size, measured as market value of equity at ﬁnancial
year end
Gear = Gearing ratio, measured as long-term debt divided by
long-term debt plus shareholders' equity at ﬁscal year end
B/M = Firm book-to-market ratio, measured as book value of equity
divided by market value of equity
AF = Analyst following, the number of analysts following a ﬁrm
Attributions*AF = Interaction variable of attribution disclosure and analyst
following, operationalised as a multiplication of the
attribution disclosure variable and analyst following
β = Regression coeﬃcient
 = Error term
Similar to chapter 7, the attribution disclosure measure used in this analysis is
the wordcount of attributions as a percentage of the total wordcount of the ﬁrm's
narrative disclosures (WCN) as described in chapter 6. A number of regressions were
run. First, a reduced form which excluded the interaction term (Attributions*AF )
was run. Second, the complete model including the interaction term was employed.
Subsequently, the attribution variable (WCN) is split into internal (WCN_INT ) and
external (WCN_EXT ) attributions. As for the WCN model, ﬁrst, a reduced form
which excluded the interaction term (Attributions*AF ) was run. Second, the com-
plete model including the interaction term was run. Table 8.2.1 presents a summary
of the hypotheses to be tested and the expected sign of the control variables:
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Table 8.2.1: Research hypotheses and expected signs control variables
Variable Predicted Sign
Beta +
Size -
Gear +
B/M +
AF -
WCN -
WCN_INT -
WCN_EXT -
WCN*AF +/-
WCN_INT*AF no predction
WCN_EXT*AF no prediction
Beta = Firm beta, measuring a ﬁrm's systematic risk; measures the sensitivity of a stock's
return to variation in the return of the overall market. Size = Firm size, measured as market
value of equity at ﬁnancial year end in ¿m. Gear = Gearing ratio, measured as long-term
debt divided by long-term debt plus shareholders' equity at ﬁnancial year end. B/M =
Book-to-market ratio, measured as the ratio of book value of equity to the market value of
equity. AF = Analyst following, measured as the number analysts following a ﬁrm. WCN =
Wordcount of attributions per narrative disclosures, measured as the percentage of words
used for attributions to the total number of words in the narrative sections of the annual
report. WCN_INT = Wordcount of internal attributions per narrative disclosures, measured
as the percentage of words used for internal attributions to the total number of words in the
narrative sections of the annual report. WCN_EXT = Wordcount of external attributions
per narrative disclosures, measured as the percentage of words used for external attributions
to the total number of words in the narrative sections of the annual report. WCN*AF =
Interaction term expressing an interaction between WCN and AF . WCN_INT*AF =
Interaction term expressing an interaction between WCN_INT and AF . WCN_EXT*AF =
Interaction term expressing an interaction between WCN_EXT and AF .
8.3 Normality tests and data transformations
Prior to running the regressions, the data was tested for normality as discussed in
chapter 5, section 7.3. As some of the variables were assessed already in chapter 7, the
normality assessment in the chapter here focuses on the newly introduced independent
variables: beta and book-to-market. If any of these variables signiﬁcantly violate the
normality assumptions, appropriate transformations are made. In order to test for
deviations from normality, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test was carried out. The
test results are provided below in Table 8.3.1.
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Table 8.3.1: Normality tests and variable transformations
Mean Median StdDV Skew. Kurt. K-S
Lillie
fors
K-S
Sign.
Panel A: Untransformed variables
Cost of capital
CoC 0.098 0.093 0.040 1.500 4.477 0.154 0.000
Disclosure measures
WCN 0.051 0.045 0.034 1.640 5.264 0.140 0.000
WCN_INT 0.036 0.029 0.026 1.440 2.126 0.139 0.000
WCN_EXT 0.015 0.008 0.019 2.985 14.149 0.219 0.000
Firm
characteristics
Beta 0.972 0.970 0.252 0.474 0.469 0.052 0.200*
Size 1955.944 402.400 4165.979 3.685 15.217 0.320 0.000
AF 7.590 5.000 6.212 0.905 -0.096 0.183 0.000
Gear 0.404 0.415 0.255 0.561 0.918 0.066 0.200*
B/M 0.448 0.370 0.323 1.887 4.955 0.145 0.000
Panel B: Transformed variables
Cost of capital
CoC WS95a 0.097 0.093 0.032 0.875 0.397 0.131 0.000
CoC = Cost of equity capital. Beta = Firm beta, measuring a ﬁrm's systematic risk; measures the
sensitivity of a stock's return to variation in the return of the overall market. Size = Firm size,
measured as market value of equity at ﬁnancial year end in ¿m. AF = Analyst following, measured as
the number of analysts following a ﬁrm. Gear = Gearing, measured as long-term debt to long-term debt
plus equity at ﬁnancial year end. B/M = Firm book-to-market ratio, measured as book value of equity
divided market value of equity. WCN = Wordcount of attributions per narrative disclosures, measured
as the percentage of words used for attributions to the total number of words in the narrative sections
of the annual report. WCN_INT = Wordcount of internal attributions per narrative disclosures,
measured as the percentage of words used for internal attributions to the total number of words in the
narrative sections of the annual report. WCN_EXT = Wordcount of external attributions per narrative
disclosures, measured as the percentage of words used for external attributions to the total number of
words in the narrative sections of the annual report.
*This is a lower bound of the true signiﬁcance
aWS95 = Winsorised at the 95% level.
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It can be seen from Table 8.3.1 Panel A that Beta and Gear are normally dis-
tributed and the remaining variables show deviations from a normal distribution. As
the ﬁrm size measure (MVE ) and AF have already been discussed in chapter 7, the
focus now is on discussing CoC and B/M.1
The observation of a non-normal distribution of CoC and B/M is supported by
visual inspection of histograms which show that both variables exhibit positive skew-
ness, and the inspection of QQ-plots shows deviations of the observations from the
expected straight line. Moreover, the visual inspection procedure detected the pres-
ence of outlying values. Histograms and QQ-plots for Beta, B/M, and CoC are
provided in Appendix A.3.9. Based on these ﬁndings, the following actions were
taken: First, it was decided to transform CoC to achieve a more normal distribution
and to reduce outlier problems (see Tabachnick and Fidell 2007). While the com-
mon approach in the literature is to leave CoC untransformed (see e.g. Hail 2002;
Gietzmann and Ireland 2005; Francis, Khurana and Pereira 2005; Berger et al. 2006;
Francis et al. 2008), the descriptive statistics presented previously in Chapter 6 Table
6.3.1 showed that CoC has a number of extremely low estimates at the bottom of the
distribution (a minimum value of 1.1%) as well as a maximum of 28.6%. To correct
for normality failures and to deal with outliers, some studies recur to winsorising the
data (e.g. Lee et al. 2006; Espinosa and Trombetta 2007; Muino and Trombetta
2009). Therefore, CoC was winsorised at the 5th and 95th percentile.2
Panel B of Table 8.3.1 presents the CoC after winsorising. Consistent with pre-
vious other studies (see Daske 2006; Hail and Leuz 2006; Kothari et al. 2009; Muino
and Trombetta 2009; Dhaliwal et al. 2011), B/M was left untransformed. Following
Botosan (1997) and Richardson and Welker (2001), to measure analyst following a
dummy variable was created that takes the value of 1 if a ﬁrm's analyst following is
lower than or equal to the median number of analyst following of the sample ﬁrms,
and 0 if analyst following is higher than the median. The remaining variables of the
1Refer to chapter 7, section 3 and section 6, and Appendix A.3.1 for a discussion of MVE and
AF.
2Other studies (e.g.Lee et al. 2006 and Muino and Trombetta 2009) winsorise at the 1st and
99th percentile. However, that level does not oﬀer much improvement in this study (results not
reported).
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regression model were adopted in the transformations from the previous chapter 7
(Log for MVE and AF untransformed).
8.4 Multiple regression analysis
Multiple regression analysis is based on a number of assumptions to ensure valid
results. These assumptions have been discussed in chapter 5, section 7.3, and include
normality, linearity, homoscedasticity, and independence of error terms. Additionally,
multicollinearity of the data and the existence of inﬂuential data points has to be
ruled out. To test whether these assumptions were met, a number of methods were
used (Pearson correlation, Variance Inﬂation Factor (VIF), Cook's distance, Durbin-
Watson). Multicollinearity between the independent variables was assessed by means
of the correlation matrix presented in Table 8.4.1.
As can be seen from the table, the results show that the aggregate attribution
disclosure (WCN) shows as expected high multicollinearity with WCN_INT, and
WCN_EXT. With regard to the correlations between the independent variables, ex-
cept for the correlations between ﬁrm size (Size) and analyst following (AF ), all of
the correlations are below the cut-oﬀ limit of 0.8 to 0.9 suggested in the literature
above which multicollinearity is considered a problem (see Gujarati 2003; Field 2009).
The high correlation between analyst following and ﬁrm size (0.873) however requires
that analyst following and ﬁrm size are not used in the same regression model in order
to avoid multicollinearity problems. An examination of the Variance Inﬂation Factor
(VIF) included in the regression statistics reported in the next section shows that
none of the values comes close to or exceeds the value of 10 suggested as a limit for
VIF (Stevens 2002; Gujarati 2003). Hence multicollinearity is not considered a major
problem. In order to assess whether any observations have undue inﬂuence on the
regression results, Cook's distance was used. There are no inﬂuential data points that
might inﬂuence the results as all values are below the limit of 1 (Cook and Weisberg
1982). Additionally, to ascertain that the regression residuals are independent from
each other and there is no correlation, the Durbin-Watson test (DW) was employed.
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The DW statistics of around the value of 2 demonstrate independence of the error
terms (test statistics for both tests are provided in Appendix A.4.3).
8.4.1 Multiple regression results
This section presents the results from the multiple regression analysis. Two main
separate regression analyses are undertaken. The ﬁrst analysis, of which the results
are reported in Table 8.4.2, regresses the aggregate attribution measure (WCN)
against the cost of capital estimates. In the second analysis, the aggregate attribution
measure is replaced by the internal and external attribution measure (WCN_INT
and WCN_EXT ), introduced as separate variables (see Table 8.4.3). A number
of regression models were run to explore the hypotheses. In Table 8.4.2, Model 1
explores Hypothesis 1 and includes the aggregate attribution measure (WCN) and
the ﬁve control variables that previous literature has shown to be associated with the
cost of capital (e.g. Fama and French 1992; Botosan 1997; Richardson and Welker
2001; Hail 2002; Espinosa and Trombetta 2007). The model is run separately with
either ﬁrm size (MVE ) or analyst following (AF ) due to the high correlation of these
variables. In Model 2, the interaction term of attributions with low analyst following
(WCN*AF ) is included following Botosan (1997) and Richardson and Welker (2001),
to test Hypothesis 2.
The results in Table 8.4.2 show that the Adjusted R2 ranges from 12.1 (Model
1 using AF ) to 13.9 (Model 2) with F-values between 4.874 (Model 2) and 5.533
(Model 1 using Size) which are signiﬁcant at the 1% level or better. The signiﬁcance
at p<0.01 suggests that the models have signiﬁcant power to explain cross-sectional
variation in the sample ﬁrm's cost of equity capital. In terms of the control variables
all except one show the expected sign and signiﬁcance. The results show that Beta is
positively related to the cost of capital at the 10% level or better. MVE is negatively
related to the cost of capital at the 1% level or better, and AF (low analyst following)
is positively related to the cost of capital at the 1% level or better. B/M is positively
related to the cost of capital at the 10% level or better. Although Gear has the
expected positive sign, it is insigniﬁcant.
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Table 8.4.2: Multiple regression results for the eﬀect of attribution disclosure (WCN)
on the cost of equity capital
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Size AF VIF AF VIF
Constant 6.105*** 4.501*** 4.428***
Beta 1.679* 1.876* 1.023 1.927* 1.018
Size -3.128*** - 1.390 - -
AF - 2.691*** 1.346 2.749*** 1.225
Gear 0.733 0.659 1.135 0.519 1.150
B/M 1.792* 2.563** 1.240 2.656*** 1.121
WCN 0.982 1.142 1.122 -0.798 2.707
WCN*AF - - - 1.977* 2.594
Adj. R2 13.6 12.1 13.9
F-value 5.533 4.963 4.874
SE 0.030 0.030 0.030
Sign. 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 142 142 142
***Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); **Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level
(2-tailed); *Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed)
VIF = Variance inﬂation factor; Constant = Regression constant
Adj. R2 = Explanatory power of the regression model for variance in WCN. F-value = Indicator for
statistical signiﬁcance of the regression model. SE = Standard Error. Sign. = Signiﬁcance level for
the predictive ability of the regression model. Beta = Firm beta, measuring a ﬁrm's systematic risk;
measures the sensitivity of a stock's return to variation in the return of the overall market. Size =
Firm size, measured as market value of equity at ﬁnancial year end in ¿m. Gear = Gearing ratio,
measured as long-term debt to long-term debt plus equity at ﬁnancial year end. B/M =
Book-to-market ratio, measured as the ratio of book value of equity to the market value of equity.
AF = Analyst following, measured as the number of analysts following a ﬁrm. WCN = Wordcount
of attributions per narrative disclosures, measured as the percentage of words used for attributions to
the total number of words in the narrative sections of the annual report. WCN*AF = Interaction
term expressing an interaction between WCN and AF .
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Regarding the disclosure measures, the results in Model 1 and 2 show thatWCN is
not signiﬁcant. Hence Hypothesis H1a of a negative association between attribution
statements and the cost of capital is not supported. The coeﬃcient for WCN is
positive, suggesting that ﬁrms that provide more detailed performance explanations
have a higher cost of capital. However, the introduction of the interaction with
analyst following in Model 2 shows that the interaction term itself is signiﬁcant at
the 10% level or better. Therefore hypothesis H2 is mildly supported. The result is
consistent with Botosan (1997) and Richardson and Welker (2001).
In addition to the regression of the aggregate attribution measure and the cost
of capital, the analysis is also undertaken by replacing aggregate attribution disclo-
sure with the internal and external attribution disclosure measure (WCN_INT and
WCN_EXT ). The results are reported in Table 8.4.3.
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Table 8.4.3: Multiple regression results for the eﬀect of attribution disclosure
(WCN_INT and WCN_EXT ) on the cost of equity capital
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Size AF VIF AF VIF
Constant 5.699*** 3.981*** 4.059***
Beta 1.254 1.454 1.017 1.375 1.045
Size -2.993*** - 1.432 - -
AF - 2.469** 1.377 2.331** 1.275
Gear 0.385 0.328 1.181 0.026 1.224
B/M 1.701* 2.316** 1.314 2.321** 1.219
WCN_INT 0.240 0.335 1.084 -1.154 2.316
WCN_EXT -0.570 -0.346 1.187 0.009 2.112
WCN_INT*AF - - - 1.940* 2.181
WCN_EXT*AF - - - -0.086 1.974
Adj. R2 11.6 9.4 10.8
F-value 3.469 2.943 2.719
SE 0.031 0.031 0.031
Sign. 0.004 0.012 0.009
N 111 111 111
***Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); **Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level
(2-tailed); *Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed)
VIF = Variance inﬂation factor; Constant = Regression constant
Adj. R2 = Explanatory power of the regression model for variance in WCN. F-value = Indicator for
statistical signiﬁcance of the regression model. SE = Standard Error. Sign. = Signiﬁcance level for
the predictive ability of the regression model. Beta = Firm beta, measuring a ﬁrm's systematic risk;
measures the sensitivity of a stock's return to variation in the return of the overall market. Size =
Firm size, measured as market value of equity at ﬁnancial year end in ¿m. Gear = Gearing ratio,
measured as long-term debt to long-term debt plus equity at ﬁnancial year end. B/M =
Book-to-market ratio, measured as the ratio of book value of equity to the market value of equity.
AF = Analyst following, measured as the number of analysts following a ﬁrm. WCN_INT =
Wordcount of internal attributions per narrative disclosures, measured as the percentage of words
used for internal attributions to the total number of words in the narrative sections of the annual
report. WCN_EXT = Wordcount of external attributions per narrative disclosures, measured as the
percentage of words used for external attributions to the total number of words in the narrative
sections of the annual report. WCN_INT*AF = Interaction term expressing an interaction between
WCN_INT and AF . WCN_EXT*AF = Interaction term expressing an interaction between
WCN_EXT and AF .
The analyses are based on a reduced sample of 111 observations because only
ﬁrms were included that provided both internal and external attributions. In other
words, some ﬁrms only attributed performance outcomes to internal factors whilst
other ﬁrms only used external factors. The reduced sample of 111 ﬁrms are those
that provided both internal and external attributions. As can be seen from the table,
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the Adjusted R2 ranges from 9.4 (Model 1 using AF ) to 11.6 (Model 1 using Size)
with F-values between 2.719 (Model 2) and 3.469 (Model 1 using Size). The models
are signiﬁcant at the 1% level (5% level for Model 1 using AF ), which suggests that
the models have signiﬁcant power to explain cross-sectional variation in the sample
ﬁrm's cost of equity capital.
In terms of signiﬁcant variables, the control variables are less signiﬁcant compared
to the levels found in theWCN models. Beta is insigniﬁcant in all models. Consistent
with the WCN models, however, MVE is negative at the 1% level or better, and AF
is positive at the 5% level or better. B/M is also positive at the 10% level or better.
With regard to the disclosure measure, similar to theWCN models, the results indicate
that WCN_INT and WCN_EXT are not signiﬁcant. Hence Hypotheses H1b(i) and
H1b(ii) are not supported. The interaction term of internal attributions with analyst
following (WCN_INT*AF ) is signiﬁcant at the 10% level but it is not signiﬁcant for
WCN_EXT. Hence hypothesis 2 is supported. A summary of the regression results
against the hypotheses and the expected signs for the control variables is provided in
Table 8.4.4.
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Table 8.4.4: Summary of multiple regression results against hypotheses
CoC
Sign Pred. Sign Obs & Signif. Sign Obs & Signif.
WCN WCN_INT/WCN/EXT
Model Size AF Size AF
Beta + +* +* + +
Size - -*** -***
Gear + + + + +
B/M + +* +*** +* +**
AFa - +*** +**
WCN - + -/+
WCN_INT - + +/-
WCN_EXT - - -/+
WCN*AF +/- +*
WCN_INT*AF no prediction +*
WCN_EXT*AF no prediction -
*** Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
* Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed)
Sign Pred. = Sign of the association predicted
Sign Obs. & Signif. = Sign of the association observed & Signiﬁcance level
a
A negative association between analyst following and the cost of capital is expected. In the empirical
analysis, analyst following is entered in the regression models as a dummy variable taking the value of 1 (0) if
analyst following is lower than or equal to the median number of analysts following the sample ﬁrms. The
positive association found empirically shows a positive association between low analyst following and the cost
of capital, which is consistent with the theoretical prediction.
Beta = Firm beta, measuring a ﬁrm's systematic risk; measures the sensitivity of a stock's return to variation
in the return of the overall market. Size = Firm size, measured as market value of equity at ﬁnancial year
end in ¿m. Gear = Gearing ratio, measured as long-term debt to long-term debt plus equity at ﬁnancial year
end. B/M = Book-to-market ratio, measured as the ratio of book value of equity to the market value of
equity. AF = Analyst following, measured as the number of analysts following a ﬁrm. WCN = Wordcount of
attributions per narrative disclosures, measured as the percentage of words used for attributions to the total
number of words in the narrative sections of the annual report. WCN_INT = Wordcount of internal
attributions per narrative disclosures, measured as the percentage of words used for internal attributions to
the total number of words in the narrative sections of the annual report. WCN_EXT = Wordcount of
external attributions per narrative disclosures, measured as the percentage of words used for external
attributions to the total number of words in the narrative sections of the annual report. WCN*AF =
Interaction term expressing an interaction between WCN and AF . WCN_INT*AF = Interaction term
expressing an interaction between WCN_INT and AF . WCN_EXT*AF = Interaction term expressing an
interaction between WCN_EXT and AF .
8.4.2 Discussion of the regression results
This section presents a detailed discussion of the results from the multiple regression
analysis. The aggregate wordcount measure (WCN) is discussed ﬁrst.
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With regard to the control variables, beta consistently shows the hypothesised
positive sign and is always signiﬁcant at p<0.10. This is consistent with theoretical
predictions and empirical evidence (e.g. Fabozzi and Modigliani 2003; Botosan 1997;
Hail 2002; Botosan and Plumlee 2002; Poshakwale and Courtis 2005). The ﬁnding
suggests that ﬁrms with higher beta, that is a higher sensitivity of their returns to
variation in the return of the overall market (Fama and French 2004), have a higher
cost of equity capital as investors want to be compensated for that higher risk with
a higher return (Fabozzi and Modigliani 2003). As hypothesised, ﬁrm size has a
negative association with the cost of equity capital and is signiﬁcant at p<0.01. This
suggests that larger ﬁrms have a lower cost of equity capital, and is consistent with
prior research ﬁndings (e.g. Botosan 1997; Hail 2002; Botosan and Plumlee 2002;
Poshakwale and Courtis 2005; Francis, Khurana and Pereira 2005; Daske et al. 2006;
Espinosa and Trombetta 2007). That supports the notion put forward in the literature
(e.g. Gebhardt et al. 2001; Daske et al. 2006; Espinosa and Trombetta 2007) that
because more information is available for larger ﬁrms, information asymmetry may
be lower and investors may therefore perceive larger ﬁrms as less risky and require a
lower risk premium.
In respect of analyst following, the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant and positive (p<0.01).
As analyst following is entered as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 (0) for
ﬁrms with low (high) analyst following, the positive association indicates that ﬁrms
with low analyst following have a higher cost of equity capital. This is consistent
with expectations and with the results by prior research that has repeatedly reported
a negative association of analyst following with the implied cost of equity capital
(e.g. Gebhardt et al. 2001; Richardson and Welker 2001; Daske et al. 2006). The
literature (e.g. Gebhardt et al. 2001; Daske et al. 2006) suggests that, as more
information is available for ﬁrms with higher analyst following, this might lower infor-
mation asymmetry and reduce the required rate of return. Gearing is insigniﬁcant in
all models, suggesting that a ﬁrm's gearing level is unrelated to the cost of capital.
This is inconsistent with previous research (e.g. Hail 2002; Gietzmann and Ireland
2005; Espinosa and Trombetta 2007) that reported signiﬁcant positive results. The
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diﬀerence to those results may stem from diﬀerences in measuring gearing. While
this study measures gearing as long-term debt to long-term debt plus equity, those
studies have tended to use debt-to-market value of equity to measure leverage. The
coeﬃcient, however, is positive as expected, and this positive relationship between
gearing and the cost of equity capital is consistent with previous studies' ﬁndings (e.g.
Hail 2002; Gietzmann and Ireland 2005; Espinosa and Trombetta 2007). It suggests
that investors require a higher return from investing in ﬁrms with higher gearing,
since default risk increases with gearing level and therefore the risk to stockholders'
investment (Fama and Miller 1972). The book-to-market ratio (B/M) has a con-
sistent positive association with the cost of equity capital as expected and is always
signiﬁcant, with a range from p<0.01 to p<0.10. This is in line with ﬁndings by pre-
vious research (e.g. Gebhardt et al. 2001; Francis et al. 2004; Botosan and Plumlee
2005; Daske et al. 2006; Hail and Leuz 2006). The ﬁnding suggests that ﬁrms with
a higher ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity have a higher cost of
equity capital. An explanation for the positive association may be that the B/M ratio
reﬂects common risk factors which are unobservable (Fama and French 1992), hence
high B/M ﬁrms would reﬂect a higher underlying risk of the stock, leading to higher
expected returns (La Porta 1996; Gebhardt et al. 2001). Alternatively, it is possible
that the B/M ratio captures the eﬀect of stock mispricing (see e.g Lakonishok et al.
1994; La Porta 1996; Daske et al. 2006), with stocks with high B/M (`value stocks')
being priced too low and low B/M stocks (`growth stocks') priced too high. Overall,
the control variables show the expected associations with the cost of equity capital,
with the only diﬀerence between the models being the level of signiﬁcance of the
association of each variable.
Turning to the main issues of the thesis, the results in Model 1 show that WCN
is insigniﬁcant, suggesting that the cost of equity capital is not inﬂuenced by how
extensive ﬁrms explain their performance outcomes in the narrative sections of their
annual reports. Thus Hypothesis H1a of a negative association between attribution
statements and the cost of capital is not supported using this attribution measure.
The sign of the coeﬃcient, however, is positive, which suggests that ﬁrms that elab-
8.4. MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 231
orate more on explaining their performance outcomes may actually face a higher cost
of equity capital. Botosan and Plumlee (2002) also reported a positive association
of timely disclosures with the cost of equity capital.
A possible explanation for the insigniﬁcant result is that the market might see ex-
planations for performance outcomes provided by management as `cheap talk', that is
costless, non-binding and non-veriﬁable messages, and therefore ignore them in their
assessment of ﬁrm performance (see e.g. Bhattacharya and Krishnan 1999; Farrell
1995; Farrell and Rabin 1996; Forsythe et al. 1999). For a message to have an eﬀect
on the receiver's behaviour, the incentives of the sender and the receiver of the mes-
sage have to be closely aligned, otherwise the information is considered `cheap talk'
and ignored (Farrell 1995; Forsythe et al. 1999). Whether the incentives between
management and investors are aligned is doubtful (Forsythe et al. 1999; Barton and
Mercer 2005). This applies in particular to explanations for corporate performance
outcomes, which may be used by management in a way as to manage and manipulate
outsider's impressions and to present the ﬁrm and its performance in a better light
(Aerts 2005; Merkl-Davies et al. 2007). For example, managers have incentives to
portray ﬁrm performance in a positive light, that is to claim successful outcomes for
themselves or to downplay negative outcomes for reasons such as their job security,
reputation and pay (Clatworthy and Jones 2003; Baginski et al. 2004), or to keep
investors satisﬁed and support stock price (Salancik and Meindl 1984; Abrahamson
and Amir 1996). Investors, aware of such potential incentives may, as a consequence,
question the value and thus the usefulness of management's attribution statements
for their own decision making. Research suggests that if investors doubt the credi-
bility and believability of disclosures, they will consider it `cheap talk' and ignore the
information (see e.g. Bhattacharya and Krishnan 1999; Forsythe et al. 1999). This
suggestion is supported by empirical ﬁndings by Kothari et al. (2009). Kothari et al.
(2009) failed to ﬁnd an association between management's information disclosures in
the MD&A section and the cost of capital, and suggested that, given management's
incentives to present the ﬁrm's performance in a self-serving way, investors may not
see this information as credible and therefore ignore it. This suggests that, if investors
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feel that they cannot believe the attribution statements and therefore consider them
`cheap talk', they will disregard the explanations. So instead of being useful infor-
mation for investors in their assessment of ﬁrm value, management's performance
attributions might be considered useless and ignored. This might explain the ﬁnding
in this study that attribution statements in the annual report are unrelated to the
cost of capital.
Another possible explanation for the insigniﬁcant result might be that investors
already knew the reasons behind performance outcomes from other sources prior
to the publication of the attribution statements in the annual report. That is, this
information was already incorporated into investors' decision models and forecasts, so
that when the annual report was published some time after the ﬁnancial year end, the
information was no longer new to the market. As markets react to new information
when it becomes available (Rippington and Taer 1995; MacKinlay 1997), it is
possible that the valuation implications of performance attributions may have already
occurred, so that their information content is already incorporated in price. Kothari
et al. (2009) also suggest that limited timeliness of MD&A information may explain
their ﬁnding that management's disclosures in the MD&A sections are not associated
with the cost of capital.
To analyse hypothesis 2 on the mitigating eﬀect of analyst following on the re-
lationship between attribution statements and the cost of capital, Model 2 includes
an interaction variable that expresses an interaction of attribution disclosure with low
analyst following (WCN*AF ). Following Botosan (1997) and Richardson and Welker
(2001), to measure analyst following a dummy variable was created that takes the
value of 1 if a ﬁrm's analyst following is lower than or equal to the median number
of analysts following the sample ﬁrms, and 0 if analyst following is higher than the
median. This categorical variable is then interacted with the attribution disclosure
measure and the resulting interaction term is added to the regression model. The
results are shown in Table 8.4.2.
As for the control variables, the signs of the coeﬃcients and the levels of sig-
niﬁcance are consistent with the values in Model 1, thus will not be repeated here.
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The only slight diﬀerence is B/M which is now signiﬁcant positive at the 1% level as
compared to the 5% level in Model 1. The results suggest that for ﬁrms with high
analyst following, the cost of capital is higher if ﬁrms have a higher beta and higher
book-to-market ratio, while gearing has no eﬀect.
With regard to the attribution measure, (WCN) is insigniﬁcant, suggesting that
for ﬁrms with high analyst following, attribution statements do not inﬂuence the cost
of equity capital. This is also consistent with the ﬁndings in Model 1. The interaction
term (WCN*AF ), however, is positive and signiﬁcant at the 10% level. This suggests
that ﬁrms with low analyst following that provide more extensive performance expla-
nations have a higher cost of equity capital. Thus Hypothesis 2, which suggested
that the association between attribution statement disclosure and the cost of equity
capital is stronger for ﬁrms with lower analyst following, is mildly supported.
A possible explanation for the signiﬁcant association is given by Kothari et al.
(2009) who argue that for ﬁrms about which not much information is available, any
disclosures that can shed more light on the risks attached to the business and reduce
uncertainty among investors regarding the ﬁrm will aﬀect investors' assessment of the
ﬁrm. Botosan (1997) also suggests that corporate disclosures in disclosure venues
such as the annual report become more important to investors for ﬁrms with low an-
alyst following. This suggests that for ﬁrms with low analyst following, investors will
need to rely more on management's performance explanations in the annual report to
look for information about the reasons behind performance outcomes, and to incor-
porate these into their decision making, since analysts' assessments are not as easily
available. Hence it is possible that for ﬁrms with low analyst following, performance
explanations might not necessarily be considered `cheap talk' and disregarded and in-
vestors might be more inclined to consider management's performance explanations,
as there is less other information available on which investors can base their decisions.
As Table 8.4.2 shows, for ﬁrms with high analyst following, attribution statements
(WCN) are not related to the cost of equity capital. This suggests that for these
ﬁrms there is less need for investors to rely on the explanations provided by manage-
ment in the annual report, as analysts may already be providing an assessment of
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performance. As a consequence, investors can use analysts' information rather than
ﬁrm-provided attribution statements to understand the reasons for performance, so
that management's explanations in the annual report would be less important for
investors' decision processes. This may explain why there is a signiﬁcant associa-
tion between the cost of equity capital and attribution statements for ﬁrms with low
analyst following, but not for those followed by a larger number of analysts.
In terms of the positive sign of the coeﬃcient, the ﬁnding suggests that ﬁrms
with low analyst following that provide more extensive attribution statements face
a higher cost of equity capital. This result might be explained with the ﬁndings by
Barton and Mercer (2005) who provided evidence that implausible, thus not credible,
performance explanations by management are not ignored by analysts but instead
are used to make negative inferences about management and the ﬁrm's prospects.
Their study found that implausible performance explanations result in lower earnings
forecasts and lower ﬁrm valuations than if no explanations were given. This suggests
that attribution statements that lack credibility are not necessarily ignored but can
actually increase the risk investors attach to investing in the ﬁrm (Barton and Mercer
2005), and lead to a higher cost of capital. Barton and Mercer (2005) suggest that
implausible explanations harm management's reputation, which impacts its credibil-
ity in communicating with the capital market. This, in turn, would aﬀect a ﬁrm's
information risk and ultimately negatively inﬂuence its cost of capital. Similarly, Kim-
brough and Wang (2009) show that investors use the current performance reported by
industry peer ﬁrms and the commonality of the ﬁrm's earnings with industry earnings
and the overall market to judge the plausibility of attribution statements in earnings
announcements. Kimbrough and Wang (2009) show that the stock price reaction
to explanations for good and bad outcomes then varies accordingly. It can be ar-
gued that implausible or not credible performance explanations may lead investors
to become more suspicious and cautious, thinking about why management might
provide such seemingly not credible disclosures. Investors therefore may become less
optimistic about a ﬁrm's prospects and require a higher return. In addition, provid-
ing more detailed information about the reasons that have inﬂuenced a performance
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outcome may point to factors and issues that either raise investors' doubts about the
sustainability of the achieved good performance, or point to potentially continuing
bad performance. That is, factors that suggest that the future might be less bright
for the ﬁrm. This may lead investors to revise the ﬁrm's earnings potential downward
and to require a higher rate of return, which would explain a positive association with
attribution statements.
The ﬁnding that an interaction eﬀect of attribution statements with analyst fol-
lowing inﬂuences the relationship between disclosure on the cost of capital is in line
with and adds to the growing body of research that shows that disclosure interacts
with other factors to exercise a combined eﬀect on the cost of equity capital, for in-
stance with ﬁnancial performance (Richardson and Welker 2001), accounting policy
(Espinosa and Trombetta 2007), or superior disclosure performance relative to peer
ﬁrms (Dhaliwal et al. 2011).
Having discussed the aggregate wordcount measure (WCN), the focus is now on
the models that explore the relationship between the cost of capital and internal and
external attribution statements (WCN_INT/WCN_EXT ). The results are presented
in Table 8.4.3.
For Model 1, the results for the control variables are similar to those in the
aggregate WCN models, but generally less signiﬁcant, with the exception of beta.
Diﬀerent from the aggregate WCN models beta is, although positive, insigniﬁcant,
which suggests that a ﬁrm's beta is not related to the cost of capital. This ﬁnding is
in line with the mixed results by a number of previous studies that also found beta
to be insigniﬁcant (Gietzmann and Ireland 2005; Espinosa and Trombetta 2007), or
to have an inconsistent and unstable association with the cost of capital (Gebhardt
et al. 2001; Muino and Trombetta 2009). Firm size is negative and signiﬁcant at the
1% level in line with the WCN models, suggesting that larger ﬁrms have a lower cost
of capital. The signiﬁcant positive association between low analyst following and the
cost of capital is also consistent with the results in the WCN model, suggesting that
ﬁrms followed by fewer analysts face a higher cost of capital. Gearing is insigniﬁcant,
which suggests that a ﬁrm's gearing level does not aﬀect its cost of capital, consistent
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with the aggregate attribution measure (WCN) models. The book-to-market ratio
(B/M) is positive and signiﬁcant at p<0.10 (in the ﬁrm size model) and p<0.05
when analyst following is used, in line with the WCN models.
Regarding the attribution disclosure measures, the results in Model 1 show that,
consistent with the aggregate attribution measure (WCN), neither WCN_INT nor
WCN_ EXT have a signiﬁcant association with the cost of equity capital. Hence Hy-
potheses H1b(i) and H1b(ii), that internal and external attributions have a diﬀerent
eﬀect on the cost of capital, are not supported. The result suggests that investors
consider neither internal performance explanations nor external performance explana-
tions as value relevant. In the context of biased attributions (Staw et al. 1983; Huﬀ
and Schwenk 1990) and uninformative disclosures (Forsythe et al. 1999), it is possible
that investors consider internal explanations as uninformative `cheap talk' because, as
Baginski et al. (2004) point out, explanations that give ﬁrm-internal reasons are not
easy to verify. Since the literature (e.g. Bhattacharya and Krishnan 1999) suggests
that investors might disregard information that is diﬃcult to verify, this might explain
why attributions to internal reasons are unrelated to the cost of capital. Further,
given the tendency by managers to use external attributions to blame external factors
for bad performance in order to deny responsibility and to make the ﬁrm and manage-
ment appear in a better light (e.g. Staw et al. 1983; Bettman and Weitz 1983; Aerts
2005), external attributions may also be considered not reliable and therefore disre-
garded in decision making. Moreover, as Kimbrough and Wang (2009) suggest, even
if it was possible to observe and verify the external reasons given (e.g. overall state of
the economy), it might be diﬃcult for investors to judge whether this really impacted
on performance, and to assess the degree of inﬂuence that is claimed by management.
Investors might anticipate that management will tend to praise themselves for good
outcomes or blame external factors for bad outcomes, thus not pay much attention
to whether internal or external explanations are given. Investors therefore might not
be willing to incorporate potentially biased information into their decision processes
and use it to evaluate performance and assess ﬁrm value. This suggests that investors
might consider both internal and external performance explanations as information
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that is uninformative and not useful for ﬁrm valuation.
Turning to the interaction between the internal and external attribution measures
with the level of analyst following (WCN_INT*AF and WCN_EXT*AF ) in Model
2, the interaction term WCN_INT*AF is positive and signiﬁcant at the 10% level,
whereas WCN_EXT*AF is insigniﬁcant. This provides support for hypothesis 2 that
the association between attribution statements and the cost of capital is stronger for
ﬁrms with lower analyst following. It also provides support for hypothesis H1b(ii) that
internal attribution statements have their own distinct eﬀect on the cost of equity
capital.
The ﬁnding suggests that for ﬁrms with low analyst following, those ﬁrms that
elaborate more on internal reasons for performance tend to have a higher cost of
equity capital, whereas elaborating more on external causes for performance does not
inﬂuence the cost of equity capital. This suggests that although investors in general
might consider internal explanations to be diﬃcult to verify and therefore see them
as 'cheap talk' and ignore them, as the results from Model 1 show, for ﬁrms with low
analyst following investors might be more inclined to consider management's perfor-
mance explanations, as there is less other information available on which investors
can base their decisions. This suggests that for ﬁrms with low analyst following, per-
formance explanations to internal reasons might not necessarily be considered `cheap
talk' and disregarded by investors.
It can be argued that when performance is explained with internal reasons, these
internal factors can oﬀer exactly the type of information investors are looking for,
for example insight into internal operational processes, resources, or the eﬀectiveness
of implementing strategic plans. For ﬁrms with low analyst following, this type of
information might be diﬃcult to obtain from sources other than the annual report.
More detailed internal explanations can give investors ﬁrm-speciﬁc insight into the
value creation processes and if the ﬁrm is able to use its resources and processes
properly to create value for the investor. Internal reasons also allow a direct as-
sessment of the results against the resources available, how well the ﬁrm has used
these resources to produce results and how well it is managed. Moreover, internal
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attributions might reveal proprietary information, which would be of high interest to
analysts and investors and aid in their ﬁrm evaluation (see Baginski et al. 2004). This
is particularly the case for ﬁrms with low analyst following, where other information
sources are limited. The results also show that external attributions are unrelated
to a ﬁrm's cost of capital, potentially because they can apply to any ﬁrm without
much improving an investors' insight needed for assessing a speciﬁc ﬁrm's operations
and prospects. Attributions to external causes consist more of factors that the ﬁrm
cannot control, such as competition or the economy and these can apply to every
ﬁrm, thus no ﬁrm-speciﬁc information is gleaned.
With regard to the positive sign of the association which indicates that more
detailed internal attributions are related to a higher cost of capital, this can be ex-
plained in a way similar to the ﬁndings for aggregate attribution statements (WCN).
Although investors may see information that sheds light on internal procedures and
success factors as potentially valuable and useful, this does not mean that the in-
formation will automatically have a positive inﬂuence on investors' perception of the
ﬁrm. As discussed above, it is possible that these explanations contain information
that investors do not see as beneﬁcial. For example, if these explanations indicate
that positive factors underlying good performance are not going to continue, or if
explanations point to internal factors of which investors think that they may develop
a negative eﬀect in the future. This may raise investors' doubts about the ﬁrm's
future performance and its risk, and cause them to revise down their outlook for the
ﬁrm, hence to require a higher return.
Furthermore, it is also possible that investors see internal explanations as lacking
credibility since internal reasons are diﬃcult to verify (Baginski et al. 2004). In this
case, as the ﬁndings by Barton and Mercer (2005) suggest, if internal attributions
are seen as lacking credibility or plausibility, investors may infer a higher risk and a
higher cost of capital. This may explain the ﬁnding of a positive association between
internal performance explanations and the cost of equity capital.
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8.5 Additional analysis
In addition to the analysis discussed above, three more tests were carried out to
investigate the robustness of the results. This section presents the results. In the
ﬁrst analysis, the normal score transformed attribution disclosure measures (WCN,
WCN_INT andWCN_EXT ) are replaced by attribution measures transformed using
the fractional rank. A number of previous studies (e.g. Botosan 1997; Botosan and
Plumlee 2002; Hail 2002) have used fractional rank transformation of their disclosure
measure in the analysis of the eﬀect on the cost of capital. The results are presented
in Table 8.5.1.
The WCN model is discussed ﬁrst. For Model 1, Table 8.5.1 shows that the signs
of the correlation and the signiﬁcance levels of all variables are unchanged from the
main model. In terms of the control variables, beta is positive and signiﬁcant at
p<0.10 and ﬁrm size is negative and signiﬁcant at p<0.01. Low analyst following is
positive and signiﬁcant at p<0.01, and book-to-market is positive and signiﬁcant at
p<0.10 (ﬁrm size model) and p<0.05 (analyst following model). Gearing is insigniﬁ-
cant. Also consistent with the main model, the attribution disclosure measure WCN
is insigniﬁcant. The results for Model 2 are also consistent with the main model
in terms of signs of the correlation and signiﬁcance levels. In terms of the control
variables, beta is positive and signiﬁcant at p<0.10, low analyst following is positive
and signiﬁcant at p<0.01, and book-to-market is positive and signiﬁcant at p<0.01.
Gearing is insigniﬁcant. The attribution disclosure measure WCN is insigniﬁcant,
consistent with the main model. The interaction term (WCN*AF ) is positive, yet a
signiﬁcance level of 5% is stronger than the 10% found in the main model.
The results for the internal and external attribution measures (WCN_INT/WCT_
EXT ) are also shown in Table 8.5.1. The results for Model 1 are consistent with
the main analysis. Of the control variables, ﬁrm size is negative and signiﬁcant at
p<0.01 and low analyst following is positive and signiﬁcant at p<0.01. Book-to-
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market is positive and signiﬁcant at p<0.10 (ﬁrm size model) and p<0.05 (analyst
following model). Beta and gearing are insigniﬁcant. Also consistent with the main
model, the internal and external attribution disclosure measures (WCN_INT and
WCN_EXT ) are insigniﬁcant. The results for Model 2 are also consistent with the
main analysis. Of the control variables, low analyst following is positive and signiﬁcant
at p<0.05 and book-to-market is positive and signiﬁcant at p<0.05. Beta and gearing
are insigniﬁcant. Also consistent with the main model, the internal and external
attribution disclosure measures (WCN_INT and WCN_EXT ) are insigniﬁcant, but
the interaction term (WCN_INT*AF ) is positive and signiﬁcant at p<0.10. Taken
together, the results from using fractional ranks of the attribution disclosure measures
instead of the normal score transformed values are consistent with the results from
the main analysis, suggesting that the conclusions are unaﬀected.
The second additional analysis used a diﬀerent measure of ﬁrm size. A ﬁrm's
market value of equity (MVE ) was replaced by a ﬁrm's total assets (TA), which is
an alternative measure of ﬁrm size also used in the literature (e.g. Francis, LaFond,
Olsson and Schipper 2005; Wallace and Naser 1995; Haniﬀa and Cooke 2005). Due to
the multicollinearity problem between ﬁrm size and analyst following and the resulting
separate models, only Model 1 can be analysed here. The results are provided in Table
8.5.2.
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Table 8.5.2: Regression results for the eﬀect of the attribution disclosure measures
(WCN and WCN_INT / WCN_EXT ) Model 1 using Total Assets
Variable Model 1 Model 1
WCN WCN_INT / WCN_EXT
Size (TA) VIF Size (TA) VIF
Constant 5.918*** - 5.509*** -
Beta 1.703* 1.023 1.220 1.018
Size (TA) -2.699*** 1.295 -2.607*** 1.296
Gear 0.985 1.251 0.661 1.274
B/M 2.862*** 1.094 2.617*** 1.190
WCN 1.160 1.084 - -
WCN_INT - - 0.406 1.070
WCN_EXT - - -0.423 1.175
Adj. R2 12.1 9.9
F-value 4.972 3.072
SE 0.030 0.031
Sign. 0.000 0.008
N 142 111
***Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
**Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
*Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed)
VIF = Variance inﬂation factor
Constant = Regression constant
Adj. R2 = Explanatory power of the regression model for variance in WCN. F-value = Indicator for statistical
signiﬁcance of the regression model. SE = Standard Error. Sign. = Signiﬁcance level for the predictive
ability of the regression model. Beta = Firm beta. Size = A ﬁrm's total assets at ﬁnancial year end in ¿m.
Gear = Gearing ratio, measured as long-term debt to long-term debt plus equity. B/M = Book-to-market
ratio, measured as the ratio of book value of equity to the market value of equity. AF = Number of analysts
following a ﬁrm. WCN = Wordcount of attributions per narrative disclosures, measured as the percentage of
words used for attributions to the total number of words in the narrative sections of the annual report.
WCN_INT = Wordcount of internal attributions per narrative disclosures, measured as the percentage of
words used for internal attributions to the total number of words in the narrative sections of the annual
report. WCN_EXT = Wordcount of external attributions per narrative disclosures, measured as the
percentage of words used for external attributions to the total number of words in the narrative sections of
the annual report.
The results are consistent with the main results using MVE. In the model using
aggregate attribution disclosure (WCN), beta is positive and signiﬁcant p<0.10. TA
is negative and signiﬁcant at p<0.01, suggesting that larger ﬁrms, measured as having
more total assets on their balance sheet, have a lower cost of capital. This is consistent
with the ﬁndings in the main analysis (see Table 8.4.2) that larger ﬁrms in terms of
market value have a lower cost of capital. This suggests that investors perceive
larger ﬁrms as less risky, hence require a lower rate of return (Gebhardt et al. 2001;
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Espinosa and Trombetta 2007). Book-to-market is also positive and shows a higher
signiﬁcance level (1%) than in the main MVE model (10%). Gearing is insigniﬁcant.
The attribution disclosure measure (WCN) is insigniﬁcant, which is also consistent
with the MVE model.
The results for the model using the internal and external attribution measure
(WCN_INT and WCN_EXT ) are also consistent with the MVE model. TA is
negative and signiﬁcant at p<0.01, consistent with the ﬁndings in the MVE model.
Book-to-market is also positive, and shows a higher signiﬁcance level (1%) than in
the MVE model (10%). Beta and gearing are positive but insigniﬁcant. Consistent
with the results in the MVE model, the internal and external attribution measures
(WCN_INT and WCN_EXT ) are insigniﬁcant. Taken together, measuring ﬁrm size
as total assets yields similar results to using market value of equity.
The third additional analysis investigates potential endogeneity problems between
the disclosure of performance explanations and the cost of capital. Endogeneity refers
to the situation when the error term in a regression is correlated with one or more
of the independent variables and this may be caused by, for instance, a correlated
omitted variable or unobservable ﬁrm characteristics (see e.g. Wooldridge 2003;
Nikolaev and Van Lent 2005). In case of endogeneity, the estimators derived from
a regression using standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) may be inconsistent and
biased (Hail 2002; Nikolaev and Van Lent 2005).
A number of studies (e.g. Healy and Palepu 2001; Core 2001; Hail 2002; Larcker
and Rusticus 2010) suggest that there might be an endogenous relationship between
disclosure and the cost of capital. If companies decide on their disclosure policy
based on the costs and beneﬁts of providing more information (including beneﬁcial
eﬀects on the cost of capital), then a self-selection bias might inﬂuence the association
between disclosure and the cost of equity capital (Hail 2002). Companies that choose
to provide a higher disclosure level might have diﬀerent underlying characteristics
than companies with a lower disclosure level, so their cost of equity capital could
be diﬀerent irrespective of the chosen disclosure level (see Hail 2002; Nikolaev and
Van Lent 2005). Diﬀerences in the cost of capital could be correlated with disclosure
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level, but not necessarily caused by the level of disclosure (Nikolaev and Van Lent
2005). The consequence for investigations of the association between disclosure and
cost of capital is that, in the presence of endogeneity, it is not clear which direction
the eﬀect is taking (Hail 2002; Larcker and Rusticus 2010) and the estimators derived
from an OLS regression may be inconsistent (Hail 2002; Nikolaev and Van Lent 2005).
To deal with endogeneity problems in regression, the two-stage-least-squares
(2SLS) method is a widely used method in the literature (e.g. Wooldridge 2003;
Larcker and Rusticus 2010; Aerts and Tarca 2010; Ntim et al. 2012). In the 2SLS
method, the endogeneous variable is estimated in a ﬁrst stage regression as a func-
tion of factors that are assumed to determine the variable; then, in the second stage,
the predicted values for the endogeneous variable replace the initial values in the
regression analysis (Hail 2002; Wooldridge 2003; Ntim et al. 2012). Since using an
estimated value for the suspected endogeneous variable increases the variance of the
estimator and lowers the ability to make inferences from the estimates (see Greene
1993; Wooldridge 2003; Gujarati 2003), Wooldridge (2003) stresses the importance of
making sure whether endogeneity is present and the 2SLS approach is really required.
In order to assess whether endogeneity issues might inﬂuence the results of the
thesis, and whether the 2SLS technique is appropriate, the Hausman test was carried
out (see Hausman 1978; Wooldridge 2003; Gujarati 2003; Beiner et al. 2006; Larcker
and Rusticus 2010; Ntim et al. 2012) which tests for the presence of endogeneity. The
Hausman procedure investigates whether the coeﬃcient of the residuals obtained from
the ﬁrst-stage regression is signiﬁcant when included as an explanatory variable in an
ordinary least squares (OLS) version of the second-stage regression (Wooldridge 2003;
Gujarati 2003; Larcker and Rusticus 2010). The null hypothesis states that there is
no endogeneity. If the coeﬃcient of the residuals is signiﬁcant, the null hypothesis of
no endogeneity is rejected, suggesting that estimates derived from an OLS regression
may be inconsistent, and a 2SLS method can be applied (Beiner et al. 2006; Larcker
and Rusticus 2010). Therefore, as a ﬁrst step, the Hausman test was carried out
to test for the presence of endogeneity between attribution statement disclosure and
cost of equity capital, and hence whether the 2SLS technique is appropriate.
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The Hausman test consists of two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, attribution statement
disclosure was determined by regressing it on (1) the corporate governance factors
and ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics that were used in the model in chapter 7 to determine
attribution statement disclosure (See chapter 7, section 2)3; and (2) the independent
variables contained in the second-stage model (that is, Beta and Book-to-market
value in the Cost of capital model) (see Wooldridge 2003; and Beiner et al. 2006;
Larcker and Rusticus 2010; Ntim et al. 2012 for an application of the Hausman test).
The regression model for the ﬁrst-stage Hausman test to determine attribution
disclosure was speciﬁed as follows:
Attributions = β0 + β1PropNED + β2Dirown+ β3ACSize+ β4ACExp
+β5Size+ β6AF + β7Gear + β8Profit+ β9Perf
+β10Issue+ β11Beta+ β12B/M + 
(8.5.1)
3These variables had been identﬁed in chapter 3 as determinants of attribution statement dis-
closure and their eﬀect analysed in chapter 7, therefore they can be considered an adequate choice
to represent the endogenous variable (see Larcker and Rusticus 2010).
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PropNED = Proportion of non-executive directors on the board of directors, measured as the
proportion of non-executive directors on the board of directors to the total
number of directors on the board
Dirown = Executive director share ownership, measured as the percentage of shares held
by ﬁrm executive directors
ACSize = Audit committee size, measured as the number of directors on the audit
committee
ACExp = Audit committee expertise, measured as the proportion of audit committee
members with accounting and ﬁnancial management expertise to the total size
of the audit committee
Size = Firm size, measured as market value of equity at ﬁnancial year end in ¿m
AF = Analyst following, measured as the number of analysts following a ﬁrm
Gear = Gearing ratio, measured as long-term debt divided by long-term debt plus
shareholders' equity at ﬁnancial year end
Proﬁt = Firm proﬁtability, measured as return on assets
Perf = Change in ﬁnancial performance from the previous ﬁnancial year, measured as
indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the ﬁrm's operating proﬁt has
decreased from the previous year; 0 otherwise
Issue = Indicator variable if the ﬁrm has issued equity within the subsequent ﬁnancial
year; taking the value of 1 if the ﬁrm has issued equity within the year following
the publication of the annual report; 0 otherwise
Beta = Firm beta, measuring a ﬁrm's systematic risk; measures the sensitivity of a
stock's return to variation in the return of the overall market
B/M = Firm book-to-market ratio, measured as book value of equity divided by market
value of equity
β = Regression coeﬃcient
 = Error term
The results from the ﬁrst-stage regression are reported in Table 8.5.3.
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Overall, the results of the ﬁrst-stage regression are comparable to those reported
in chapter 7, section 5, on the determinants of attribution statement disclosure. In
the WCN model, the results for those variables taken from the model in chapter 7
remain unchanged, except PropNED, ACSize and Proﬁt (in the AF model) being less
signiﬁcant (now at the 5% level as compared to previously 10%). Beta and Book-to-
market value are insigniﬁcant. The results for the WCN_INT model are also broadly
unchanged, except for the MVE model in which Proﬁt becomes signiﬁcant at the
10% level, while Dirown loses signiﬁcance at the 10% level (but is signiﬁcant at the
11% level). Also, Issue shows an increased signiﬁcance level (now at the 5% level,
up from 10%), while PropNED is less signiﬁcant (now at the 10% level, down from
5%). As in the WCN model, Beta and Book-to-market value are insigniﬁcant. The
results for WCN_EXT are mostly consistent with the analysis in chapter 7, yet also
show some slight diﬀerences. In the MVE model, Size (MVE ) remains signiﬁcant at
the 10% level, while Gear loses signiﬁcance (from the 10% level previously) in both
the MVE and AF model. All other variables remain unchanged. As for the WCN
and WCN_INT models, Beta and Book-to-market value are insigniﬁcant.
In the second stage of the Hausman test, the residuals obtained from the ﬁrst-
stage regression above were included as an additional explanatory variable in the
second-stage regression (that is, in the cost of capital model model as speciﬁed in
section 8.2). The results are presented in Table 8.5.4 (WCN model) and Table 8.5.5
(WCN_INT/WCN_EXT model). The WCN model is discussed ﬁrst.
As can be seen from Table 8.5.4, the coeﬃcient of the residuals is insigniﬁcant.
That is, the Null hypothesis of no endogeneity between attribution statement disclo-
sure and the cost of equity capital cannot be rejected, suggesting that endogeneity
between aggregate attribution statement disclosure (WCN) and the cost of equity
capital is not a major problem in the thesis, and the use of OLS regression is appro-
priate (see Larcker and Rusticus 2010; Ntim et al. 2012).
The results for the WCN_INT/EXT model are reported in Table 8.5.5 below.
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Table 8.5.4: Second-stage Hausman test regression results for testing endogeneity
between attribution disclosure (WCN) and the cost of equity capital
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Size AF VIF AF VIF
Constant 5.130*** 4.665*** 4.501***
Beta 1.734* 1.939* 1.020 1.965* 1.021
Size -2.042** - 2.272 - -
AF - 1.716* 1.622 1.759* 1.834
Gear 0.645 0.552 1.152 0.420 1.65
B/M 1.729* 2.188** 1.188 2.373** 1.190
WCN 0.729 0.661 1.221 -0.950 2.820
WCN_Resid 0.642 1.269 1.798 0.843 2.033
WCN*AF - - - 1.958* 2.595
Adj. R2 13.2 12.5 13.7
F-value 4.660 4.422 4.270
SE 0.030 0.030 0.030
Sign. 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 142 142 142
***Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); **Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level
(2-tailed); *Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed)
VIF = Variance inﬂation factor; Constant = Regression constant
Adj. R2 = Explanatory power of the regression model for variance in WCN. F-value = Indicator for
statistical signiﬁcance of the regression model. SE = Standard Error. Sign. = Signiﬁcance level for
the predictive ability of the regression model. Beta = Firm beta, measuring a ﬁrm's systematic risk;
measures the sensitivity of a stock's return to variation in the return of the overall market. Size =
Firm size, measured as market value of equity at ﬁnancial year end in ¿m. Gear = Gearing ratio,
measured as long-term debt to long-term debt plus equity at ﬁnancial year end. B/M =
Book-to-market ratio, measured as the ratio of book value of equity to the market value of equity.
AF = Analyst following, measured as the number of analysts following a ﬁrm. WCN = Wordcount
of attributions per narrative disclosures, measured as the percentage of words used for attributions to
the total number of words in the narrative sections of the annual report. WCN_Resid. = Residuals
obtained from the ﬁrst-stage regression of the Hausman test. WCN*AF = Interaction term
expressing an interaction between WCN and AF .
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Table 8.5.5: Second-stage Hausman test regression results for testing endogeneity
between attribution disclosure (WCN_INT/EXT ) and the cost of equity capital
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Size AF VIF AF VIF
Constant 3.658*** 3.981*** 4.010***
Beta 1.234 1.454 1.0132 1.299 1.054
Size -1.270 - 4.931 - -
AF - 2.469** 2.706 1.168 2.716
Gear 0.493 0.328 1.489 0.159 1.538
B/M 1.369 2.316** 2.035 1.698* 2.048
WCN_INT 0.111 0.335 1.201 -1.264 2.424
WCN_EXT -0.600 -0.346 1.211 -0.027 2.191
WCN_INT_Resid 0.358 0.335 1.868 0.664 1.872
WCN_EXT_Resid 0.264 -0.346 5.274 0.185 5.304
WCN_INT*AF - - - 1.898* 2.187
WCN_EXT*AF - - - -0.090 1.984
Adj. R2 10.1 8.2 9.6
F-value 2.585 2.266 2.204
SE 0.031 0.032 0.031
Sign. 0.013 0.028 0.023
N 111 111 111
***Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); **Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level
(2-tailed); *Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed)
VIF = Variance inﬂation factor; Constant = Regression constant
Adj. R2 = Explanatory power of the regression model for variance in WCN. F-value = Indicator for
statistical signiﬁcance of the regression model. SE = Standard Error. Sign. = Signiﬁcance level for
the predictive ability of the regression model. Beta = Firm beta, measuring a ﬁrm's systematic risk;
measures the sensitivity of a stock's return to variation in the return of the overall market. Size =
Firm size, measured as market value of equity at ﬁnancial year end in ¿m. Gear = Gearing ratio,
measured as long-term debt to long-term debt plus equity at ﬁnancial year end. B/M =
Book-to-market ratio, measured as the ratio of book value of equity to the market value of equity.
AF = Analyst following, measured as the number of analysts following a ﬁrm. WCN_INT =
Wordcount of internal attributions per narrative disclosures, measured as the percentage of words
used for internal attributions to the total number of words in the narrative sections of the annual
report. WCN_EXT = Wordcount of external attributions per narrative disclosures, measured as the
percentage of words used for external attributions to the total number of words in the narrative
sections of the annual report. WCN_INT_Resid. = Residuals obtained from the ﬁrst-stage
regression of the Hausman test. WCN_EXT_Resid. = Residuals obtained from the ﬁrst-stage
regression of the Hausman test. WCN_INT*AF = Interaction term expressing an interaction
between WCN_INT and AF . WCN_EXT*AF = Interaction term expressing an interaction between
WCN_EXT and AF .
As can be seen from Table 8.5.5, the coeﬃcient of both residuals is not signiﬁcant,
hence the Null hypothesis of no endogeneity between the cost of equity capital and the
disclosure of internal (WCN_INT ) and external (WCN_EXT ) attribution statements
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cannot be rejected. This suggests that endogeneity between the cost of equity capital
and internal attribution statement disclosure (WCN_INT ) and external attribution
statement disclosure (WCN_EXT ), respectively, is not a major problem in the thesis
and the use of OLS regression is appropriate (see Larcker and Rusticus 2010; Ntim
et al. 2012).
Taken together, these results suggest that the ﬁndings on the association between
attribution statement disclosure and the cost of equity capital as reported in section
8.4 are not inﬂuenced by the presence of endogeneity, hence the conclusions remain
unchanged.
Overall, having carried out additional tests to investigate the robustness of the
main results, it can be concluded that the results of the main analysis are robust and
can be relied upon for interpretation.
8.6 Summary and conclusion
There is consensus in the literature that information disclosure can help overcome
information asymmetry between the ﬁrm and capital market participants, reduce in-
vestor uncertainty surrounding determining expected returns, and ultimately can have
beneﬁcial eﬀects for a ﬁrm's cost of equity capital. In this respect, one important
type of disclosure are narrative explanations for corporate performance outcomes.
Accounting standard setting bodies, law makers, and regulatory agencies around the
world advocate or require the provision of explanations for corporate performance out-
comes based on the argument that they are useful for investors' investment decision
making. Hence, the question whether the disclosure of performance explanations in-
ﬂuences the cost of equity capital becomes important. This chapter has presented the
results of an investigation of the eﬀect of the provision of performance explanations
on the cost of equity capital.
The evidence relates to two major ﬁndings. On one hand, the analysis revealed
that for the overall sample, while controlling for a number of factors that are known
to inﬂuence the cost of equity capital, providing more extensive causal attribution
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statements for corporate performance outcomes does not aﬀect the cost of equity
capital. That is, the theoretical suggestion that providing performance explanations
aﬀects the cost of equity capital could not be conﬁrmed. Thus based on the overall
sample, hypothesis H1a and H1b(i) and H1b(ii) are not supported. On the other hand,
however, the analysis also provided evidence that the value relevance of attribution
statements depends on a ﬁrm's level of analyst following. For ﬁrms with high analyst
following (above the sample median) there is no association between attribution
statements and the cost of equity capital. By contrast, for ﬁrms with low analyst
following, the results show that those ﬁrms that provide more extensive performance
explanations have a higher cost of equity capital. This suggests that for ﬁrms with low
analyst following, analysts consider attribution statements to be useful information for
investment decision making, and that ﬁrms that explain their performance outcomes
in more detail face a higher cost of capital. For ﬁrms with low analyst following there
is also a signiﬁcant positive association between the cost of equity capital and the
extensiveness of internal attribution statements. Thus hypothesis H2 is supported,
as is H1b(ii) for ﬁrms with low analyst following. Additional tests demonstrated that
the results are robust to diﬀerent measurements of the variables.
Taken together, the ﬁndings presented in this chapter suggest that causal attri-
bution statements are value relevant for ﬁrms which are covered by fewer ﬁnancial
analysts. As in this case less analyst provided information about the company is
publicly available, the results suggest that therefore explanations for corporate per-
formance given by management and their assessment of performance in the annual
report can oﬀer valuable information for investors for valuing equity.
CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION
9.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a summary of the ﬁndings of the study against the backdrop of
the research questions and hypotheses tested. It is structured as follows: First, the
objective of the thesis and the research questions are presented. This is followed by,
second, a summary of the empirical ﬁndings with regard to the research questions and
hypotheses. Third, the implications of the thesis are highlighted followed by, fourth,
the contribution of the thesis. Fifth, the limitations of the thesis are identiﬁed. The
chapter concludes with suggestions for further research.
9.2 Research questions and approach
There is consensus among standard-setters and regulatory bodies around the world
that the provision of complementary and supplementary commentaries of organisa-
tional accounting outcomes and future prospects in the annual report helps investors
in their assessment of the ﬁrm's results and prospects. (Cole and Jones 2005; IASB
2005; ASB 2006). The review of the literature presented in chapters 2, 3 and 4 has
highlighted that, although academic research has extensively examined attribution
statements in a business context, there are two areas in which there is a gap in cur-
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rent knowledge. First, while there is a multitude of studies analysing the determinants
of information disclosure by ﬁrms, the determinants of attribution statement disclo-
sure are not well understood. Second, while there is a large body of research on the
eﬀect of information disclosure on a ﬁrm's cost of equity capital, not much attention
has been given to the question of whether a ﬁrm's performance explanations have
information content for equity valuation. Based on the identiﬁcation of these two
gaps, the aim of the thesis was twofold:
1. To explore the determinants of causal attribution statements for corporate per-
formance outcomes provided by management in corporate communications by
UK companies. Speciﬁcally, to examine the relationship between attribution
statement provision and corporate governance and ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors.
2. To investigate the economic consequences of attribution statements provided
by management in corporate communication to the capital market in the UK.
Speciﬁcally, to examine whether attribution statements aﬀect the ﬁrm's cost
of equity capital.
These aims led to the formulation of ﬁve research questions that the study addressed:
1. What is the nature and extent of attribution statements provided by UK listed
companies on organisational performance outcomes?
2. Do corporate governance factors inﬂuence the extent and nature of attributions
on organisational performance outcomes by UK listed companies?
3. Is the extent and nature of attributions on organisational performance outcomes
by UK listed companies related to ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors?
4. Do attribution statements about organisational performance outcomes inﬂuence
a ﬁrm's cost of equity capital?
5. Does this inﬂuence on the cost of capital depend on the types of attribution
statements (e.g. internal or external)?
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A quantitative approach was used to answer the research questions. A sample of
142 ﬁrms listed on the London Stock Exchange from the year 2006 was analysed.
Attribution statements were extracted from the annual reports by using content anal-
ysis. Firms' attribution statement provision was measured as the percentage of the
number of words used by a ﬁrm for attributions to the total number of words in the
ﬁrm's narrative sections of the annual report that review and discuss performance and
ﬁnancial position. This resulted in an attribution wordcount index (WCN). This vol-
ume measure captured the detail of the attributions and the emphasis placed by the
ﬁrm on explaining performance outcomes. Attribution statements were also classiﬁed
as to whether an internal or external cause was given as explanation and a separate
internal and external attribution wordcount index (WCN_INT, WCN_EXT ) was es-
tablished. This provided a measure of the volume and detail of internal and external
attributions in the narrative sections. A number of hypotheses were established to
analyse (1) factors that may inﬂuence attribution statement provision, and (2) the
eﬀect of attribution statements on the cost of equity capital. To test the hypotheses,
univariate analysis and multiple regression analysis were used. Univariate analysis
(Pearson) ﬁrst examined the correlations between the dependent and the indepen-
dent variables. Following that, a number of regression models were run to test the
hypotheses and answer the research questions.
9.3 Summary of the ﬁndings
This section presents a summary of the key ﬁndings of the thesis. First, the results
derived from the descriptive analysis are presented. Second, the results regarding the
determinants of attribution statement provision followed by, third, the results for the
eﬀect of attribution statements on the cost of equity capital are presented.
9.3.1 Extent and nature of attribution statements
The descriptive analysis of the sample ﬁrms addresses research question 1. These
results show that the percentage of words used for attributions to the total number
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of words in the narrative sections of the annual report is generally low, with a mean
value of 5.2% of the narrative review sections being used for narrative performance
explanations. This indicates that ﬁrms do not accord much space in their discussions
of the ﬁnancial year to explaining performance outcomes. This result is in contrast
to standard setters and regulators who emphasise the usefulness of explanations for
making investment decisions and thus call for ﬁrms to provide explanations for cor-
porate performance outcomes. It can be argued that ﬁrms, weighing up the costs
and beneﬁts of disclosing the reasons for their performance outcomes, judge that the
costs, such as proprietary costs from disclosing information that might also be useful
to competitors, are higher than the beneﬁts, hence decide not to disclose performance
explanations.
The results of the separate examination of internal and external attributions re-
veals that the sample ﬁrms tend to give more space to attributing outcomes to
internal than to external causes, as can be seen by the considerably higher mean
values for WCN_INT (0.037) as compared to WCN_EXT (0.019). This tendency
for giving more extensive internal than external attributions is found in all industries
analysed in the thesis. The ﬁnding of a predominance of internal attributions provides
some support for the suggestion by Salancik and Meindl (1984) that ﬁrms would at-
tribute performance more to causes internal to the ﬁrm in order to demonstrate they
are in control. Moreover, this tendency is present for ﬁrms with increasing as well
as decreasing performance, thus a self-serving attribution behaviour as reported by
previous research is not present in the sample.1
9.3.2 Determinants of attribution statement provision
Regression analysis provided evidence for the inﬂuence of a number of corporate gov-
ernance factors and ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics on attribution statement provision.
This addressed research questions 2 and 3. Table 9.3.1 presents a summary of the
regression results.
1Self-serving means attributing good outcomes to internal reasons but bad outcomes to external
reasons.
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Table 9.3.1: Summary of multiple regression results for the eﬀect of corporate gov-
ernance factors on attribution statement disclosure
WCN (Ha) WCN_INT (Hb(i)) WCN_EXT (Hb(ii))
Sign
Pred.
Sign Obs.
& Signif.
Sign
Pred.
Sign Obs.
& Signif.
Sign
Pred.
Sign Obs.
& Signif.
Model MVE AF MVE AF MVE AF
PropNED (H1) + +** +** -/+ +** +** -/+ - -
Dirown (H2) -/+ + + -/+ +* + -/+ + +
ACSize (H3) + -** -** -/+ -** -** -/+ + +
ACExp (H4) + + + -/+ + + -/+ - -
Size (H5) + - -/+ - -/+ -*
AF (H6) + - -/+ - -/+ -
Gear (H7) + + + -/+ - - -/+ -* -*
Proﬁt (H8) -/+ -* -** -/+ - - -/+ - -
Perf (H9) + - - -/+ - - + + +
Issue (H10) + -** -** + -* -* -/+ - -
*** Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); ** Correlation
signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); * Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.10
level (2-tailed)
Sign Pred. = Sign of the association predicted; Sign Obs. & Signif. =
Sign of the association observed & Signiﬁcance level
PropNED = Proportion of non-executive directors on the board of directors, measured as the proportion of
non-executive directors on the board of directors to the total number of directors on the board. Dirown =
Executive director ownership, measured as the percentage of shares held by executive directors. ACSize =
Audit committee size, measured as the number of directors on the audit committee. ACExp = Audit
committee expertise, measured as the proportion of audit committee members with accounting and ﬁnancial
management expertise to the total size of the audit committee. Size = Firm size, measured as market value
of equity at ﬁnancial year end in ¿m. AF = Number of analysts following a ﬁrm. Gear = Gearing ratio,
measured as long-term debt to long-term debt plus equity at ﬁnancial year end. Proﬁt = Firm proﬁtability,
measured as return on assets. Perfchange = Dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if the ﬁrm's performance
has deteriorated from the previous ﬁnancial year, measured as the percentage change in return on assets from
the previous year; 0 otherwise. AF = Analyst following, measured as the number of analysts following a ﬁrm.
Issue = Indicator variable if the ﬁrm has issued equity within the subsequent ﬁnancial year; taking the value
of 1 if the ﬁrm has issued equity within the year following the publication of the annual report; 0 otherwise.
WCN = Wordcount of attributions per narrative disclosures, measured as the percentage of words used for
attributions to the total number of words in the narrative disclosures of a ﬁrm excluding the notes to the
ﬁnancial statements. WCN_INT = Wordcount of internal attributions per narrative disclosures, measured as
the percentage of words used for internal attributions to the total number of words in the narrative
disclosures excluding the notes to the ﬁnancial statements. WCN_EXT = Wordcount of external
attributions per narrative disclosures, measured as the percentage of words used for external attributions to
the total number of words in the narrative disclosures excluding the notes to the ﬁnancial statements.
9.3.2.1 Corporate governance characteristics
The analysis provided evidence for the signiﬁcant inﬂuence of certain corporate gov-
ernance characteristics on attribution statement provision. Attribution statement
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provision is signiﬁcantly associated with PropNED, Dirown and ACSize. Hence Hy-
potheses H1a and H1b(i), H2b(i), and H3a and H3b(i) are supported. For the remain-
ing corporate governance factor, ACExp, no evidence was found that audit committee
expertise inﬂuences attribution disclosure, thus Hypothesis H4 was not supported by
the data.
More non-executive directors on the board are associated with more extensive
attribution statements, and with more space devoted to internal explanations in the
narrative sections of the annual report, consistent with H1a&b. The association
with volume supports the argument that non-executive directors contribute to bet-
ter monitoring and to stressing management's accountability for the ﬁrm's actions,
which then can translate into better disclosure. This is consistent with agency theory
considerations. In addition, having more non-executive directors on the board was
found to be associated with more volume of explanations to internal causes. This
supports arguments that inside and outside directors attribute performance diﬀerently
(see Schaﬀer 2002). The level of executive director share ownership is not associated
with the volume of the attribution statements provided, but shows a signiﬁcant posi-
tive association with the volume of internal attribution statements. This is consistent
with H2b(i) and lends some support to the suggestion that the higher management's
stake in the ﬁrm, the easier it might be for them to attribute performance to their
own actions, which might be an attempt to create an impression of conﬁdence in
management's abilities among existing and potential investors and the wider public.
Firms with larger audit committees provide less extensive attribution statements and
elaborate less on internal explanations in their narrative review sections. Thus H3a
and H3b(i) are supported. This ﬁnding suggests that larger audit committees might
be less eﬃcient monitors due to negative eﬀects of increasing group sizes. The fourth
corporate governance characteristic that was investigated, audit committee expertise,
was not found to be a signiﬁcant determinant of attribution statement provision. H4
therefore did not ﬁnd support.
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9.3.2.2 Firm characteristics
A number of ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics were found to inﬂuence the provision of
attribution statements. The analysis revealed that attribution statement provision has
a signiﬁcant association with ﬁrm size, gearing, proﬁtability, and equity issuance in
the following year. Hence hypotheses H5b(ii), H7b(ii), H8a are supported. Although
there is a signiﬁcant (negative) association between attribution disclosure and issuing
shares in the following ﬁnancial year, the hypothesis suggested a positive sign, hence
H10a and H10b(i) are not supported. For the remaining ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics
(analyst following and change in ﬁnancial performance from the previous year) no
evidence was found that they inﬂuence attribution disclosure, thus Hypotheses H6
and H9 were not supported.
Larger ﬁrms provide less extensive attribution statements to external reasons (sup-
porting H5b(ii)), whereas there is no association of ﬁrm size with the overall aggregate
volume of attribution statements. The negative coeﬃcient suggests that large ﬁrms
provide less detail in attributing performance outcomes to external factors. Higher
geared ﬁrms elaborate less in their narrative sections on external attributions for per-
formance, supporting H7b(ii). Consistent with signalling theory, this may be seen
as an attempt at trying to demonstrate to the market that management itself is in
control of the ﬁrm's course, not external events which are out of their control, so as
to downplay the perceived riskiness of high gearing. Firms which are more proﬁtable
give less space in their narrative sections for attributions, which supports H8a. This
is consistent with proprietary costs theory in that proﬁtable ﬁrms may disclose less, in
particular explanations for why they are so proﬁtable, as they do not want to provide
information that might help competitors. Firms that issue shares in the ﬁnancial
year following the publication of the annual report devote less space in their narra-
tive sections to explanations for performance outcomes, and less space to internal
explanations. This is contrary to expectations, since H10a and H10b(ii) suggested a
positive association. It is possible that, as ﬁrms increase the overall disclosure and
provide more information in their narrative sections prior to issuing shares (see Gibbins
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et al. 1990; Lang and Lundholm 1993; Lang and Lundholm 2000), the proportion of
wordcount for performance explanations decreases as a result of the increase in total
wordcount of the narrative sections.
9.3.3 Economic consequences of attribution statement pro-
vision
The investigation of the cost of equity capital eﬀect of attribution statement provision
addressed research questions 4 and 5. Regarding the cost of equity estimates of the
sample ﬁrms, the analysis shows that the mean cost of equity capital is 9.76%,
with the majority of sample ﬁrms having a cost of equity capital between 5% and
below 15% (85.9% of sample ﬁrms in total). Two main regression models were
run. One model included an interaction term between attribution disclosure and
analyst following (Model 2), and the other model was run without the interaction
term (Model 1). The aggregate wordcount measure (WCN) and its internal and
external components (WCN_INT and WCN_EXT ) were analysed separately. Also,
the models were run separately with either ﬁrm size (MVE ) or analyst following (AF )
due to the high correlation of these variables. Table 9.3.2 presents a summary of the
regression results.
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Table 9.3.2: Summary of multiple regression results for the eﬀect of attribution
statement disclosure on the cost of equity capital against hypotheses
CoC
Sign Pred. Sign Obs & Signif. Sign Obs & Signif.
WCN WCN_INT/WCN/EXT
Model Size AF Size AF
Beta + +* +* + +
Size - -*** -***
Gear + + + + +
B/M + +* +*** +* +**
AFa - +*** +**
WCN - + -/+
WCN_INT - +/-
WCN_EXT - -/+
WCN*AF +/- +*
WCN_INT*AF no prediction +*
WCN_EXT*AF no prediction -
*** Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); ** Correlation
signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); * Correlation signiﬁcant at the
0.10 level (2-tailed)
Sign Pred. = Sign of the association predicted; Sign Obs. & Signif.
= Sign of the association observed & Signiﬁcance level
a
A negative association between analyst following and the cost of capital is expected. In the
empirical analysis, analyst following is entered in the regression models as a dummy variable taking
the value of 1 (0) if analyst following is lower than or equal to the median number of analysts
following the sample ﬁrms. The positive association found empirically shows a positive association
between low analyst following and the cost of capital, which is consistent with the theoretical
prediction of a negative association between analyst following and the cost of capital.
Beta = Firm beta, measuring a ﬁrm's systematic risk; measures the sensitivity of a stock's return to
variation in the return of the overall market. Size = Firm size, measured as market value of equity at
ﬁnancial year end in ¿m. Gear = Gearing ratio, measured as long-term debt to long-term debt plus
equity at ﬁnancial year end. B/M = Book-to-market ratio, measured as the ratio of book value of
equity to the market value of equity. AF = Analyst following, measured as the number of analysts
following a ﬁrm. WCN = Wordcount of attributions per narrative disclosures, measured as the
percentage of words used for attributions to the total number of words in the narrative sections of
the annual report. WCN_INT = Wordcount of internal attributions per narrative disclosures,
measured as the percentage of words used for internal attributions to the total number of words in
the narrative sections of the annual report. WCN_EXT = Wordcount of external attributions per
narrative disclosures, measured as the percentage of words used for external attributions to the total
number of words in the narrative sections of the annual report. WCN*AF = Interaction term
expressing an interaction between WCN and AF . WCN_INT*AF = Interaction term expressing an
interaction between WCN_INT and AF . WCN_EXT*AF = Interaction term expressing an
interaction between WCN_EXT and AF .
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9.3.3.1 WCN
In terms of the control variables, all variables show the expected sign of the association
and all, except one, are signiﬁcant as expected. There is a positive association
between the cost of equity capital and a ﬁrm's beta, book-to-market-ratio and low
analyst following, while there is a negative association between the cost of equity
capital and ﬁrm size. Only gearing is insigniﬁcant. This suggests that ﬁrms with
higher beta, book-to-market-ratio and low analyst following have a higher cost of
equity capital. The results also suggest that the cost of equity capital is lower for
larger ﬁrms, and is unrelated to a ﬁrm's gearing.
Regarding the disclosure measures, the results show that for the overall sample,
while controlling for a number of other factors that the literature found to inﬂu-
ence the cost of equity capital, providing more extensive attribution statements for
corporate performance outcomes does not aﬀect the cost of equity capital. Hence
based on the overall sample, hypothesis H1a of a negative association between at-
tribution statements and the cost of capital is not supported. H1b (i) and H1b(ii),
which proposed that internal and external attributions have their own separate eﬀect
on the cost of equity capital , are also not supported. This suggests that, given
management's incentives for self-serving disclosures, investors might perceive these
performance explanations as lacking credibility and veriﬁability. Hence investors might
see attributions as `cheap talk' and disregard attribution statements in their assess-
ment of performance and ﬁrm value, which might explain the lack of a signiﬁcant
association with the cost of equity capital. Alternatively, it is possible that investors
knew the information before so that it was already incorporated in price when the
attribution statements were provided in the annual report, which is published with a
delay after the announcement of the results.
The thesis, however, also provided evidence that attribution statements can be
value relevant, as the analysis demonstrated that the association between attribution
statements and the cost of equity capital is inﬂuenced by the level of analyst following.
For ﬁrms with high analyst following, attribution statements are not associated with
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the cost of equity capital. By contrast, for ﬁrms with low analyst following, those ﬁrms
that provide more extensive performance explanations have a signiﬁcantly higher cost
of equity capital. Thus hypothesis H2, which proposed that the association between
attribution statement disclosure and the cost of equity capital is stronger for ﬁrms
with lower analyst following, is supported. This suggests that ﬁrms with low analyst
following that explain their performance outcomes in more detail face a higher cost of
equity capital. As for ﬁrms with lower analyst following there is less analyst-provided
information about the ﬁrm's performance available which investors can use in their
investment decision making, it can be argued that ﬁrms' own disclosures become
an important source of information for investors. It is possible that in the presence
of less analyst-provided information about a ﬁrm's performance outcomes, investors
might turn to the information they would normally perceive as `cheap talk' in order to
ﬁnd clues about the reasons for performance. Hence, the signiﬁcant association with
the cost of capital for these ﬁrms. This ﬁnding also suggests that potentially biased
attribution statements are not necessarily disregarded by investors, but lead them to
make negative inferences about ﬁrm value and require a higher rate of return. It is
also possible that investors, from analysing the explanations and drawing inferences
for the ﬁrm's prospects, come to the conclusion that the ﬁrm's future performance
will be worse than current performance. This could also lead them to requiring a
higher rate of return.
9.3.3.2 WCN_INT/WCN_EXT
The results for the control variables are similar to those in the aggregateWCN models,
but are generally less signiﬁcant. Consistent with the aggregate attribution (WCN)
measure, the cost of equity capital has a negative association with ﬁrm size and a
positive association with the book-to-market ratio and low analyst following. Gearing
is insigniﬁcant. Beta, however, is also insigniﬁcant. This suggests that the cost of
capital is lower for larger ﬁrms, higher for ﬁrms with a higher book-to-market ratio
and low analyst following, and unrelated to a ﬁrm's beta and gearing.
With regard to the relationship between the internal and external attribution
9.4. IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY 266
measure (WCN_INT and WCN_EXT ) and the cost of equity capital, the results
are similar to the results for the aggregate wordcount measure. For the overall
sample of ﬁrms, the extensiveness of internal or external attribution statements does
not inﬂuence the cost of equity capital. Thus Hypotheses H1b(i) and H1b(ii) that
proposed that both types have their own separate impact on the cost of equity capital
is not supported if the overall cross-section of ﬁrms is considered. This further
suggests that attribution statements might normally be considered `cheap talk' and
disregarded by investors.
But the analysis also provides evidence that for ﬁrms with low analyst following,
there is a signiﬁcant negative association between internal attributions (WCN_INT )
and the cost of equity capital, while external attributions (WCN_EXT ) are unrelated
to the cost of equity capital. This provides support for hypothesis H2 and also H1b(ii)
and suggests that for ﬁrms with low analyst following, those ﬁrms that provide more
detailed internal attribution statements have a higher cost of capital. This suggests
that for ﬁrms with low analyst following, disclosing internal reasons behind perfor-
mance oﬀers value relevant information to investors. That more internal explanations
are associated with a higher cost of capital might be due to this information revealing
internal factors that investors consider to have a negative eﬀect on future ﬁrm per-
formance, hence they require a higher rate of return. In addition, given the potential
self-serving bias in performance attributions, it is also possible that investors do not
perceive the explanations as credible. This may cause investors to develop a negative
impression of the ﬁrm, and lead them to require a higher rate of return.
9.4 Implications of the study
The results of the thesis have a number of implications for accounting standard
setters, regulators and policy makers. These implications are discussed here.
First, the ﬁndings regarding the determinants of attribution provision can provide
feedback to policy makers about the eﬀectiveness of corporate governance mech-
anisms and for improving disclosure. The thesis shows that ﬁrms with a higher
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proportion of non-executive directors on the board provide more extensive attribution
statements. This is consistent with the suggestions by regulators and research and
provides support for current policies. The results also show that audit committee size
inﬂuences disclosure. Opposite to expectations, however, the thesis ﬁnds that more
extensive attribution statements are associated with smaller audit committees, as is
the provision of more space to internal attribution statements. These ﬁndings are in
contrast to the suggestions by research and committees of enquiry that a larger audit
committee would be more eﬀective, as is reﬂected in the UK Corporate Governance
Code (FRC 2010b) that recommends a minimum of 3 members. As other studies
also have not found clear evidence to conﬁrm the notion that better disclosure would
be associated with larger audit committees (see chapter 3), this suggests the need
for a closer examination of potential reasons in light of current policies. In addi-
tion, the study ﬁnds that audit committee expertise is not associated with attribution
statement disclosure. In light of the emphasis that the Corporate Governance Code
places on ﬁnancial expertise on the audit committee as an important factor to the
committee's eﬀectiveness, as reﬂected in the current policy of recommending to have
at least one member with ﬁnancial expertise (FRC 2010b), this also suggests the need
for a closer look at current policies and why empirical support is weak. Moreover, the
ﬁnding that a number of sample ﬁrms did not fully comply with the recommendation
of having at least one member with relevant qualiﬁcations or experience on the audit
committee also suggests the need for a closer investigation into the reasons.
A second implication of the results comes from the analysis of the value rele-
vance of attribution statements, which can provide feedback to policy-makers and
standard setters on the usefulness of explanations for performance outcomes. This is
particularly important against the background of the costs a) to ﬁrms of providing in-
formation, and b) to the regulators to monitor compliance with the rules. The results
show that the standards setters' view that explanations for corporate performance
outcomes have information content that investors use for investment decisions, and
therefore the recommendation to provide this information, is not unconditionally sup-
ported. While the results show that ﬁrm-provided attribution statements are useful
9.4. IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY 268
for ﬁrms with low analyst following, they do not seem to be useful to investors for
ﬁrms with higher analyst following. This ﬁnding suggests that attributions can help
reduce information asymmetry for those ﬁrms where information asymmetry is higher,
thus for ﬁrms for which less external and independent information is available. This
provides support for the standard setters' view that performance explanations pro-
vided by management can help reduce information asymmetry, and supports current
policies of recommending that ﬁrms explain their performance outcomes in their an-
nual report. That attribution statements are not value relevant for ﬁrms with higher
analyst following, thus with more external and independent information available,
however, does not support the standards setters' view and current policy. Moreover,
the ﬁnding that attribution statements to internal reasons (for ﬁrms with low analyst
following) are value relevant provides policy makers with an indication of what type
of information investors might see as important for their decision making processes.
This ﬁnding may enrich discussions about future disclosure regulations or changes to
existing policies.
As a third implication, in view of the research ﬁndings that narrative information
may be subject to impression management and have a self-serving bias (e.g. Bettman
and Weitz 1983; Huﬀ and Schwenk 1990; Clapham and Schwenk 1991; Wagner III
and Gooding 1997), the thesis can give standard setters an indication of whether more
regulation of narratives should be considered and action taken. The ﬁndings presented
in this thesis show that ﬁrms have a strong tendency to elaborate more on internal
causes for performance than on external reasons. That is, management would prefer
to emphasise that success is due to their own actions and skills and not so much due
to external inﬂuences (in case of good performance); they would also prefer to take
responsibility for bad outcomes instead of blaming external factors. This can also be
considered in the light of the ﬁnding that a higher level of executive director share
ownership is associated with more extensive internal attributions which suggest that
ﬁrms in which directors own more of the outstanding shares attribute outcomes more
to their own strengths and capabilities than to external factors. Although no evidence
was found that making a proﬁt/loss is linked to self-acclaiming or externally-blaming
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attributions, the preference for internal attributions still should be explored further
against the backdrop that attribution statements may inﬂuence investor decision
making.
The ﬁndings can inform discussions by standard setters and regulators about the
adequacy of current regulations, and may inform future discussions regarding poten-
tial changes in regulation of performance explanations. The danger that narrative
disclosures are used for impression management purposes, together with the ﬁnding
that performance explanations are used by investors for valuing a ﬁrm, suggests that
policy makers should take a closer look at ﬁrms' attribution behaviour and, if deemed
necessary, take action to limit management's potential for managing investors' im-
pressions of the ﬁrm. Such an investigation can also be seen in the context of the
possibility that the usefulness of attribution statements might be limited because
investors, aware of management's impression management tendencies, perceive attri-
bution statements as not always credible and therefore disregard them.
9.5 Contribution of the study
The thesis makes six contributions in two areas. The ﬁrst area is on the determinants
of attribution statement provision. Here the thesis makes two contributions.
1. The thesis provides evidence on the determinants of attribution statements in
the annual reports of UK listed ﬁrms by using a measure that has not been pre-
viously applied in the literature to measure attribution statements. Attributions
are measured as the percentage of words used for performance explanations to
the total number of words in the ﬁrm's narrative review sections to capture
the volume and the emphasis ﬁrms place on explaining performance. Previous
research has used the presence/absence of an attribution or the total number
of explanations provided by a ﬁrm to develop an attribution measure. In or-
der to understand attribution behaviour, more detailed measures provide better
insights than categorical measures.
2. The thesis provides evidence on the factors that inﬂuence the extent and the
9.5. CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 270
type of performance explanations provided by ﬁrms by using a comprehensive list
of ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics, and of ﬁrms' corporate governance mechanisms
in particular. The scarce previous research has analysed only a limited range
of possible determinants from either category and has not provided evidence
based on using a comprehensive list of factors combined in one study. This
thesis has provided evidence that a number of corporate governance factors
(audit committee size, proportion of non-executive directors on the board of
directors, executive director ownership) and ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics (market
value, gearing, proﬁtability, share issue in the following year) inﬂuence the
extensiveness of attribution statement provision as well as the space given to
internal and external attribution statements.
The second area to which the thesis contributes is on the eﬀect of performance
explanations on the ﬁrm's cost of equity capital. The contribution is fourfold.
1. The thesis provides evidence of an association between a ﬁrm's performance
explanations and its cost of equity capital based on a quantitative approach to
directly estimate the cost of capital eﬀects. It contributes by using an implied
cost of equity capital measure (the PEG model by Easton 2004) unlike previous
research that either analysed stock price reactions to attribution announcement
(Baginski et al. 2000; Baginski et al. 2004; Baginski et al. 2008; Kimbrough and
Wang 2009) or used earnings valuation multiples as a proxy in an experiment
(Barton and Mercer 2005). Hence this method allows a precise quantiﬁcation
of the longer term eﬀect as opposed to a short term market reaction or the
use of earnings valuation multiples. Using this measure, the thesis shows that
attribution statements are value relevant for ﬁrms with low analyst following,
while for ﬁrms with high analyst following attribution statements do not aﬀect
the cost of equity capital.
2. The thesis contributes to the growing body of research on how diﬀerent dis-
closure types aﬀect the cost of equity capital. It also provides evidence that
the association between attribution statements and the cost of equity capi-
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tal is inﬂuenced by an interaction between attribution statements and analyst
following.
3. The thesis provides the ﬁrst evidence of the relationship between attribution
statements and the cost of equity capital in a UK setting. While previous
research on the value relevance of attribution statements was done on US data
(e.g. Baginski et al. 2000; Baginski et al. 2004), the literature in the UK has
only examined factors that inﬂuence attribution behaviour (e.g. Clatworthy and
Jones 2003; Aerts and Tarca 2010).
4. The thesis responds to calls for more research on the relation of disclosure and
the cost of capital by both academic studies (e.g. Healy and Palepu 2001;
Botosan 2006) and professional bodies (ICAEW 2004) to better understand
the relation of information asymmetry, disclosure, and the cost of capital. The
thesis contributes by providing more evidence that the relationship between dis-
closure and the cost of equity capital is complex and is inﬂuenced by interactions
between disclosure and information intermediaries.
9.6 Limitations of the study
The thesis is subject to a number of limitations that need to be kept in mind when
interpreting the results. However, it should be noted that these limitations do not
reduce the value of the results.
First, sample size is a limiting factor. The method of content analysis that is
used to extract attribution statements from the annual reports is costly in terms of
labour and of time. Sample size therefore had to be restricted in order to keep the
project in a manageable scope. Despite this limit, however, the sample size used
can be considered suﬃcient to yield reliable results that can be generalised to a
wider population of ﬁrms. Moreover, as the number of observations per independent
variable required to obtain robust regression results is well above the minimum number
recommended in the literature, sample size does not impair the results.
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Second, attribution statements can be ambiguous and diﬃcult to classify as they
can ﬁt into more than one category. As Baginski et al. (2004) have pointed out,
any resulting misclassiﬁcation can cause bias in the measure and may aﬀect the
signiﬁcance of the subsequent analysis. This risk has been minimised by setting clear
guidelines for the classiﬁcation process and by employing a second coder to test for
consistency in the coding.
Third, the thesis focused on causal attribution statements in the annual report.
Hence the ﬁndings regarding the determinants of attribution disclosures as well as
their eﬀect on the cost of equity capital give an indication only for this disclosure
medium. However, as the methodology chapter has laid out, the annual report can be
considered the most appropriate representative of ﬁrms' attribution disclosures and
was therefore used as source of attributions to address the aims of the thesis.
Fourth, the Adjusted R2 in the regression models shows that there still is varia-
tion in the dependent variable that cannot be explained by the variables analysed. In
the attribution determinants model, Adjusted R2 ranges from 8.4% to 12.9%, leav-
ing 91.6% to 87.1% of cross-sectional variation in attribution statement provision
unexplained. Similarly, in the model exploring the eﬀects of attribution statement
provision on the cost of equity capital, Adjusted R2 ranges from 9.4% to 13.9%,
indicating that 90.6% to 86.1% of the cross-sectional variation in the cost of eq-
uity capital cannot be explained by the disclosure measures nor the control variables.
These values indicate that there are still other factors that inﬂuence (1) the provision
of attribution statements and (2) the cost of equity capital.
Fifth, both a ﬁrm's disclosure level and the cost of equity capital are diﬃcult to
measure. The literature has highlighted that the proxies used for both measures can
be noisy (see, e.g. Healy and Palepu 2001; Core 2001). The measure of attribu-
tion statement provision is based on a self-constructed checklist. On one hand, this
increases validity, but on the other hand makes replication more diﬃcult as its de-
velopment involves subjective judgement. The measure of the cost of equity capital
is an estimate of a variable that cannot be directly observed. Hence both disclosure
and cost of equity capital measures contain by deﬁnition an element of imprecision.
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These measurement issues might reduce the power of the tests (see Healy and Palepu
2001). However, both measures were tested for their reliability and validity and the
tests showed that both are reliable and valid measures of the underlying concept.
This helps to minimise measurement issues.
Sixth, the analysis was carried out for the cross-section of ﬁrms for one year.
That is, the investigation cannot take account of the time dimension in the relation-
ship between attribution statements of consecutive years. For the determinants of
attribution provision, this means it cannot analyse a potential interaction between at-
tribution statements made in diﬀerent ﬁnancial years, whether attribution statement
provision in one year might potentially be inﬂuenced by what attributions had been
given in the previous year. For the eﬀect of attribution statements on the cost of
equity capital, this means that the analysis does not capture whether previous years'
attribution statements might inﬂuence investors' perception and the value relevance
of attributions given in the current year.
Seventh, potential endogeneity issues between attribution statement disclosure
and the cost of equity capital can be considered another limitation. Healy and Palepu
(2001) point out that there is potentially a number of omitted correlated variables
in the relationship between disclosure and capital market variables, so that disclosure
itself might have a weaker eﬀect on other capital market variables such as the cost of
capital than is assumed, and than research ﬁndings might suggest. In order to assess
whether endogeneity problems between attribution disclosure and the cost of equity
capital might have inﬂuenced the results in this thesis, a test was carried out to detect
the potential presence of endogeneity. No evidence for an endogenous relation was
found, which helps to reduce concerns about the eﬀect of endogeneity on the results.
9.7 Suggestions for further research
There are a number of avenues for further research to build on the ﬁndings of this
thesis.
1. Future research could use other information sources for the analysis of attribu-
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tion statements such as corporate websites, analyst presentations, earnings an-
nouncements. This could give insight into whether a ﬁrm's attribution provision
is consistent across diﬀerent disclosure media, or whether there are diﬀerences
regarding type and extensiveness of attribution statements. This can provide a
better understanding of a ﬁrm's attribution disclosure strategy.
2. A longitudinal study over several years could be undertaken in order to explore
changes in attribution behaviour over time. This might reveal how attribution
statements in a given year are inﬂuenced by the statements given in previous
years, whether, and if so, how ﬁrms take prior attributions into consideration
when explaining current performance. Moreover, this might shed more light
on the question of how attribution provision reacts to changes in corporate
performance. A potentially fruitful way of carrying out such an investigation
could be using panel data, focusing on a limited number of ﬁrms but tracking
their development over time.
3. This thesis has provided evidence for a number of factors that inﬂuence attri-
bution statement provision. Further research could be conducted that explores
additional factors, such as top management turnover, or corporate diversiﬁca-
tion.
4. With regard to the cost of equity capital eﬀect of attribution statements, future
research might use diﬀerent corporate documents for analysis. For instance,
earnings announcements could be used to explore the eﬀect on the cost of
equity capital that stems from the publication of performance explanations
that accompany the announcement of the results. Future research could also
compare the cost of capital eﬀect of attribution statements provided in diﬀerent
corporate documents in order to shed light on potential diﬀerences in the value
relevance of attribution statements provided via diﬀerent disclosure avenues.
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A.1 Alphabetical list of sample ﬁrms
1 4Imprint Group 26 Cadbury
2 AEA Technology 27 Carclo
3 Aggreko 28 Care UK
4 Air Partner 29 Carphone Warehouse Group
5 Alexon Group 30 Centaur Media
6 Alphameric 31 Centrica
7 Alterian 32 Chapelthorpe
8 Amstrad 33 Charter International
9 Anite 34 Chemring Group
10 Arena Leisure 35 Compass Group
11 Arriva 36 Computacenter
12 Ashley (Laura) Holdings 37 Cookson Group
13 Associated British Foods 38 Corin Group
14 AstraZeneca 39 Cropper (James)
15 Avis Europe 40 Davis Service Group
16 Avon Rubber 41 Delta
17 BBA Aviation 42 Devro
18 Beale 43 Dignity
19 BG Group 44 Dyson Group
20 Bovis Homes Group 45 Erinaceous
21 British Airways 46 Expro International
22 British Energy Group 47 Fidessa Group
23 British Polythene Industries 48 Filtrona
24 British Sky Broadcasting 49 First Group
25 BT Group 50 Flying Brands Units
51 Fuller Smith 79 Management Consultants Group
52 Future 80 Marshalls
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53 Galliford Try 81 McAlpine (Alfred)
54 Games Workshop 82 Meggitt
55 Greggs 83 Menzies (John)
56 Halfords Group 84 Microgen
57 Hampson Industries 85 Misys
58 Harvey Nash Group 86 Mitchells & Butlers
59 Hays 87 Morrison (WM) Supermarkets
60 Headlam Group 88 Morse
61 Hikma Pharmaceuticals 89 Moss Brothers Group
62 HR Owen 90 North Midland Construction
63 Intercontinental Hotels Group 91 Northern Foods
64 IMI 92 OPD Group
65 Imperial Tobacco Group 93 Oxford Instruments
66 Inchcape 94 Pace
67 Invensys 95 Parity Group
68 ITE Group 96 Pearson
69 JJB Sports 97 Pendragon
70 Johnson Services Group 98 Persimmon
71 KCom Group 99 Petrofac
72 Kelda Group 100 Porvair
73 Ladbrokes 101 Randgold Resources
74 Latchways 102 Rank Group
75 Lavendon Group 103 Raymarine
76 Lincat Group 104 Reckitt Benckiser Group
77 Low & Bonar 105 Reed Elsevier
78 MacFarlane Group 106 Renishaw
107 Rentokil Initial 135 Victoria
108 Robert Walters 136 VP
109 ROK 137 VT Group
110 Rotork 138 WH Smith
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111 RPC Group 139 Wolseley
112 Scottish Power 140 Wood Group (John)
113 SDL 141 WSP Group
114 Senior 142 XP Power (DI)
115 Severn Trent 143 Yell Group
116 Shire 144 Yule Catto
117 Spectris 145 Zetex
118 Speedy Hire 146 Zotefoams
119 Spirax-Sarco
120 St.Ives
121 Surfcontrol
122 Tarsus Group
123 Tate & Lyle
124 Taylor Nelson Sofres
125 Telecom Plus
126 Tesco
127 Thorntons
128 Trinity Mirror
129 Tullow Oil
130 Umeco
131 Unilever (UK)
132 United Business Media
133 UTV Media
134 Venture Production
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A.2 Examples of attribution statements to the
ﬁve performance outcomes
Sales
Plendil sales for the full year were down 23% worldwide as a result of generic competition in
the US market, where sales declined by 49% to $84 million. (Astra Zeneca 2006, p. 19)
Revenue decreased by 1.3% to $113.7 million, compared to $115.2 million in 2005. The
change was primarily due to continued price erosion, which was only partially oﬀset by
volume increases, and a limited contribution from new product launches. (Hikma
Pharmaceuticals 2006, p. 13)
Costs
Direct and indirect costs have been reduced by 11.5% (¿11.1 million) as a result of changes
in the UK store portfolio, volume changes and other UK overhead savings. (Laura Ashley
2006, p. 5)
Operating expenses before exceptional items have increased substantially during the year
from ¿15m to ¿19.5m. The principal elements of this are higher commission payments to
our distributors and an increase in our bad debt charge (in line with the growth in turnover),
and an increase in the average number of staﬀ we employ to 211 during the year under
review (which has enabled us to improve customer service, as well as signiﬁcantly enhancing
the strength of the management team). (TelecomPlus 2006, p. 10)
Proﬁt/Proﬁtability
Proﬁts per unit in the existing business were down year on year mainly due to the weakness
in the new car market. (Pendragon 2006, p. 6)
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Proﬁt from operations decreased ¿86 million (9%) to ¿909 million compared to 2005. This
was driven by: an increase in restructuring costs of ¿62 million; an increase of ¿32 million in
amortisation and impairment of intangible assets, due to the amortisation charge from
deﬁnite life CSBG customer relationships and contracts and the impairment of ¿15 million
goodwill relating to the Group's investment in Cadbury Nigeria; a decrease of ¿25 million in
the IAS 39 adjustment; and a ¿30 million charge arising from the UK product recall.
(CadburySchweppes 2006, p. 76)
Cash Flow
The cash ﬂow in the year was aﬀected by the recorded losses and signiﬁcant changes in
working capital. There was a signiﬁcant increase in ﬁnished goods and component
inventories due to delay in product approval preventing shipments before the year-end. The
inventory increase, from ¿10.1m to ¿34.8m, most of which took place at the end of the
year, also aﬀected the trade payables position, which increased from ¿22.3m to ¿38.7m.
The trading losses have also been a signiﬁcant factor in the year's cash outﬂow. (Pace
Microtechnology 2006, p. 15)
The year ended March 2006 produced a free cash ﬂow excluding legacy payments of ¿100
million (2005: ¿39 million). After payments totalling ¿175 million (2005: ¿181 million) in
respect of legacy liabilities, total free cash outﬂow was ¿75 million (2005: outﬂow of ¿142
million). The improvement in free cash ﬂow excluding legacy payments was inﬂuenced by
higher operating proﬁt, improved working capital management, reduced net capital
expenditure and lower restructuring costs. (Invensys 2006, p. 9)
Debt
Net debt was ¿356.9 million, signiﬁcantly lower than at the end of 2005 (¿527.1 million).
The lower debt resulted from the transfer of ¿173.1 million of debt to Fiberweb prior to its
demerger and the balance to the impact of exchange rates on the translation of our Dollar
debt which reduced net debt by ¿77.1 million. This was oﬀset by a net cash outﬂow of
¿76.1 million in the period. BBA Aviation (2006, p. 15)
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The increased capital expenditure, increased pension funding and investment in working
capital during the year result in increased Group borrowings at year-end of ¿6.9 million
(2005: ¿3.7 million). Beale (2006, p. 9)
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A.3 Figures
Figure A.3.1: Histograms and QQ-Plots for normality tests of ﬁrm characteristics (I)
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Figure A.3.2: Histograms and QQ-Plots for normality tests of ﬁrm characteristics (II)
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Figure A.3.3: Histograms and QQ-Plots for normality tests of corporate governance
variables (I)
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Figure A.3.4: Histograms and QQ-Plots for normality tests of corporate governance
variables (II)
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Figure A.3.5: Histograms and QQ-Plots for normality tests of the WCN attribution
disclosure measures
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Figure A.3.6: Plots of the regression residuals WCN
Model using Market value 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model using Analyst following 
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Figure A.3.7: Plots of the regression residuals WCN_INT
Model using Market value 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model using Analyst following 
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Figure A.3.8: Plots of the regression residuals WCN_EXT
Model using Market value 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model using Analyst following 
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Figure A.3.9: Histograms and QQ-Plots for normality tests of ﬁrm characteristics
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A.4 Tables
Table A.4.1: Durbin-Watson and Cook's distance statistics for the WCN attribution
disclosure measures
WCN WCN_INT WCN_EXT
MVE AF MVE AF MVE AF
Durbin-
Watson
2.028 2.036 1.762 1.759 2.134 2.167
Cook's
distance
Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Max 0.056 0.052 0.074 0.073 0.079 0.052
Mean 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009
StdDV 0.011 0.011 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.013
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Table A.4.3: Durbin-Watson and Cook's distance statistics CoC model
WCN WCN_INT/EXT
MVE AF MVE AF
Model 1
Durbin-Watson 1.947 1.947 1.833 1.747
Cook's distance
Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Max 0.083 0.074 0.115 0.103
Mean 0.008 0.008 0.011 0.011
StdDV 0.014 0.014 0.020 0.019
Model 2
Durbin-Watson 1.967 1.789
Cook's distance
Min 0.000 0.000
Max 0.084 0.202
Mean 0.008 0.012
StdDV 0.015 0.026
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